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"Who can be wise, amaz'd, temp'rate, andfurious,
Loyal, and neutral, in a moment?" 1
INTRODUCTION

Since 1935, section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act or
NLRA)2 has protected employees who seek to safeguard, or to better their
working conditions by prohibiting employers from disciplining3 employees
who engage in collective activity for mutual aid or protection such as strikes,
boycotts, and the publicity accompanying these efforts. Recent years, however, have brought a change in both the battlefield on which workplace disputes are resolved and the allies sought in that contest. The battle has
moved from the physical to the verbal terrain as the strike has been increasingly replaced by the "corporate campaign." 4 A lessened stigma attached to
crossing a picket line, combined with the ready availability of unemployed
workers willing to replace strikers, has removed the strike from employees'
arsenal of viable economic weapons. In place of the traditional battle front
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 2, sc. 3, lines 108-109
(THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE (G. Blakemore Evans ed., (1974)). Macbeth's answer to
his own question is, no one. Id. at line 109.
2 In 1935 Congress enacted the Wagner Act, the original piece of current, private
sector federal labor legislation. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat.
449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)) [hereinafter NLRA].
The Act was substantially amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988))
and by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified in various sections of 29 U.S.C.).
I The term "working conditions" as used herein includes wages, hours, and other
aspects of the workplace relationship. "Discipline" refers to any sanctions undertaken
against an employee, such as discharge, suspension, or retaliation by undesirable work
assignments.
I In the typical corporate campaign, the union engages in a "multidimensional" effort
to reach all phases of a corporation's economic vulnerability. The union employs numerous approaches to generate adverse publicity about the employer and its conduct towards
its employees, community, or consumers. The tactics may include consumer boycotts,
political lobbying, pressuring shareholders, and targeting financial institutions doing business with the employer. Lawyers Predict CorporateCampaigns Will Remain Popular as
Strike Alternative, DAILY LAn. REP. (BNA) No. 45, at A-7 (Mar. 7, 1990) (reporting
that "corporate campaigns are being viewed as an alternate economic weapon"). Corporate campaigns may attack a company's public image, its noncompliance with governmental laws and regulations, or its individual officers who are believed to be egregious
labor law offenders. The campaign consists largely of rhetoric and it lacks the physical
picket line. Though the traditional strike included leaflets or words on picket signs, the
mere presence of the picket was as important, or even more important, than the written
message. The picket line alone was a nonverbal weapon, which persuaded pro-union
employees, suppliers, and customers to stay away from the plant. Its symbolism was
powerful and well-understood.
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is today's corporate campaign, in which employees and their unions relentlessly advance by verbal warfare on the target employer and its agents for
the purpose of enlisting the public as allies in their cause. 5 Specifically, in a
corporate campaign, employees seek consumers, rather than their fellow
employees, as their primary allies.'
These changes in the battle's venue and its participants affect the tactical
options available to the contestants and raise new legal issues.7 These new
I Recent examples include: a union's international president passing out leaflets at a
Neiman Marcus department store, urging consumers not to purchase Godiva Chocolates,
because Godiva was a large corporate consumer of Diamond Walnuts, which was the
primary object of a labor dispute, see Bill Wallace, Teamster Boss Says Reform on Track,Ron Carey in S.F for Clinton Campaign, Walnut Boycott, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 21, 1992, at
A2; and an Allied Industrial Workers local's president writing to top executives of First
of America Bank Corporation urging it to use its influence to end the "union busting
tactics" of a Board member who also is President of A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., the
object of a labor dispute, see AIW Sends Warning to First of America Bank over Staleyl
Tate & Lyle Dispute, Bus. WIRE, Sept. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File.
A recent, highly publicized example of the corporate campaign involved a union's allegations that Food Lion, the object of an organizing drive, violated the overtime wage
laws, and the union's cooperation with ABC's "PrimeTime Live" to produce an unflattering story about Food Lion which aired on November 5, 1992. See 'PrimeTime Live' Producer Confirms Show Is Designed to 'Entertain,'PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 20, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File; Union 'Misrepresentations'Noted in Food Lion Letter to Congress, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires
File. The Company denied the show's allegations, which included claims that it sold
outdated produce, treated products to alter their smell and appearance, and ground outdated beef with fresh beef for sale. See The Food Lion Side of the Story in Response to
PrimeTime Live's Segment November 5, 1992, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 6, 1992, availablein
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
6 "The beauty of the electronic picket line is that it allows us to involve both our
employees and customers who believe that good American jobs are worth fighting for."
CWA Unleashes Intensive Campaign Against AT&T," Employment Security Concerns
Hanging Up Talks, PR NEWSWIRE, June 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File (quoting CWA Union president's announcement of a plan to encourage union
members and labor allies to switch to other long-distance telephone carriers from AT&T,
the object of a dispute). Additional allies sought may include stockholders, board members, financiers, regulators, and government agencies.
I For example, employees have been active in corporate proxy battles, such as recent
efforts regarding Lockheed Corporation, and some employee groups are active in proxy
reform at the national level, such as the California Public Employees' Retirement System
(CalPERS). See Kellye Y. Testy, The CapitalMarkets in Transition:A Response to New
SEC Rule 144A, 66 IND. L.J. 233, 268 n. 190 (1990) and sources cited therein. It is not
difficult to imagine, for example, a scenario in which employees fight to replace directors
with a slate they perceive to be more sensitive to employee interests on such issues as
plant relocation and "exportation" of jobs. Are such activities "disloyal," given that they
are directly adverse to management's interests? The scenario raises interesting questions
concerning the interplay between the corporate agents' possible violation of their own
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issues, when combined with unclear labor law doctrine interpreting
employer and employee rights and obligations under the Act, call for a reexamination of that doctrine. I predict that the continuing development of the
corporate campaign will exacerbate the problems in one already confusing
area of labor law: the "disloyalty" exception to section 7 protection.
That an employee may lose protection because of "disloyalty" is not a new
proposition; it originated in a landmark 1953 Supreme Court decision
known as Jefferson Standard.' The disloyalty exception has never been
clearly defined, uniformly understood, or consistently applied. The National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) and courts have struggled
laboriously but unsuccessfully to make sense of it. Even before today's corporate campaign tactics emerged in the labor/management relationship, it
was notoriously hard to predict when certain collective activity might later
be adjudged as "disloyal." For labor law practitioners, the disloyalty exception has become a minefield that has indiscriminately claimed both employers and employees as casualties. Employers have responded to conduct that
they felt was the epitome of disloyalty, only to find themselves confronting
the daniaging publicity of an unfair labor practice trial, liability for reinstatement and back pay, and a further antagonized workforce. Employees have
attempted in good faith to exercise their statutorily protected right to engage
in collective activity, only to find themselves unemployed because their
actions were later adjudged disloyal. Since Jefferson Standard, the parameters of the narrow disloyalty exception have expanded to unrecognizable
proportions from its original application in the product disparagement context. As the exception was applied to more types of activity, the minefield
has claimed increasing numbers of employee casualties who wrongly estimated its boundaries. 9
The indistinct boundaries of the disloyalty exception present employers
and employees with a Hobson's choice between the drawbacks of too much
caution or the risks of too little. The overly conservative choice-for the
employer not to discharge the employee or for the employee not to engage in
the collective activity-has the drawback of leaving both needlessly disarmed in the struggle: the employer with an undesired employee in the
workforce and the employee too afraid to exercise her statutory rights. The
overly risky choice-for employers to discharge the employees or for
employees to engage in the activity-may result in litigation and liability on
the one hand and unemployment on the other. Even if a party guesses corfiduciary obligations if they fire these employees (assuming the agents are not insulated by
the business judgment rule) and NLRA § 7 protection.
8 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
9 In the last decade, the Board and the courts have narrowed the exception a bit,
reversing the 30-year trend of expansion that followed Jefferson Standard. This reversal
has left some unexpecting employers as victims in its wake. See infra notes 132-37 and
accompanying text. Interestingly, the ensuing half century since Jefferson Standard has
not occasioned clarification of the doctrine by the Supreme Court.
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rectly about the parameters of disloyalty, the result is often a costly, protracted legal battle fostered by the confusion surrounding the exception.
The phenomenon of decades of almost consistent expansion of the disloyalty exception is now about to collide with the recently expanded phenomenon of the corporate campaign. In contrast to the time when labor's
message was transmitted implicitly through the fairly standardized, physical
picket line, today's corporate campaign message is verbal in form and creatively tailored de novo in each situation to criticize the particular employer
and its agents and to involve a particular audience. 0 To be successful it
must have two key features: rhetoric and negative content. That is, it must
articulate its message with sufficient urgency, appeal, and emotion so that an
uninvolved public already numb from ubiquitous advertising stops and takes
notice,1 ' and it must publicize clearly the employer's negative attributes so
that the public is persuaded to act. These emotional appeals to public audiences, with negative content on sensitive topics, embellished with rhetoric
and flourish, would seem to be the essence of "disloyalty" from the
employer's vantage point and therefore to invite the application or, more
accurately, misapplication, of the disloyalty test.
A third development makes the inevitable collision course of the disloyalty test and the corporate campaign more imminent: a 1988 Supreme Court
decision decidedly expanding the lawfulness of the secondary boycott in
light of the First Amendment. 12 Because the boycott and appeals to consumers, shareholders, and others in the public are hallmarks of the corporate
campaign, this case makes a careful examination of the disloyalty exception
even more urgent.
'0

See, e.g., Drive Begins to DiscourageLaw Studentsfrom Applying to 'Union Busting'

Firms, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 174, at A-9 (Sept. 7, 1990) (describing a campaign
initiated by Harvard law students and joined by the AFL-CIO to discourage students
nationally from seeking jobs with law firms designated as "union busters"). I am not

implying that labor's traditional tactics lacked creativity, or that boycotts are new, but
simply that the message in the typical strike was largely communicated implicitly by the

picket line. In contrast, today's corporate campaign attempts to involve far-ranging audiences (shareholders, investors, college students, etc.) with written appeals for nationwide
boycotts, stockholder actions, and the like.
11 See generally Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an
Age of Paratroopers,68 TEX. L. REV. 1087 (1990) (discussing how commercial television
has anesthetized public discourse).

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
(DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (holding that peaceful handbilling urging consumer
12

boycott of neutral employer, absent picketing, does not constitute coercion under NLRA
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1988), secondary boycott prohibitions). A

secondary boycott involves economic pressure against a "neutral employer," one that is
not directly involved in a labor dispute. An example would be picketing (or handbilling)
with requests not to patronize a company that does business with the "primary"
employer that is the target of the dispute. Section 8(b)(4) prohibits some, but not all,
secondary activity.
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This Article critically assesses the disloyalty test, offering badly needed
guidance in this murky and risky area of labor law. Part I provides an overview of the relevant portions of the Act and the problems facing the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) and the courts as
these decision makers interpret section 7 law. It reviews the early section 7
exceptions, the creation of the disloyalty test, and the aftermath of this new
exception, and it introduces a number of problems left as Jefferson Standard's legacy. Part II discusses the analytical inconsistency applied in disloyalty doctrine analysis and proposes a coherent framework for analyzing
section 7 cases.
Moving from problems of analysis to problems of application, Part III
shows that no uniform definition of disloyalty has emerged, and that Board
members and judges have confused the term with other section 7 exceptions.' 3 The disloyalty test has proven unworkable because the cases do not,
in fact, turn on disloyalty, and because not all disloyal employees lose protection. Part III examines the unpredictable differences among the individual decision makers 4 that shape the way they apply the facts to the
disloyalty test: their individual adoption of an "adversary" or a "harmony"
labor relations philosophical paradigm, their disagreement over whether disloyalty is an objective or subjective term, their differing emotions and personal ethics, and their reluctance to accord deference to the NLRB. An
examination of the different factors often considered by these decision makers shows that consistency in the application of the test is impossible.
Part IV discusses the important philosophical and policy problems generated by a disloyalty exception. Fundamentally, all exercise of section 7
rights is "disloyal." The disloyalty test lacks a solid foundation in labor law
or common law, and it is at odds with the structure and policies of the Act.
Its abandonment will have no adverse practical or legal ramifications. This
Article concludes that the exception should be abandoned as unworkable,
unnecessary, unjustified, and inconsistent with the Act.' 5
The exceptions include product disparagement, insubordination, interruption of
production, illegality, and disclosure of confidences.
13

14 "Decision makers" refers here to all those who issue written decisions or opinions
evaluating unfair labor practice allegations. The first level decision maker in an unfair

labor practice proceeding is the Administrative Law Judge (A.L.J., formerly Trial Examiner). See 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.15, 102.34-.35 (1992). Once the Administrative Law Judge

has issued a decision and a recommended disposition, the Members of the NLRB may or
may not adopt the recommendation. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)-(c) (1988); 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.48 (1992). The Board's decision is directly appealable to the federal circuit courts
of appeals, and then to the Supreme Court, though judicial review is limited. See 29
U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1988); infra part III.C.4.
'1

The disloyalty test has not been thoroughly explored before this writing, but others

have come to similar conclusions, at least tentatively, when examining other aspects of
the Act. See Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public
Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 921, 988-94 (1992); Julius G. Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressureby
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I. EVOLUTION OF THE DISLOYALTY TEST: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Early Section 7 Exceptions
Congress established the foundations of contemporary American labor
policy in the 1935 National Labor Relations Act,' 6 conferring in section 7
statutory protection for the right of employees to organize, join unions, bargain collectively, and "engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
... mutual aid or protection."' 17 An employer commits an unfair labor practice if she disciplines an employee for exercising his section 7 rights.'8
Although section 7 contains no exceptions on its face, the Board and courts
have used legislative history, national labor policy, and common sense to
craft a group of exceptions, under which some concerted activity for mutual
aid or protection is deemed not to be "protected."' 9 The NLRB, as the
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1238-39 (1967).
But see Getman, supra, at 1240 n. 177. Professor Estlund's recent article focuses on the
comparison of the speech rights of employees in the public and private sectors. Significantly, we reach several of the same conclusions concerning disloyalty, while beginning
our scholarly journeys from entirely different points of origin, and while traversing different terrain.
16 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).

Much of the Act was grounded in the policies and

practices of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988).
1" 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
18 NLRA, § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988). An employer generally violates
§ 8(a)(1) by discharging employees who voted for or against a union, concertedly
requested a raise, decided to strike, or distributed in the parking lot leaflets concerning
working conditions. When an employer discriminates in hiring or conditions of employment to discourage membership in labor organizations, the employer also violates
§ 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

93 n.25 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1989). For a general discussion of § 8(a)(3), see id. at 182256 (2d ed. 1983), 90-124 (Supp. 1989). For our purposes, the remedies are the same, and
unless relevant, no distinction will be made herein between conduct violative of § 8(a)(1)
and conduct that also involves the animus that violates § 8(a)(3).
19 Few would argue, for example, that an employer cannot discharge employees who
bomb their work site as part of a plan to "persuade" the employer to grant a requested
wage increase. Though such employees may be acting "concertedly" for perceived
"mutual aid or protection," one cannot reasonably construe the Act to forbid their discharge. In creating exceptions, the Board and courts have acknowledged legitimate
employer interests and have construed the law to preserve these interests when possible.
See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (upholding an
employer's right to discharge employees who forcibly seize and occupy an employer's
factory building); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937) (recognizing an employer's right to select its employees or discharge them, when it exercises
that right for reasons other than labor intimidation or coercion); NLRB v. Knuth Bros.,
537 F.2d 950, 956 (7th Cir. 1976) (upholding an employer's right to discharge employees
who reveal information that the employer regards as confidential and that could jeopardize the employer's business relationships); NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prods. Co., 500 F.2d
6, 9 (8th Cir. 1974) (preserving an employer's right freely to express opinions about
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agency charged with interpreting the Act, bears the responsibility for determining the nature and scope of the activities not protected by section 7.
An interpretive obligation also falls on the federal courts of appeals, who
deferentially review Board orders. 2
Before Jefferson Standard, the Board had enunciated a less than concrete
"totality of the circumstances" test for loss of section 7 protection even
though activities may have been concerted and for mutual aid or protection:
"The question ...is ...whether this particular activity was so indefensible,
under the circumstances, as to warrant [discipline or discharge] ....",22 In
1942, Judge Learned Hand, writing for the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, narrowed the activity excepted from section 7
through a "lawfulness" inquiry that later became frequently quoted as the
test for loss of protection:
[S]o long as the "activity" is not unlawful, we can see no justification
for making it the occasion for a discharge; a union may subsidize propaganda, distribute broadsides, support political movements, and in any
other way further its cause or that of others whom it wishes to win to its
side. Such activities may be highly prejudicial to its employer; his customers may refuse to deal with him, he may incur the enmity of many
in the community whose disfavor will bear hard upon him; but the statute forbids him by a discharge to rid himself of those who lay such
burdens upon him.23
issues, including labor matters). Other sections of the Act accommodate employer interests. See NLRA, § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988) (protecting an employer's right to
express views, provided they contain no threats of force, reprisal or promises of benefit);
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(b) (prohibiting certain secondary boycotts against neutral
employers); id. § 158(b)(7)(c) (prohibiting picketing for recognition beyond 30 days without having filed a petition for election). Because § 7, unlike these sections, does not make
allowances for employer interests, the Board and courts should exercise restraint in crafting exceptions to it. A number of other labor and employment statutes similarly require
that managerial "rights" yield to countervailing public interests. See, e.g., Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (Supp. III 1991).
20 E.g., Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 215 (9th Cir. 1989). See generally NLRA, § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1988) (discussing generally the power of the Board).
21 See infra part III.C.4. The obligation to anticipate accurate statutory interpretations also falls on counsel of employers, employees, and unions.
2 Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676, 686 (1938) (finding a partial strike to protest
employer's labor policies protected). The use of "indefensibility" as a test of loss of protection has a checkered history and has been criticized. See Getman, supra note 15, at
1233-38; infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 177-81.
Judge Hand's oft-quoted decision, infra note 23 and accompanying text, clearly rejected
such a broad test, and the Supreme Court's treatment of the term "indefensible" in Jefferson Standard certainly fell short of an endorsement. See infra note 63; infra text accompanying notes 39, 46.
23 NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir.
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With a few limited exceptions for conduct such as insubordination and interruption of production, then, employees did not lose section 7 protection if
the activity was carried out (1) for lawful ends, and (2) by lawful means,
such as peacefully and non-violently.'
B.

Creatingthe Disloyalty Test

The landmark Jefferson Standard decision in 1953 introduced into section
7 discourse the new concept that employees criticizing their employer's
product in a labor dispute could be disloyal.2 5 Jefferson Standard engaged in
radio and television broadcasting in Charlotte, North Carolina. When it and
its technicians' union reached an impasse in contract negotiations, the
employees picketed and distributed the handbill that became an issue in the
case.26 The handbill alleged that Jefferson Standard had outmoded equip1942) (emphasis added); see also NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240,
258 (1939) (stating that although the Act redresses violations of employee rights, it does
not "license ... [employees] to commit tortious acts or to protect them from the appropriate consequences of unlawful conduct").
24 See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 43 (1942) (holding strikes constituting mutiny unprotected); Fansteel MetallurgicalCorp., 306 U.S. at 253-58 (holding that
§ 7 protection for concerted activity does not extend to violent, disruptive, and illegal
strikes); Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614, 1621-22 (1950) (stating that the NLRA protects
employees if they employ peaceful means and if their objectives are not improper for
reasons of clear public policy), enforcement denied on other grounds, 191 F.2d 380 (6th
Cir. 1951). Concerning insubordination and interruption of production, see International
Union, UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. (Briggs & Stratton),
336 U.S. 245, 255-63 (1949) (holding that states may forbid recurrent or intermittent
unannounced stoppages of work by employees when unaccompanied by specific
demands), overruled on other grounds, Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 152 (1976); NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of
Am., 128 F.2d 67, 77 (3d Cir. 1942) (holding that an employer may discharge employees
who stop work repeatedly during the working day when the employer promises to confer
with the employees later in the day and there is no reason to mistrust the promise); C.G.
Conn., Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390, 396-98 (7th Cir. 1939) (holding that employees who
walk off the job each day before their scheduled overtime do not merit strike protection
under the NLRA because employees do not have the right to work solely upon terms of
their own); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 336-39 (1950) (upholding an employer's
right to discharge employees who engage in a collective slowdown and thus work solely
upon terms of their own).
25 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 472
(1953).
26 Ironically, the parties were deadlocked over the Company's demand that the prior
contract's "just cause" for discharge requirement and its arbitration procedures be
deleted, allowing discharge for any (or no) reason, and the Union's insistence that the
clauses remain. Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1530 (1951)
(Trial Examiner's report), rev'd sub nom. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW v. NLRB (Jefferson Standard), 202 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1952), set aside, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). The picketing, not at issue in the case, was classically protected activity, with placards and handbills
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ment and that its television programming was outdated and devoid of local
programs.2 1 It questioned whether the company considered Charlotte a second-class city. After 5,000 copies were distributed during nine days, Jefferson Standard discharged ten employees who sponsored or distributed the
handbill.2"

When the discharged employees challenged Jefferson Standard's actions,
the Trial Examiner ruled that distribution of the leaflets was protected activity, such that the employees could not lawfully be discharged.' The Examiner reasoned that Jefferson Standard made no attempt to counter the
propaganda nor to request a retraction.' Further, the handbill was, in some
measure, true.3 Those who wrote it and authorized its distribution honestly
believed it to be completely truthful3' and had no "intent to falsify or maliciously injure"33 the Company. The Examiner noted that the Act protects
"honestly believed statements of fact or opinion, which, in some cases, may
actually be unfounded in fact."' He relied on precedent holding that as
identifying the Union, indicating that there was a labor dispute, and appealing for support. Id. at 1531 (Trial Examiner's report).
2

The handbill stated:

Is Charlotte a Second-Class City?
You might think so from the kind of Television programs being presented by the
Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co. over WBTV. Have you seen one of their television programs lately? Did you know that all the programs presented over WBTV
are on film and may be from one day to five years old. There are no local programs
presented by WBTV. You cannot receive the local baseball games, football games or
other local events because WBTV does not have the proper equipment to make these
pickups. Cities like New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington receive such programs nightly. Why doesn't the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company
purchase the needed equipment to bring you the same type of programs enjoyed by
other leading American cities? Could it be that they consider Charlotte a secondclass community and only entitled to the pictures now being presented to them?
WBT TECHNICIANS
Id. at 1532.
28 Id. at 1533.
29 Id. at 1537.

Id. at 1533-34 (Trial Examiner's report).
The partially or wholly inaccurate statements or inferences were as follows: that if
the Company purchased certain equipment, it could bring certain programs to Charlotte
as other major cities received, when the necessary telephone equipment was not actually
available in Charlotte; that there were no local programs produced by WBTV, when
actually two to two and one half hours of daily programming was local; that all programs were on film, when one was not; and that the films were "one day to five years"
old, when some were only minutes or hours old. Id. at 1535-36 n.7 (Trial Examiner's
report).
32 Id. at 1520-21 (Murdock, Member, dissenting).
33 Id. at 1536 (Trial Examiner's report); see also id. n.8 (Trial Examiner's report) (distinguishing threat from legal malice).
34 Id. at 1537 (Trial Examiner's report) (quoting Atlantic Towing Co., 75 N.L.R.B.
1169, 1172 (1948)). Further, the Trial Examiner relied on NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works,
30
31
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long as conduct is not unlawful, it does not lose protection simply because it
may be "highly prejudicial," ' and he concluded that the policy of protecting
free, robust employee speech outweighed the employer's interest in truthfulness of the handbill."
Upon review, the Board disagreed. The Board conceded that section 7
normally protects picketing and other activity publicly denouncing an
employer's practices, even if coupled with a boycott asking the public to
exert pressure to that end. 37 The Board said, however, that such activity can
lose protection if carried out for unlawful objectives' or by "indefensible"
means. 9 Here, the objectives of enlisting public support in a labor dispute to
obtain bargaining concessions were lawful, but the employees failed to disclose that purpose.4" Although the leaflets contained no willful misrepresentations, 41 they made no reference to the dispute or even to a union.' 2 The
employees "deliberately undertook to alienate their employer's customers by
impugning the technical quality of his product" 4 3 and succeeded in causing
loss of business." The employees appeared to be appealing to the consuming
153 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1946), enforcing 61 N.L.R.B. 1129 (1945), to distinguish between
"inaccuracies" because of momentary "animal exuberance" and flagrant, violent, and
serious misconduct in which an employee is unfit to continue working. Jefferson Standard, 94 N.L.R.B. at 1537 (Trial Examiner's report).
11 Jefferson Standard, 94 N.L.R.B. at 1536 (Trial Examiner's report) (quoting NLRB
v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1942)); see also
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
36 Jefferson Standard, 94 N.L.R.B. at 1537 (Trial Examiner's report).
37 Id. at 1510 n.7, 1512.
38 See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
39 Jefferson Standard, 94 N.L.R.B. at 1509-10 (noting "sit-down strikes, sabotage, [or]
'violence, or similar conduct'" (quoting Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614, 1621 (1950))).
Given that the objectives were lawful, the Board in Jefferson Standard focused on the
issue of "means." See supra notes 22-23; infra notes 63, 177-78.
40 The employees "did not indicate that they sought to secure any benefit for themselves, as employees, by casting discredit upon their employer." Jefferson Standard, 94
N.L.R.B. at 1511.
41 Id. In any event, the Board stated in dictum that truthfulness is not dispositive. It
rejected a test that "the truth of employee speech, irrespective of the context or the
motives of the speaker, is the test of its protected character." Id. at 1512 n.14. The
Board declined to rule on whether the speech constituted defamation. Id. at 1512 n. 18.
42 Id. at 1510-12. The activity did not relate to labor policies of the employer or concern wages, hours, or working conditions, and the employees' conduct was a concerted
separate attack made in the interest of the public, not the employees. Id.
43 Id. at 1511. The Board also was undoubtedly influenced by the union's admitted
intent to distribute even more extreme leaflets. The union had informed management
that there were additional "stronger" handbills to be distributed. See id. at 1533 (Trial
Examiner's report).
44 The issue of whether the Company was actually harmed was the source of some
confusion. The Trial Examiner found that the handbills caused "considerable discussion" among business persons and "some alarm among Respondent's [Jefferson Stan-
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public's interests by attacking the employer's products as of inferior quality,
but they did not reveal that they were actually seeking to further their own
interests in a labor dispute.4" As such, the leaflets were "hardly less 'indefensible' than acts of physical sabotage."4
Dissenting Member Murdock argued that activity loses section 7 protection only if the objectives or means are unlawful.47 According to Member
Murdock, the statements in the leaflet were substantially accurate and those
who distributed it believed it to be true." Whether the concerted activity
resulted in economic harm to the employer would be an inappropriate test of
protection, 49 and in any event the leaflet caused no "present financial loss" s°
or "substantial damage."'" He found the decision "startling" because it
dard's] management and television equipment distributors and dealers as to its possible
economic effects upon their business," but that there was "no evidence that any distributor or dealer communicated his concern to Respondent prior to the discharge of the
employees, although several of them did afterwards." Id. at 1533 (Trial Examiner's
report) (emphasis added). He found that the Company was already losing money when
the flyers appeared and that this continued, id., but he also said there was a drop in sales
of televisions the month after the leaflets' distribution. Id. at 1536 n. 10 (Trial Examiner's
report). The Board "corrected" the Trial Examiner's summation of the evidence in that
"[t]he record does contain evidence that dealers immediately communicated to the
Respondent their concern over the effect of the handbill." However, the Board stated
that this difference was "without significance to our finding." Id. at 1511 n.12. The
dissenting Member queried, "how relatively inconsequential was any actual damage to
the employer ... ? These employees did no more than to point out to the public what in
large measure it already knew .... [T]his handbill did not and could not result in any
present financial loss to the Respondent." Id. at 1524-25 (Murdock, Member,
dissenting).
45 Id. at 1511-12. The Board declined to rule on whether the handbills would have
been protected if they had appealed to the public for support of the union in the labor
dispute. Id. at 1512 n. 18. The Board stated that the leaflets "called for a boycott," which
is not literally true. Although some viewers might not purchase televisions because of the
leaflets, and that undoubtedly was a hoped-for result in their distribution, the flyers on
their face could just as easily be read as an appeal to consumers to demand the station to
purchase the "needed equipment" to improve the programming they were receiving.
Either result would put pressure on the employer to alter its bargaining position.
46 Id. at 1511 (footnote omitted); see also supra note 22.
41 Jefferson Standard, 94 N.L.R.B. at 1521-23 (Murdock, Member, dissenting).
48 Id. at 1520-21.
49 Id. at 1525 n.38 (Murdock, Member, dissenting) (citing Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss
Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942)); cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 599 (1988)
(noting that lawfulness of activity within the meaning of NLRA § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1988), does not turn on harm caused to employer).
o Jefferson Standard, 94 N.L.R.B. at 1525 (Murdock, Member, dissenting).
51 Id. at 1525 n.38.
As the majority opinion indicates, the Respondent only 'apprehended' the remote
contingency of an inability to increase its revenues by charging higher advertising
rates in the future based upon the presence of a larger number of TV sets in the area,
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sets aside principles which this Board with court sanction has heretofore recognized as the proper test of protected concerted activity; startling because it has shriveled the previously recognized area of statutory
protection for concerted activities and left employers, employees, and
the Board itself without any certain standards to mark the remaining
52
greatly circumscribed area.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit chastised the Board for not applying the Board's own test that
the courts had previously endorsed: protection is lost only with illegal purpose (ends) or illegal means.53 Remanding, the Court criticized the Board
for using an "indefensible" means standard and requested an explanation for
its departure from precedent. 54
The Supreme Court reversed, vacated the remand order, and addressed
the merits in a 6-3 decision.55 Much of the majority's reasoning was similar
to the Board's: product quality and business policies were impugned with a
"sharp, public, disparaging attack" made "in a manner reasonably calculated to harm the company's reputation and reduce its income;"' the relationship to a labor dispute was undisclosed; 57 and the public distribution was
widespread,5' resulting in concern in the community and "apprehen[sion]"
of loss of advertising income. 59
As an additional rationale for affirming the Board, and in what arguably
was dictum,' ° the Court stated that the employer justifiably labeled employif the handbill should discourage people who did not then own TV sets from buying
them.
Id.
52 Id. at 1520.
1a Local Union No. 1229, IBEW v. NLRB (Jefferson Standard), 202 F.2d 186, 188-89
& n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1952), set aside, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
- Id. at 188-89. The court ruled that § 7 protected all means except "unlawful" ones.
Id. at 187 n.4 (citing NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939) (action breaching labor agreement), and Scullin Steel Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1946) (mid-contract strike
for wage increase), enforced as modified, 161 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1947)); see also supra
note 23.
11 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
56 Id. at 471.
57 Id. at 472 (quoting Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1511
(1951)). The Court pointed out that disclosure might have decreased public support for
the employees' cause. Id. at 477.
58 Id. at 468, 469 n.4.
59 Id. at 471 (quoting Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1511
(1951)); see also supra note 51.
1 A careful reading of the case reflects that despite the lofty language concerning
"elemental" disloyalty, it was primarily the other bases for loss of protection-the arguments it adopted from the Board concerning the disparagement of the product-on
which the outcome was grounded. The actual holding concerned product disparagement,
and on this subject the Court affirmed the Board. The court added the disloyalty rheto-
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ees "disloyal" who attacked the product (television programming) while
drawing wages. 6 ' Disloyalty, the Court said, constitutes cause for discharge. 2 Even if the "attack" did come partly or fully within the ambit of
section 7 activities, the "means" used here provided grounds for loss of
protection.6
By contrast, dissenting Justices Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas believed
that the court of appeals had justifiably requested that the Board explain its
departure from precedent." Writing for the dissent, Justice Frankfurter
ric, on its own initiative, as additional support for the Board's holding that the product
disparagement was unprotected.
61 346 U.S. at 476. The Court stated that the employer should not be required to
"finance" attacks on "the very interests which the attackers were being paid to conserve
and develop" when there was no appeal for public sympathy. Id. Of course, the employees were not actually drawing wages at the time, for they picketed during non-work
hours. The Court ruled that the criticism of the quality of the product was separable
from the protected aspects of the employee's collective activity. Id. at 477. The Court
also invoked one of the Act's remedy provisions to rule that distribution of the leaflets
constituted "cause" for discharge. NLRA, § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1988); see also discussion infra part II.B.2.
62

346 U.S. at 475.

Id. at 477. Regarding the "indefensible" term that the Board had used, the
Supreme Court noted in passing that the Board had described the conduct this way, but
the Court appeared to go out of its way to avoid using the term itself. Id.; see also supra
note 22. As authority for its use of the term in Jefferson Standard, the Board cited one
case that did not contain the term, Brown Radio Service & Laboratory, 70 N.L.R.B. 476,
478 (1946), and another in which employees who had engaged in a partial strike and had
damaged machinery were adjudged protected, Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676, 686
(1938). The "indefensible" language later was used by the Supreme Court in a different
context, in passing and in dictum, in International Union, UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board (Briggs & Stratton), 336 U.S. 245, 256 (1949), overruled on
other grounds, Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 152 (1976). Briggs & Stratton involved illegal work stoppages,
but the Board subsequently has misinterpreted the case as endorsing the "indefensible"
term generally. Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 337 (1950) (equating indefensible
activity with any conduct involving "unlawful objective[s]" or "improper means").
The Jefferson Standard Court also noted that the handbills were distributed "[w]ithout
warning." 346 U.S. at 467. Surely this reference to the element of surprise is not legally
significant. The discussion of surprise does relate to the Board's "sabotage" analogy, see
Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1511 (1951), rev'd sub nom.
Local Union No. 1229, IBEW v. NLRB (Jefferson Standard), 202 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir.
1952), set aside, 346 U.S. 464 (1953), but surprise should not be a relevant criterion in
evaluating loss of protection because many classically protected activities do not involve
advance notice to the employer and would lose their effectiveness if notice were given.
Jefferson Standard does not indicate that advance notice would have changed the result.
Surprise may, however, affect whether the employer has time to issue counterpropaganda
in rebuttal of any union allegations, to minimize its harm.
64 346 U.S. at 478-81 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The dissent was sensitive to the
limited judicial review of administrative decisions, which dictates that the Board is the
6
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explained that imprecise notions of loyalty not found in the Act did not
justify the Court's reaching the merits. In any event, the employees should
not be treated as "interloping outsiders,"' but rather as at least arguably
exercising legitimate section 7 rights under a statute that was "designed to
put labor on a fair footing with management."66 The dissent predicted that
the disloyalty exception left no guidance for future cases and that,
More than that, to float such imprecise notions as "discipline" and
"loyalty" in the context of labor controversies, as the basis of the right
to discharge, is to open the door wide to individual judgment by Board
members and judges. One may anticipate that the Court's opinion will
needlessly stimulate litigation.6 7
C.

The Aftermath

Though the Court specified a number of objectionable aspects of the technicians' conduct, it articulated the weight and relevance of none. Like the
Board,6" it declined to formulate a test for loss of protection, but it went
beyond the Board's analysis in its imposition of a disloyalty test. Jefferson
Standard is fraught with problems of analysis, of statutory construction, and
of general ambiguity. The legal significance of Jefferson Standard lies in the
Court's creation, sua sponte, of a disloyalty exception that (1) is not provided
for expressly in any section of the Act, (2) has no stated definition and no
clear limits, (3) is grounds for forfeiture of rights, expressly protected, to
engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection, and (4) subsequently has been misconstrued to have a meaning independent of product
disparagement and other traditional section 7 exceptions. 69 Moreover, since
Jefferson Standard, the disloyalty exception has become so expansive and
vague that it threatens to eviscerate section 7's protection for activity that
happens to include negative words about the employer or its product.70
appropriate body to make the initial assessment of whether these employees' conduct was
more egregious than that previously adjudged to be lawful.
65 Id. at 481 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 480.
67 Id. at 481. The dissent also disagreed that § 10(c) provided grounds for loss of
protection. Id. at 479-80.
68 The Board had concluded, "[flor these reasons, without attempting to formulate a
test which will decide every imaginable case involving similar questions as to the scope of
Section 7, we hold that the employees in this case went beyond the pale when they published the 'second-class' handbill." Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 94 N.L.R.B.
1507, 1512 (1951) (footnote omitted), rev'd sub nom. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW v.
NLRB (Jefferson Standard), 202 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1952), set aside, 346 U.S. 464
(1953).
69 See infra part III.A.2 (discussing the confusion of the disloyalty exception with
other recognized § 7 exceptions).
70 Disloyalty usually focuses on written or oral language, though often the speech is
intertwined with other facts concerning conduct.
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The dissent's fears ultimately have been realized, as Board members and
judges have been unable to agree on a consistent application of the disloyalty
and product disparagement exceptions. In recent months alone, two decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit specifically addressed and endorsed the disloyalty rubric, but failed
to articulate clearly what the term encompasses.71 Conversely, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to judge employee
conduct against "some type of transcendent loyalty" employees supposedly
owe their employers.72 In the most comprehensive attempt to date, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit valiantly struggled to
make sense of the exception. The Ninth Circuit noted that "shifting boundaries of protection" have evolved because of the lack of consensus about what
factors decision makers should look to in defining loyalty, and the "changing
norms" regarding whether loyalty should be required in the workplace at
all.73
What is at stake while the legal confusion abounds? The well-being of real
people, both labor and management, in serious conflict. An active union
officer in an isolated company town on an island in Alaska desperately
appeals to the community for help, and even manages to fly to Washington,
D.C. to testify before Congress. By protesting his employer's "dishonorable" anti-union labor policies, strikebreaking activity, and unwarranted
demands for repeated wage concessions, he risks being discharged and
branded as disloyal for "activities destructive to the Company," and faces a
legal battle over his job that promises to last ten years. 74 An employee some71

Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied,

113 S. Ct. 1252 (1993); George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir.
1992). In Willmar Electric Service, the court assumed, arguendo, that disloyalty constituted grounds for discharge, but there was no proof that the union organizer in question
was disloyal.
72 H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1989) (dictum; holding that

union-sponsored individual was not bona fide applicant for an "employee" position on
particular facts presented, but see Town & Country Elec., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 181,
1992-1993 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 17642 (Dec. 16, 1992)).
71 Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989); cf. NLRB v.
J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975) (noting that the Board, not the courts, is
generally responsible for adapting the Act to "changing patterns of industrial life").

"I See Alaska Pulp Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1260, 1261-62 & n.8 (1989) (holding conduct
protected), enforced, 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991), reported at 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS

22273 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 1991). I served as counsel to some charging parties in the case,
though not to Florian Sever, the individual mentioned here. On December 7, 1988 the
Administrative Law Judge originally decided that Alaska Pulp Corporation (APC)
wrongfully denied charging parties their recall rights after a 1986 strike, and ordered

APC to reinstate them with back pay. Id. Despite the NLRB's affirmance of the order
and the Ninth Circuit's enforcement order, charging parties have as of this writing not
been paid their back pay or been made whole. As to Mr. Sever's fate, he is a highly

skilled mechanic and he worked at Mountain Aviation Company in Sitka, Alaska after he
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where in the country reads about a court's ruling that employees may be
fired for disloyalty for showing up at rallies or parades or participating in
boycotts. 75 Consequently, he decides not to attend an organizing rally to
find out about unionization. A paint company owner is chagrined when a

group of passionate strikers publicly question the ability of newly hired,
inexperienced strike replacements to make quality paint.76 When he seeks
counsel, his lawyer informs him that if he discharges the strikers, he may
face years of costly litigation, uncertainty on the merits, attorneys fees, and
potential liability for reinstatement and back pay for the entire group.7
Regrettably, the half century of uncertainty caused by the disloyalty
exception has been unnecessary. Jefferson Standard should never have been
interpreted, despite its dicta and ambiguity, as a case creating a "disloyalty"
exception. It was merely a product disparagement case. It turned on the
fact that employees, while concealing their union status and the existence of
a labor dispute, publicly and relentlessly
criticized their employer's product,
78
a subject unrelated to that dispute.
was illegally replaced by APC. Id. at 1265, 1267-68 (A.L.J. decision). According to
Sever, APC retaliated for his union activity and his testimony in Congress by pressuring
Mountain Aviation to fire him and by persuading the City of Sitka to blacklist him from
employment. See Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1532-33 (9th Cir. 1992).
Mountain Aviation did fire Sever. Sitka subsequently denied him a job as a dog catcher,
which, according to Sever, the City filled by hiring an individual from the "Lower 48."
See id.; Various Conversations with Florian Sever (1986-1989). Sever's RICO claim arising from these incidents was dismissed because in relevant part, APC's conduct was
merely "a single episode having the singular purpose of impoverishing Sever ... [and]

there is no suggestion defendants would have continued to tamper with witnesses, or that
they ever intended anyone but Sever any harm." Sever, 978 F.2d at 1535. His civil rights
claim was dismissed because individuals who petition the government are not a suspect
class and any harassment was motivated by the company's financial goals, not concerns
about congressional testimony generally. Id. at 1536-37. His related state law claims are
pending.
75 See George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(holding conduct unprotected); infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (discussing
Hormel).

See Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627, 1627-29 (1956) (holding conduct
unprotected on both disloyalty and product disparagement grounds).
7 Normally, after an economic strike, as vacancies arise the employer is required to
reinstate former strikers to their pre-strike jobs or equivalent positions. However, after a
strike caused by unfair labor practices, the employer must reinstate the strikers to their
pre-strike jobs.
78 Thus, this Article does not depend on proving that Jefferson Standard's holding,
concerning product disparagement, was wrongly decided; the result may have been correct. Rather, it critically assesses disloyalty as an independent basis for denial of § 7
protection, takes issue with the Court's disloyalty discussion, and, most importantly, with
the misapplication of that discussion in subsequent decisions of the Board and courts.
This Article analyzes disloyalty in the context of union activity and other collective
activity that is expressly protected by § 7. It is important to distinguish that context from
78
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Laboriously, after forty years the Board and courts still grapple with the
disloyalty exception,79 having reached no consensus on the meaning of disloyalty, having failed to distinguish it from disparagement, having ruled
much conduct protected even though disloyal (at least, as that term is commonly used), and finally having split disloyalty into allowable and unallowable categories. These decision makers have disagreed over whether the term
is objective or subjective and have been forced to apply the exception in
essentially a standardless, ad hoc manner determined by emotions, personal
ethics, and individual constructs of labor law. They have collapsed disloyalty with other traditional exceptions to section 7 on the basis of which many
putative disloyalty cases could have, and should have, been resolved. They
have looked to varying and problematic factors to determine if an employee
is disloyal. Before addressing these problems of application, I propose an
analytical framework within which to tackle them.
II. PROBLEMS OF ANALYSIS: LACK OF A COHERENT APPROACH TO
THE DISLOYALTY EXCEPTION

A. A Proposed Analytical Framework
The first problem encountered by those seeking to make sense of the dis-

loyalty exception is not a substantive one concerning the merits of disloyalty,
but rather the absence of an analytical framework within which to evaluate

section 7 cases generally. The lack of a framework is especially conspicuous
and troublesome in cases concerning disloyalty and disparagement, and its
absence has led to confusing decisions with questionable results. Accordingly, I propose a three-part analytical framework, 0 which is implicitly, but
obviously, called for when section 7 is read in light of the policies of the Act
the general day-to-day conduct of employees in all other situations, which does not implicate § 7 and is not addressed in my Article. Furthermore, in analyzing disloyalty, I have
needed to discuss decisions using the term "product disparagement," when the cases use
disparagement and disloyalty interchangeably.
71 See, e.g., Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989).
80 The Board has implicitly supported such a distinct framework:
[N]ot every form of concerted activity which falls within the literal language of section 7 is given protection, so as to immunize those who participate in it against
discharge or other discipline. [Limited exceptions to the broad language of section 7
are recognized when] the means involved violence or similar conduct, or where the
objectives sought were inconsistent with the terms or the clearly enunciated policy of
this Act or other Federal statutes.
Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1510 n.6 (1951) (quoting Hoover
Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614, 1621 (1950), enforcement denied, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951)),
rev'd sub nom. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW v. NLRB (Jefferson Standard), 202 F.2d
186 (D.C. Cir. 1952), set aside, 346 U.S. 464 (1953); see also NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455
F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1972) (recognizing that even when employees arguably are
"engaged in protected activity, there is a point where their methods ... would take them
outside the protection of the Act" (footnote omitted)); Emarco, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 832,
837 (1987) (Dotson, Chairman, dissenting) (noting that Jefferson Standard is the bench-
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and the principles of statutory construction."1 The framework is straightforward and easy to apply. Although it may appear simplistic, it is apparently
not self-evident to all Board members and judges, as the decisions attest.
To be protected under section 7, conduct must pass three distinct tests.

First, it must be "concerted." 8'2 The Act's protections hinge on collective
action. The Act protects employees who combine to better their wages,
hours, or working conditions, not individuals who act alone and solely for

their own concerns.8 3
Second, the conduct must have the purpose of "self-organization... col-

lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." ' Thus, the second
step in any section 7 analysis is to evaluate the purposes for which the
employees are acting. 5 The "mutual aid or protection" clause has been
broadly construed to encompass not only activity of immediate assistance to
employees, such as protesting a pay cut, but also more remote goals such as
forming, joining, or assisting unions, helping a union that may reciprocate in
the future, or improving the lot of workers generally through legislative,
administrative, and judicial channels.8 6 The clause has been interpreted to
mark for determining if "employee activity which generally might be protected under
Section 7" has lost its protection) (§ 10(c) reinstatement case).
81 For a discussion of statutory construction, see infra note 89 and accompanying text.
82 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
83 Protection does not require, however, that a union or unionized employees be
involved. For a discussion of the collective model concerning feminist theory, see Marion
Crain, Images of Power in Labor Law: A Feminist Deconstruction, 33 B.C. L. REV. 481
(1992). "Concert" generally turns on whether the employee is acting with or on behalf of
others or is seeking to initiate group action. Meyers Indus. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B.
882, 885 (1986), aff'd sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom. Meyers Indus. v. NLRB, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988); see also NLRB v. City
Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822 (1984); Brownsville Garment Co., 298 N.L.R.B. 507 (1990),
enforced without opinion, 937 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). See generally MORRIS, supra note 18, at 73-78; Archibald Cox, The Right to Engage in ConcertedActivities,
26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951).
84 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
85 Because organizing and collective bargaining are subsets of "mutual aid or protection," the analysis focuses on the latter phrase. The mutual aid or protection inquiry is
distinct from the concertedness inquiry. Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 884-85. It includes
the activities specifically listed in § 7 and generally any collective activity that assists
employees in the workplace. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 570 (1978)
(holding that a leaflet distribution concerning politicians' positions on minimum wage
and "right to work" laws are protected). See generally Getman, supra note 15 (discussing
the use of economic pressure by employees under the "mutual aid or protection" clause).
I See, e.g., Eastex, Inc., 437 U.S. at 556; NLRB v. Circle Bindery, Inc., 536 F.2d 447,
452 (1st Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503,
506 (2d Cir. 1942). Some commentators have persuasively argued that the clause still is
too narrowly construed. See Estlund, supra note 15. While I agree with that criticism, a
full discussion of steps one and two is beyond the scope of this Article, which will proceed
from current interpretations of step two.
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protect such diverse purposes as policing the use of the union label, promoting the hiring of union members, resisting the undercutting of union standards, and assisting others in the long-term interest of garnering reciprocal
support if needed in the future." The first two steps in section 7 cases, then,
should be to assess whether the activity meets the two literal requirements of
the statute.
Third, assuming an employee's conduct passes steps one and two, the
decision maker must determine if the conduct is so inimical to legitimate
countervailing interests that section 7 "protection" should be considered
"lost" under one of the administratively and judicially created exceptions."
Under the proposed analytical framework, then, an employee may be disciplined if he fails to act in concert (step one) or with the requisite purpose
(step two), or if he falls within an exception (step three).
B.

The Board's and Courts' Analytical Errors

1. The Collapse of the Analytical Framework
In practice, the Board and courts have not rigorously observed the above
analytical distinctions in their section 7 analyses. They have often collapsed
what should be distinct inquiries into one.89 The Board and Courts occasionally skip step two (and sometimes both one and two) and proceed
87

Circle Bindery, 536 F.2d at 452 (policing union label); Peter Cailler Kohler, 130

F.2d at 505 (garnering future support).
11 See, e.g., Cordura Publications, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 230 (1986) (analyzing § 7 protection under this framework). In creating and applying the exceptions, the Board and
reviewing court should proceed cautiously, exercising restraint under well-established
principles of statutory construction. For example, statutory exceptions should be
narrowly construed.

HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 434-38 (2d ed. 1911); EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CON-

610 (1940). When a statute contains no exceptions on its face,
exceptions should not be lightly inferred and cannot be inferred in a manner inconsistent
with the meaning of the statute itself. CRAWFORD, supra, at 612.
89 The confusion between these steps is not a new phenomenon. For example in
Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949), the court collapsed all
three steps. An employee was angry at a foreman who had warned him about unacceptable workplace conduct. The employee was fired for enlisting other employees in signing
a petition calling for the foreman's discharge and for speaking rudely to the foreman.
Concluding that the discharge did not violate the Act, the court ruled that the petition
was not "concerted" (step one), id. at 752; at least not within the meaning of the Act
(step two, perhaps?), id.; that the petition, in light of the circumstances, was not "[t]he
sort of activity that the statute protects" (step two or three, perhaps?), id. at 751, 753;
and that it lacked the § 7 "purpose" of mutual aid or protection (step two), id. at 753.
The court used these concepts interchangeably, rather than clarifying the source of each
inquiry.
Although the Board has gone to great lengths to distinguish step one from step two
and to clarify confusion surrounding them, see, e.g., Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 884, both
Board members and judges have done a poor job of distinguishing the analytical steps.
STRUCTION OF STATUTES
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directly to analyze whether the employee lost protection under an exception,
such as disloyalty. This approach may result in a failure to determine if the
activity is concerted or has a section 7 purpose.
In Jefferson Standard, the Supreme Court set a poor example in its section
7 analysis. It mistakenly treated the distribution of the "second-class city"
handbills as neither concerted nor for a section 7 purpose.' The handbill's
distribution obviously was concerted activity under step one. Just as obvious
was that the employees had a classic section 7 purpose: they sought in bargaining to retain certain contract clauses (step two). The real issue was
whether the activity fell under an exception (step three), and the Court
should have approached the analysis accordingly. In fact, almost as an
aside, toward the end of the decision the Court did state an alternative analysis for its holding:
Even if the attack were to be treated ... as a concerted [step one] activity wholly or partly within the scope of those mentioned in § 7 [step
two], the means used by the technicians in conducting the attack have
deprived the attackers of the protection [step three] of that section, when
read in the light and context of the purpose of the Act. 9 '
This is the proper analytical framework. Unfortunately, this single sentence
has proved too faint a beacon to be detected by subsequent decision makers
seeking guidance in the disloyalty analysis.
A recent Fourth Circuit case illustrates the confusion surrounding the
analysis. An employee had posted a sarcastic letter in response to an
announcement by the employer that it was giving employees a free ice
cream.92 The court ruled that the criticism lacked a section 7 purpose
because the ice cream was a one-time gift by management, not a condition of
employment. 93 Although this part of its analytical framework was appropriI The Court also stated erroneously that the Board had not viewed the activities as
concerted or for a § 7 purpose. Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 477. On the contrary, the
Board assumed the conduct to be concerted, Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 94
N.L.R.B. 1507, 1509 (1951), rev'd sub nom. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW v. NLRB
(Jefferson Standard), 202 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1952), set aside, 346 U.S. 464 (1953), and
implicitly acknowledged that it was for a collective bargaining objective, see id. at 1511.
The Board properly handled the analysis as one of step three forfeiture because of the
means used. Id. at 1509-10, 1510 n.6. The Supreme Court's misstatement may have
originated with a misunderstanding of dissenting Board Member Murdock's statement
that "the holding of the majority that the distribution of the 'second-class city' handbill is
not concerted or union activity protected by the Act is one of the most important decisions
dealing with that subject which the Board has ever issued." Id. at 1520 (Murdock, Member, dissenting) (emphasis added). Perhaps the Supreme Court majority did not realize
that the italicized words mean that the distribution was not concerted activity that was
protected, not that the distribution was not concerted.
91 346 U.S. at 477-78 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
92 New River Indus. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290 (4th Cir. 1991).
93 One might have expected that the presence or absence of ice cream at work would
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ate, the court supported it with facts that are relevant only to disloyalty,
illegality, or one of the other step three exceptions, not to the issue of mutual
aid or protection." Moreover, the court cited two disloyalty cases as authority for its no-section-7-purpose conclusion. 9s In both of those cases the
employees had section 7 purposes, and the decisions turned on whether the
employees lost protection under disloyalty and disparagement at step three.
There are at least four reasons why it is important to complete the concertedness (step one) and purpose (step two) inquiries before starting the
disparagement/disloyalty inquiry. First, by adhering to the proper analysis,
subsequent decision makers will shorten the inquiry in those cases in which
employees' conduct lacks the required concert or purpose. When the statutory requirements of concert or purpose are not met, conduct is not even
arguably within section 7 protection, and the inquiry into the lawfulness of
the discipline need go no farther." Second, decision makers who dispose of
cases at the first two steps have the additional benefit of avoiding the more
nebulous, non-statutory issues of disloyalty and disparagementY' Third, the
be a matter pertaining to working conditions. According to the Court, however, the
letter was not intended to enlist support of other employees, and it was not related to
calling attention to or resolving what the Court believed to be working conditions. Id. at
1294-95. This conclusion overlooks the fact that § 7 encompasses attempts to call
employees' attention to conditions of employment and to create solidarity regarding those
matters. Several employees did collectively generate the idea of pointing out the
employer's lack of generosity to the employees, which they felt was demonstrated by the
insignificance of the ice cream reward compared to the size of the new contract it celebrated. Id. at 1292. The letter did discuss morale, working conditions, and management's lack of appreciation for employees. Id.
"The court emphasized that the company's suppliers were in the plant, where they
were likely to see the letter, and that the employees had apparently broken into a locked
bulletin board to post it.
Additional instances of collapsed analysis occur in some cases phrasing the Jefferson
holding as a rule that collective activity is protected unless it is a personal attack unrelated to a labor dispute. See infra notes 323-25.
95 New River Indus., 945 F.2d at 1295 (relying on NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229,
IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953), and comparing Community Hosp. of
Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1976)). The court's disposition of
the case at step two means that it did not reach the issue of step three.
96 The absence of coverage at steps one or two could be compared to a "jurisdictional"
defect, the absence of which renders further analysis moot.
97 See infra part III.C.5. I do not suggest that the first two steps are always easy to
resolve, nor that there are not "borderline" issues involving concert and purpose. The
application of few legal standards to facts is entirely self-evident, and a given set of facts
may fall within the "grey areas" of steps one or two. See, e.g., Cordura Publications,
Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 230, 234 (1986). In Cordura Publications, three Board members
treated a critical letter written by employees as pertaining to terms and conditions of
employment (professionalism, wages, education, training, and employee treatment), while
one viewed it as an effort to change "managerial policies and organizational structure."
Such cases notwithstanding, on a comparative basis steps one and two generally involve a
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recommended framework accords with well-tested principles of statutory
construction.98 Finally, on a practical level, when the Board and courts fail
to follow a coherent analytical approach, their decisions create precedent
that is perplexing to subsequent Board members or judges attempting to
apply cases such as Jefferson Standard. Lack of clear distinctions among the
three analytical steps causes confusion in the substantive law concerning
each of the three issues."
2.

Improper Interjection of Section 10(c) into the Analysis

A different analytical problem stems from the misapplication of section
10(c) of the Act. As part of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, 1°° a clause
was added to section 10(c) prohibiting the reinstatement of or back pay for
any employee who was "suspended or disciplined for cause."10 1 Board members and reviewing judges sometimes yield to the temptation to begin the
section 7 analysis not with section 7 itself, but by determining if the
employee was discharged for "cause" under section 10(c). 2 The temptation
more straightforward application of facts to law than the vague parameters of disloyalty,
and possibly of product disparagement.
98 Sound statutory analysis requires examining a rule before its exceptions. Section 7
mandates the presence of concertedness and purpose in all cases, while disloyalty and
disparagement constitute exceptions in some. See supra note 88.
1 Much of the substantive confusion in the case law appears to result from the failure
to understand that the three analytical steps are distinct inquiries, often because the
Board and courts begin with step three and fail to assess steps one and two. See, e.g.,
Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1956). Theoretically, the outcome of a case
would not be affected by the order of the three-step inquiry. Putting step three first,
however, may well be causing some of the substantive confusion between the "not related
to a labor dispute" step three disparagement issue in Jefferson Standard, see supra text
accompanying note 57, and the purpose requirement of step two, see infra notes 324-25
and accompanying text.
1o Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988)).
101 The Taft-Hartley Act added the italicized language to § 10(c):
If upon the preponderanceof the testimony taken the Board shall not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an
order dismissing the said complaint. No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged,or
the payment to him of any back pay, ifsuch individualwas suspended or discharged
for cause.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 10(c), 61 Stat. 136,
147 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988)).
102 See, e.g., George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(beginning its analysis, after mentioning §§ 7 and 8(a)(l) in passing, by citing § 10(c) for
the proposition that "[n]othing in the Act prevents an employer from disciplining or
discharging an employee for disloyalty," and citing § (10)(c), as if that section conferred
substantive "rights" on employers); see also Sahara Datsun, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 1044,
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stems from the fact that if the behavior was outrageous or obviously unacceptable, the conclusion seems self-evident: "an employer just ought to be
able to discipline for this!"' 1 3 Though in extreme cases, this initial instinct to

shortcut the analysis by labeling such conduct "cause" and skirting the section 7 issue is understandable, this approach is inconsistent with the structure of the Act and creates confusion in section 7 case analyses, especially in
the disloyalty and disparagement cases. This method of analysis incorrectly
eliminates any investigation into the section 7 protection that the employee
conduct, considered as providing "cause" for discharge, might deserve.
When viewed in context, neither the Taft-Hartley Act generally nor its
amendments to section 10(c) provides grounds to begin section 7 analysis
with the issue of "cause." The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act
does reflect Congress' perception that Board decisions had been overly generous in extending section 7 protection. First, Congress believed that the
Board had read section 7 incorrectly as licensing employees to engage in
certain collective activity.' ° Accordingly, Congress enacted several amendments (not the "cause" amendment) that now expressly outlaw certain con10 5
certed activities, such as prohibitions against union coercion of employees,
certain secondary boycotts, 1 6 and attempts to force employers to assign
work in union jurisdictional disputes. 10 7
Second, Congress expressed dissatisfaction with the Board for finding
some employers in violation of the Act simply because they expressed their
1045 (1986) (stating that the Jefferson Standard Court held that "even if employees are
arguably engaged in concerted activity, if the nature of their actions involves a malicious
attack on the product or reputation of their employer, their activity loses the protection
of Section 7 of the Act and their subsequent discharge is for 'cause' within the meaning of
Section 10(c)" (footnote omitted)), enforced, 811 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1987).
In NLRB v. Knuth Bros., 537 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1976), the Court ended its analysis of
an employee's activity with the comment that § 10(c) "protects the employer's right to
protect its business interests and if necessary, to discharge an employee for cause," id. at
956, followed by the remarkable statement that "[t]he power of the Act cannot be used as
a pretext for infringing the employer's rights," id. at 957.
103 For example, if a group of employees blow up an employer's equipment, it scarcely
seems necessary to assess if they were acting concertedly and perceived themselves to be
doing so for mutual aid or protection; under any approach, the employer ought to be
allowed to discipline them.
104 Specifically, the Board had been refusing to allow the discharge of employees who
had destroyed property, assaulted other employees, and obstructed plant entrances by
"violence, mass picketing, and general rowdyism." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4-5 (1947) (remarks of bill's sponsor, Congressman Hartley), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LA3OR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292,

295-96 (1948) [hereinafter

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF

LMRA].

Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 8(b)(1), 61
Stat. 136, 141 (1947).
106 Id. § 8(b)(4)(A).
107 Id. § 8(b)(4)(D).
105
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opinions, typically negative, about unionization. To remedy this, Congress
amended the Act to provide that "[t]he expressing of any views, argument,
or opinion, or the dissemination thereof ... shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice .... if such expression contains no threat of
reprisal or force or promise of benefit."'" 8 This addition allows freedom of
speech in labor matters, most notably, freedom for employers to communicate noncoercive opinions to employees or to respond when criticized by
employees and unions."l o
Last, in debating several versions of the "cause" amendment in particular,
Congress focused on the Board's mishandling of issues in three areas: (1) it
had been improperly attributing unlawful motives to employers without
actual proof of such motives; (2) it had been mishandling mixed motive
cases, those cases in which employers had several motives, lawful and unlawful; and (3) it had been improperly allocating the burden of proof in some
cases." The "cause" clause was added to address these problems and to
108 Id. § 8(c). Congressman Hartley remarked that the employer "has had to stand
mute while irresponsible detractors slandered, abused, and vilified him." H.R. REP. No.
245, supra note 104, at 5, reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LMRA, supra note
104, at 292, 296.
109 See MORRIS, supra note 18, at 80-85. A few years earlier, the Supreme Court had
acknowledged possible First Amendment problems if the Board used its unfair labor
practices sanctions to punish employers for noncoercive speech. NLRB v. Virginia Elec.

& Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1941).
11o See generally NLRB v. New York Univ. Medical Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 295-98 (2d
Cir.) (examining the legislative history of § 10(c)), vacated, 464 U.S. 805 (1983). The
House Report indicated that Congress believed that the NLRB had been cursory in ascertaining whether the cause of a challenged discharge was the § 7 activity or another
(unprotected) cause, such as "gross misconduct." See H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note
104, at 42, reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LMRA, supra note 104, at 292, 333.
The Board had been loosely inferring from an employee's union involvement that the
employer's motivation was that involvement, and not some other non-§ 7 activity. It
essentially had been ruling that merely engaging in protected activities insulated employees from discipline while carrying out those activities. See id. The Committee wanted
the Board to make clear findings on causation and to articulate them to enable meaningful judicial review. New York Univ. Medical Ctr., 702 F.2d at 295. Congress did not
want employees to feel that when they were engaging in union activities, they had license
to "loaf, wander about the plants, refuse to work, waste time, break rules, and engage in
incivilities and other disorders and misconduct." H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 104, at
42, reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LMRA, supra note 104, at 292, 333. Similarly, a House Conference Report stated that the "cause" amendment allows discharge
for interfering with other employees at work and violating shop rules, even if the
employee was simultaneously carrying out union activities. It also affirmed that the
Board must not infer improper employer motives when the evidence shows there was a
legitimate cause. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1947), reprintedin
1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LMRA, supra note 104, at 505, 559. By contrast, opponents of the "cause" amendment feared that the language would encourage employers to
fabricate a reason as the supposed motivation for a discharge, when the real reason was
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safeguard appellate review,111 not to constrict the universe of section 7 protected activities.1 " The latter was accomplished by adding the amendments
mentioned above, which expressly outlawed certain secondary boycotts and
other conduct. Congress enacted the "cause" amendment, by contrast, to
reaffirm pre-existing employer rights under section 7 law as Congress
thought the Board should have been interpreting it (and as some recent decisions had correctly interpreted it)." 3 It did not purport to alter the landscape of protected section 7 activities. Thus, section 10(c) 114
"cause" is not a
synonym for the group of substantive section 7 exceptions.
Having "cause" also cannot itself be viewed as an independent, substantive "exception" to the rule that discharges for the exercise of section 7
rights are unlawful. Discipline by an employer that today would constitute
an unfair labor practice (such as firing an employee for encouraging a strike)
certainly would have been considered by many employers as "cause" for
discipline were the Act's unfair labor practice prohibitions not in effect. The
''cause" clause is a limitation on Board remedies in certain circumstances,
not an "exception" to section 7; its placement in section 10, the remedies
section of the Act, rather than in the substantive "Unfair Labor Practices"
section, reflects this difference."'
the employee's § 7 activity. H.R. MINORITY REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-93,

reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LMRA, supra note 104, at 383-84; 93 CONG.
REC. 6658, 6677 (daily ed. June 6, 1947), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
LMRA, supra note 104, at 1572, 1593.
111 New York Univ. Medical Ctr., 702 F.2d at 295.

See H.R.

REP. No. 245, supra note 104, at 27, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HisLMRA, supra note 104, at 292, 318. Congress also considered expressly
exempting unfair labor practices, unlawful concerted activities, and labor contract violations from § 7 protection. Its reasons for rejecting this option do not indicate that
§ 10(c)'s cause requirement altered the way § 7 was to be approached.
113 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, supra note 110, at 55, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF LMRA, supra note 104, at 559 (citing Wyman-Gordon v. NLRB, 153 F.2d
480 (1946)); see also NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 104,
112

TORY OF

at 27, reprinted in I

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF

LMRA, supra note 104, at 292, 318

(discussing the possibility of amending § 7 to provide specific exclusions).
114 See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 45-46 (explaining that the
Board may not reinstate employees discharged for reasons other than protected concerted
activity).
115 Generally, under current Board doctrine, the Agency should invoke § 10(c) to buttress its denial of reinstatement or back pay in four circumstances: (1) An employee is not
reinstated because the § 7 activity was not in fact a reason for the discipline, see, e.g.,
Taracorp Indus., 273 N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (1984) (denying reinstatement or back pay when
employer disciplines an employee for a lawful reason, even if the employer violates the
employee's § 7 Weingarten rights); (2) There were mixed motives and the employee
would have been disciplined irrespective of her protected activity. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1983) (setting standards in mixed
motive cases); (3) There was serious misconduct during a strike or after an unlawful
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Additionally, it is analytically unsound to begin the unfair labor practice
analysis with an inquiry into whether there was "cause" for discipline
because the Act does not require employers to have "cause" 116 (much less
"good cause" or "just cause"). 117 Though the historical underpinnings of
the twentieth century American notion of employment-at-will have been
widely questioned and that doctrine sharply criticized, this century's labor
and employment laws have been interpreted as imposing no sanctions on
employers who discipline for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all. 1 "
The employer is limited only by specific federal or state statutes such as
those forbidding discipline or discrimination based on such factors as collecdischarge that, if not excusable because of unlawful employer provocation or other reasons, causes forfeiture of the employee's right to post-strike reinstatement or make-whole
remedy for the discharge. See, e.g., Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044
(1984) (denying reinstatement and backpay to strikers who had engaged in misconduct
that reasonably tended to coerce or intimidate employees), enforced without opinion, 765
F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986); Sahara Datsun, Inc., 278
N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046 (1986) (denying reinstatement to unlawfully discharged employee
who had unjustifiably accused employer of being involved in prostitution and drugs and
of falsifying documents), enforced, 811 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1987); or (4) Post-discharge
events would have led to the employee's discharge for other reasons, for example, a subsequent plant closure moots back pay or reinstatement beyond the date the plant closed.
116 Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (noting that the Act allows
discharge for any reason other than union and collective bargaining activities); Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 45-46 (stating that the Act permits discharge for reasons other than intimidation and coercion); NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of Am., 128 F.2d
67, 75 (3d Cir. 1942) (conceding the Act's allowance of discharge for any or no reason
providing it is not illegal). The statement in the text above assumes, of course, no union
animus on the part of the employer.
117 The two latter terms are often negotiated in labor agreements as limitations on an
employer's ability to discipline.
118 Many commentators have criticized the employment-at-will doctrine as lacking
common law or doctrinal precedent and as having been an inaccurate statement of American law when first articulated. Nonetheless, in this century it has been widely applied by
courts until the recent erosions through contract and tort theories such as wrongful discharge or discharges in violation of public policy, and by various "whistleblower" statutes. See generally MATTHEW W. FINKIN ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE
INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 284-86 (1989) (discussing specific anti-retaliation laws and gen-

eral "whistleblower laws"); David Dominguez, Just Cause Protection: Will the Demise of
Employment at Will Breathe New Life into Collective Job Security?, 28 IDAHO L. REV.
283 (1992) (supporting the adoption of a statutory just cause standard instead of employment-at-will); Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in
the United States and England:An HistoricalAnalysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85 (1982) (comparing the divergent developments of the indefinite employment contract in England and
the United States at the turn of the century); Arthur Leonard, A New Common Law of
Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631 (1988) (suggesting that state courts
develop a new presumption to replace "at will," which would require employers to give a
justification for dismissing employees who have passed a reasonable probationary period).
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tive activity (under the Act), race, age, or physical or mental disability. 1 9
To begin a section 7 case by inquiring if the employer had "cause" does not
simply put the cart before the horse; it hitches the employer to a cart that the
law has said she is not required to pull.
If "cause" is defined as the right to discharge for "any reason other than
on account of one's section 7 activities," then employers have always had
this right under the Act, including the years before Congress added section
10(c). 120 Section 10(c) simply does not grant to employers a substantive section 7 "exception" for which they may discharge employees. Employers
have that power independent of section 10(c).
121
More importantly, as the Jefferson Standard dissenters aptly perceived,
any analysis beginning with an inquiry about "cause" risks misconstruing
the statute precisely because, under the Act, an activity protected by section
7 cannot lawfully constitute "cause" for discipline. Assessing section 7 by
starting with section 10(c) is not merely "backwards," it is circular. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Jefferson Standard did just that.' 22 The
Court determined that because the broadcasting company had "cause" to
discharge, the technicians' activity fell outside the ambit of section 7.
As a matter of analysis, all of the facts and circumstances discussed by the
Jefferson Standard Court in its "cause" inquiry12 should simply have been
"19 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988
& Supp. III 1991) (race, color, sex, religion, or national origin); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (Supp. III 1991) (physical or mental
disability).
120 See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 45-46.
121 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 480

(1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("To suggest that actions which in the absence of a
labor controversy might be 'cause' . . . for discharge should be unprotected, even when
... undertaken as 'concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining,' is to
misconstrue legislation designed to put labor on a fair footing with management.").
122 Confusion about the relationship between § 10(c) and § 7 is not limited to the Jefferson line of cases. In Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1951), the
court stated that it would decide, first, if a certain boycott was a "concerted activity for
the purpose of ... mutual aid and protection, which was protected," and, second, if the
boycott was not protected, could the employees maintaining it be suspended or discharged
because the boycott constituted cause. If the court answered the first question negatively,
there should be no inquiry into the second, unless the first question means to ask if the
activity was concerted (step one), and for a § 7 purpose (step two) and therefore arguably
protected. If this is the meaning, then the second question asked in this case should
simply have been whether the boycott was illegal (step three exception). For a discussion
about a case confusing § 10(c) with the issue of concertedness, see Cox, supra note 83, at
324 n.24 (citing National Elec. Prods. Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 995, 1001-02 (1948) (Herzog,
Member, concurring), and noting that although the result in the case might be sound,
"the opinion errs in basing the conclusion on the ground that the strike in breach of
contract" was not concerted).
123 Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 472 (citing such things as disparagement of prod-
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included in the loss of protection step three inquiry.'
The Court could
have followed the proper analytical framework, discussed all of the same
facts, and reached the same result, without predicating its analysis on section
10(c).' 25 Subsequent to Jefferson Standard, the Supreme Court has implicitly acknowledged that section 10(c) does not create or justify any exception
to section 7.126
Turning now from Jefferson Standard's analytical structure to its substance, the Court did not define the word "means" when it stated that the
"means used" deprived the technicians of protection.' The dilemma facing
the Jefferson Standard progeny has been in determining what it was about
the conduct in that case that made the technicians' "means" unprotected.
How has the disloyalty exception been applied in the ensuing four decades?
How have subsequent Board members and judges defined the term? What
basis did the Jefferson Standard Court have to read an independent disloyalty exception into section 7, if that is what it intended? The sections that
follow answer these questions.
III.

PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION: THE TORTUOUS ROUTE OF THE
DISLOYALTY TEST

I posit that the salient "means" in Jefferson Standard involved both the
disparagement of a product and the particular way in which that product
was disparaged. 12 However, the confusion about the pertinent "means" has
proven to have equal or greater potential for abuse in cases involving alleged
disloyalty.
A.

Confusion with Existing Section 7 Exceptions
1. Confusion with Product Disparagement'
Unfortunately, disloyalty has not been clearly distinguished from disparagement. A dictionary definition of "disparage" is "to lower in the esteem
or reputation; to speak slightingly of; to run down; to depreciate."'" The
uct quality, concealment of relationship to labor dispute, apprehension of loss of income,
and disloyalty).

124 The issue of the technicians' purposes should have been discussed in the step two
inquiry.
125 I do not concede that all of the considerations the Court listed were appropriate,
but merely that these factors should be considered at step three, if at all.
126 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1962) (explaining that

although § 10(c) allows for "cause" discharges, "this, of course cannot mean that an
employer is at liberty to punish a man by discharging him for engaging in concerted
activities which § 7 of the Act protects").
127 See supra text accompanying note 91.
128 Specifically, that the employees made highly critical public comments, criticizing
product quality, which was not an issue in the labor dispute, and concealed both their
union status and the existence of a labor dispute.
12 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

653 (3d ed. 1976).
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term may also mean to "cheapen," "criticize," "degrade," "insult,"
"malign," "ridicule," or "vilify."'3 A person, goods, property, or title may
be disparaged."' 1 Given these variations, disparagement could be construed
to mean virtually any negative words spoken by an employee about an
employer or its agents, product, or service. However, not all criticism may
be legitimately labeled disparagement because the Act clearly would protect
statements such as "Unconscionable employer is cruel to employees," or
"Scabrous employer hires scab labor." The Board and courts have occasionally, and properly, stressed that a construction equating "disparaging" with
"highly critical" would misinterpret Jefferson Standard.l "2 "[G]reat care
must be taken to distinguish between disparagement and the airing of what
may be highly sensitive issues,"'" because the employer will always be sensitive to employee criticism to some degree. Indeed, if the comment or publicity is not critical or does not persuade the public or others, the employees
would not be making it.
Despite all of the above admonitions, however, disparagement has been
used loosely to cover almost any kind of critical comments. One employee
"disparaged" a manager's "performance as a manager and . . .his naval
service, [the manager] having recently retired from the Navy with the rank
of lieutenant commander after 32 years of service."" Another employee
"disparaged" his employer by calling him "Castro. ' as In another case an
employee "disparaged" an "employer's judgment and capacity to effectively
perform. ' ' " The term has also encompassed defamation concerning
the
37
character and reputation of individual managers or supervisors.
130 WILLIAM C. BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS 177 (2d ed. 1992).
131 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

470 (6th ed. 1990). Historically, disparagement had a

particular meaning within the confines of legal analysis. Old English law provided that a
person could be disparaged by marrying below one's class. Disparagement was actionable at common law when a person's falsehood tended to denigrate another's goods or
services. Under modern law, the same conduct may form the basis of a Federal Trade
Commission complaint or may be actionable under state law. Id.
132 See, e.g., Misericordia Hosp. Medical Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 814 (2d Cir.
1980) (noting that Jefferson Standard "is not authority for the proposition that a statement critical of an employer automatically provides grounds for discharg[e]"); see also
Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216-17 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that Jefferson may not be read as equating criticism with "disloyal product disparagement," nor as
equating every critical comment with "unprotected disloyalty").
133 Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 229, 231, enforced without opinion, 636
F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1980).
is4 NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721, 725 (8th Cir. 1972).
11 Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1968); see also infra notes
149-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Boaz case).
11 American Arbitration Ass'n, 233 N.L.R.B. 71, 71 & n.1 (1977).
137 See, e.g., Sahara Datsun, Inc. 278 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1045-46 (1986) (referring to
disparagement of manager's and owner's "reputation ...in the eyes of the financial
institution ... and in the eyes of the employees," by an unsubstantiated claim that the
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"Disloyalty" is even less clearly understood. Dictionary definitions of
"loyalty" range from "feelings of devoted attachment and affection,"'n to
"faithful adherence to one's promise, ' 39 to "conformity to law."'" Loyal
can also mean "faithful in one's political relations; giving faithful support
and allegiance to one's prince or sovereign or to the existing government [or]
[flaithful support to cause, ideal, office, or person. 141 Some decision makers
treat disparaging and disloyal as interchangeable.' 42 Others view disparagement as a subset of disloyalty, such that an employee who has made disparaging comments is then, derivatively and automatically, labeled as
disloyal.
The Court, in Jefferson Standard, created this imprecision when
it first found the leaflets disparaging, next described their shortcomings, and
then concluded that the employees were disloyal. It used product disparagement and disloyalty almost interchangeably, giving no guidance on the factors relevant to each.' 44 The lack of a clear distinction between the two
terms makes analysis difficult for decision makers attempting to apply these
exceptions.
employer was falsifying credit applications and was linked to prostitution, drugs, and
crime), enforced, 811 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1987); cf. Brownsville Garment Co., 298
N.L.R.B. 507, 508 (1990) (finding no disparagement by employee's comments about
manager's "personal integrity with respect to ... production of garments"), enforced
without opinion, 937 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1991).
138 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 773
(1973).

9 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 74 (2d ed.
140 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 947 (6th ed. 1992).
139

1989).

11 Id. Other meanings include "faithful to plighted troth." 9 THE
74 (2d ed. 1989).

OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY

1

See, e.g., Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1968) (finding a

comparison to Fidel Castro a "blunt disparagement" and a "form of flagrant insubordination and disloyalty"); American Arbitration Ass'n, 233 N.L.R.B. 71, 71 & n.1 (1977)
(finding "tone and comment" of a questionnaire and letter "constituted disloyalty to, and
disparagement of, Respondent's judgment").
143 See, e.g., American ArbitrationAss'n, 233 N.L.R.B. at 74 (finding use of confidential list and sending questionnaire, "because it was childish and disparaged the Respondent, constituted acts of disloyalty").
1" NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 472
(1953). Conduct deemed disloyal is not always disparaging, and vice versa. Disparagement as used colloquially normally would be considered an objective term relating to the
negativity of one's words, not a subjective frame of mind. Very negative comments could
be made with no desire to harm, no negative state of mind, and no disloyalty. If disloyalty were a distinct or valid exception, it probably would focus on one's subjective state of
mind. An example of the difference would be a group of hospital nurses that issued
statements criticizing serious understaffing. The statements clearly disparage the service
provided by the hospital, but they are not necessarily disloyal. The statements might be a
genuine effort to improve the care provided, and thus benefit the hospital's reputation.
Some reviewers have found it "immaterial" whether an employee means to disparage the
employer. American Arbitration Ass'n, 233 N.L.R.B. at 75 (A.L.J. decision).

HeinOnline -- 73 B.U. L. Rev. 322 1993

1993] LABOR, LOYALTY, AND THE CORPORATE CAMPAIGN

323

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit approached
the relationship between the two exceptions by returning to the essential elements of Jefferson Standard. It ruled that there can be no finding of disloyalty unless the statements publicly disparage the quality of an employer's
145
product (or service) in a manner similar to that in Jefferson Standard.
This approach has treated the disloyalty test as I have argued that Jefferson
Standard treated it: as supplemental rhetoric when there is product
disparagement.
2.

Confusion with Other Exceptions

Reviewing Board members and judges frequently use the disloyalty rubric
when conduct is unprotected for other reasons. Some allegedly disparaging
or disloyal conduct may be correctly labeled as insubordination or interruption of production. Insubordination is the refusal to do one's assigned tasks
1
or to follow other instructions, and it has long been ruled unprotected. '
Refusals to do the job or to comply with instructions on the job are straightforward cases of insubordination. In contrast, interruption of production
usually involves interfering with other employees' ability to get the job done,
or otherwise keeping the facility from operating. 1 47 It, like insubordination,
need not be labeled as disloyalty or disparagement, even when the offending
employee makes insulting or ridiculing comments. 48
14' NLRB v. New York Univ. Medical Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 292 (2d Cir.) (holding
conduct disloyal only when it publicly disparages product), vacated on other grounds, 464
U.S. 805 (1983).
1 See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) ("The act permits a discharge for any reason other than union activity or agitation for collective bargaining with
employees."); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 338 (1950) (allowing discharge of
employees who participate in work slow-down in protest of wage arrangement); Audubon
Health Care Ctr., 268 N.L.R.B. 135, 137 (1983) (allowing discharge for refusing to cover
duties of sick co-worker). According to popular maxim, it's "a fair day's work for a fair
day's wage," not "a fair day's loyalty for a fair day's wage."
"I See, e.g., NLRB v. Aintree Corp., 135 F.2d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 1943) (perceiving
leaflet as having the potential to create hostility and provoke militant dissension); NLRB
v. Condenser Corp. of Am., 128 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1942) (holding employees who stand
idle at work stations in morning and again at noon to protest wages, when Company had
agreed to meet with them at end of day, unprotected). There are a few instances, in
addition to strikes, in which refusing to work is protected under § 7 because it is transitory or in furtherance of a § 7 purpose, such as sympathy strikes and brief "quickie
strikes" (walkouts) over working conditions. However, the courts have been less willing
than the Board to rule that activities interrupting production are protected. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 496 (8th Cir. 1946) (holding the
selective refusal to perform certain assigned tasks unprotected); C.G. Conn., Ltd. v.
NLRB, 108 F.2d 390, 397 (7th Cir. 1939) (holding the repeated refusal to work scheduled
overtime not a strike and thus not protected).
4 See supra note 147. The technicians in Jefferson Standard neither refused tasks
nor interrupted production. Not all activity that adversely affects production falls within
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Jefferson Standard'simprecision has left decision makers with a seductive
opportunity, especially in egregious cases, to add "disloyalty" to buttress a
conclusion that an employee was insubordinate or interfered with production, and to add "disparagement" to describe any rude, insulting, or embarrassing comments the employee made in the process. These labels add
nothing and merely complicate an already unwieldy doctrine. For example,
in one case an employee would not be silent at an anti-union meeting and
demanded the right to speak."" The court found this conduct so disruptive
that not disciplining the employee risked "the complete breakdown of plant
discipline. '""W If the court was correct in this factual conclusion,' 5 ' then the
employee actually jeopardized production, and he was also insubordinate for
refusing to be quiet in a meeting on company time not designated for
employee speeches. Either rationale justified the discharge; disloyalty and
disparagement were not needed.
Conversely, and admirably, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit perceived some of these distinctions in one case and refused
the interruption of production exception. For example, strikes or walkouts in protest of
working conditions are classically protected activity. See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962) (leaving work to protest poorly heated plant protected). Three instances of interruption of production about which there is disagreement
are partial strikes (only some employees strike), intermittent strikes (short, recurring
strikes), and slowdowns (employees remain at work but do their tasks deliberately
slowly). See, e.g., International Union, UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. (Briggs & Stratton), 336 U.S. 245, 255-63 (1949) (holding 27 sporadic work
stoppages in five months, unaccompanied by specific demands, unprotected), overruled on
other grounds, Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). These concerted activities resemble those that warrant
protection, yet they are generally treated as unprotected. This is based largely on the
impact on production, though another rationale may be that they are too effective and
would render management helpless. See Briggs & Stratton, 336 U.S. at 264; Cox, supra
note 83, at 331-32. The Board has ruled, however, that these activities are unprotected
even when the employer can defend itself. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 107 N.L.R.B.
1547, 1549 (1954). The law on partial and intermittent strikes has been criticized. See
Lodge 76, 427 U.S. at 152 n. 14 (speculating that some partial strikes may be protected);
Julius G. Getman, The ProtectedStatus of PartialStrikes After Lodge 76:x A Comment, 29
STAN. L. REV. 205 (1977) (arguing that the law is unclear as to partial strikes). But see
Kenneth T. Lopatka, The Unprotected Status of PartialStrikes After Lodge 76: A Reply
to ProfessorGetman, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1181, 1188-89 (1977) (arguing that sporadic work
stoppages should not be protected). The precise contours of the insubordination and
interruption of protection exceptions is an issue beyond the scope of this Article,
although it has been noted that the legal status of partial strikes and slowdowns may be
changing in light of several decisions. See Estlund, supra note 15, at 975 n.217; Getman,
supra, at 205-11.
'l

Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1968).

150

Id.

The Court reversed the Board in this case and, in my opinion, failed to accord
adequate weight to the Agency's factual conclusions. See infra part III.C.4.
151
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to heap the "disloyal" label on top of insubordination or interruption of production. 52 The case involved sharply dissident employees of a medical
center who distributed leaflets using extreme language to garner support for
their slate of candidates in a union election. They accused the employer of
racism and of using race to divide employees. Among their inflammatory
comments was the statement, "If the NYU management feels threatened, it
has reason to be because we mean businessl " 1 The court did not become
embroiled in assessing the University's claim that the leaflets were disloyal
and disparaged "the good name and reputation of the medical center."'
Instead, it refrained the issue in insubordination and interruption of production terms and evaluated the conduct for its "likely impact on the workplace."'" The court agreed with the Board that "the objectionable 1 language
in the leaflets posed no danger of breach of employee discipline.' 5
Another exception to section 7 that has been needlessly confused with
disloyalty is illegal conduct.'57 On occasion, the Board or courts have found
152

NLRB v. New York Univ. Medical Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 292 (2d Cir.), vacated on

other grounds, 464 U.S. 805 (1983).
153 Id. at 287.
154 Id. at 288. The Board and court even took the unusual step of refusing to defer to
an arbitrator's decision upholding the discharges, on the ground that it was repugnant to
the Act. See id. at 289.

1m Id. at 290.
156 Id. at 291.
157 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. The conduct may involve unlawful
means, such as trespassing on a company president's private property during a demonstration, or unlawful objectives (ends), such as boycotting to force an employer to breach
a contract. There are several relevant sources of unlawfulness. First, some conduct may
be unlawful because its ends or means are inconsistent with specific labor laws. Such
conduct is usually outlawed expressly in the Act. See, e.g., § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4) (1988) (certain secondary boycotts); § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1988) (hot
cargo agreements); § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1988) (forcing employers to
bargain with uncertified organization); § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1988) (picketing
for recognition if another union is certified, when election has been held within 12
months, or if petition for election is not filed within reasonable time); see also Hoover Co.
v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1951) (seeking to persuade employer to recognize
one union when another is certified). Illegal ends include persuading an employer to
breach a labor contract, because conduct that repudiates a contract's terms involving
mandatory bargaining subjects constitutes an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(5), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988); Scullin Steel Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1294, 1317-18 (1946) (holding
walkouts that breach a labor contract unprotected), enforced as modified, 161 F.2d 143
(8th Cir. 1947). Second, some conduct may not be directly unlawful under the Act, yet
be contrary to the labor law scheme because it impedes the performance of specific obligations required by, or the exercise of specific rights granted by, the Act. An example is a
minority group of employees demanding that the employer bargain directly and separately with them when the Act's premise is that elected union officials be the exclusive
representatives with whom the employer is required to bargain. See § 8(a)(5); Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 67 (1975); NLRB v.
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employees disloyal because they engaged in conduct that was for illegal purposes or carried out by illegal means. In one recent case, an appellate court
determined that an employee supported an illegal boycott and then it
engaged in a lengthy and unnecessary disloyalty analysis, even creating new
law on disloyalty. 1 8 Given that illegal ends and means are unprotected,
decision makers need not resort to the disloyalty rationale in such cases.
Cases in which employees disclosed confidences also have been infused
with disloyalty rhetoric. Under common law, employees had an obligation
not to reveal confidential information or communications, and the NLRB
has read a similar exception into section 7.159 The section 7 exception is
somewhat narrow because the purpose of public collective activity is to create pressure on the employer, and the information employees seek to publicize in labor disputes is likely to be that which the employer least wishes to
have openly discussed."° Therefore, although the Board has declined to
equate the publication of "highly sensitive" or "delicate" issues with unprotected breaches of confidentiality, 6' disclosure of truly confidential matter is
Draper, 145 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1944) (concluding that wildcat strike by minority
circumvented the Act's bargaining process). Third, conduct may have goals that, if
achieved, would violate other laws independent of the labor laws. See, e.g., American
News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302, 1307 (1944) (violation of wage stabilization laws). Fourth,
the conduct may be illegal in and of itself under these other laws. Southern S.S. Co. v.
NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 46 (1942) (holding that a strike aboard a vessel in harbor constituted
mutiny).
158 George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061, 1064-66 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see
also infra notes 191-94.
159 At common law, an agent had a duty not to use information he acquired as agent
for purposes likely to harm his principal or interfere with his principal's business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. a (1958). See generally W. EDWARD
SELL, SELL ON AGENCY 123-24 (1975). Under the common law, confidentiality obligations extended to items such as lists of names, trade secrets, and other matters peculiarly
known to those in the employer's business. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 395
cmt. b. In today's situations involving more technical disclosures of confidences, such as
patents or trade secrets, the NLRB can tailor an exclusion in a way that is sensitive to
both employers and employees' § 7 rights.
l1 See, e.g., Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 229, 231 (1089) (acknowledging
that employer "would understandably prefer to keep out of the public eye" such delicate
matters), enforced without opinion, 636 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1980). Examples include a
union's publicity that an employer illegally employs children or pollutes the environment.
"Il See, e.g., id. (finding an airplane mechanic's letter to a third party, discussing
safety problems at his employer's company, a protected activity); Misericordia Hosp.
Medical Ctr., 246 N.L.R.B. 351, 354-56 (1979) (finding a nurse's participation in the
creation of a report presented to the accreditation committee that criticized hospital sanitary conditions protected activity, rejecting the hospital's disloyalty, disparagement, and
breach of confidence claims), enforced, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980); cf W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 115, at 828 (5th ed. 1984)
(explaining that defamation may be conditionally privileged when reasonably calculated
to protect or further common interest between publisher and recipient).
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not, and should not be, protected. 2 Clothing breaches of confidence in
notions of disloyalty collapses the two concepts and creates confusion." 3 An
example is Knuth Brothers,'" where a print shop employee telephoned
Schlitz Brewing Company, an indirect customer of the print shop, and asked
some general questions about Schlitz management's opinions about unionization.1"s Although the Board found the activity protected, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the call revealed
the existence of a sensitive, confidential subcontracting relationship." 6 It
ruled that the employee violated confidences, but it couched its holding in
terms of disloyalty." 7
When decision makers gratuitously apply the disloyalty rubric in such
162 There may be lesser protection when the breach of confidence involves the malign-

ing of a physical product sold, as opposed to a service provided. The quality of a finished
product is often not as integrally related to working conditions as is the service that it is
the job of employees (in a service industry) to provide. This general distinction between
workplace products and working conditions would collapse, however, if the employees
were instructed to make a product unsafe or unsafely (e.g., instructed secretly to remove
safety devices on a kitchen appliance or to disregard hazardous substance labeling
requirements on a chemical being sold), which would involve working conditions.
163 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently defined what is
confidential in a case discussing disloyalty and disparagement. See Sierra Publishing Co.
v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989), enforcing 291 N.L.R.B. 540 (1988). Employees
who worked for a newspaper publisher wrote letters to the newspaper's advertisers discussing the newspaper's financial difficulties and its decline in advertising. Id. at 214.
They claimed the paper faced an "imminent collapse." The employer had argued that
the "advertising lineage" used by the employees was not a matter of public record, and
that by publicizing confidential information, the employees had acted in reckless disregard of the newspaper's business interests. Sierra Publishing Co., 291 N.L.R.B. 540, 540
n.1 (1988), enforced, 889 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989). In rejecting the argument, the Board
stated that the letter did not "reveal any specific financial figures relating to the newspaper," and the information in the letter was readily available to the employer's advertisers.

Id. at 540.
164 218 N.L.R.B. 869 (1975), enforcement denied, 537 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1976).
165 Id. at 872 (A.L.J. decision). The employee sought the information to help unionize
Knuth Brothers' production workers, because if Schlitz preferred that its printing jobs be
done by union workers, then unionizing could help bring in business and secure the
employees' jobs. Id.
166 NLRB v. Knuth Bros., 537 F.2d 950, 956 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Knuth Bros., 218
N.L.R.B. at 870 (Kennedy, Member, dissenting) (explaining that because the practice of
subcontracting makes the ultimate product more expensive to customers, the dealers
required the shop to keep the information confidential).
167 537 F.2d at 956 (explaining that the employee could have accomplished his objective of obtaining information in other ways); see also American Arbitration Ass'n, 233
N.L.R.B. 71, 72-73 (1977) (finding that an employee who sent a sarcastic questionnaire to
individuals identified from a private caseload breached confidentiality and also noting in
dictum that the "tone and context" of the questionnaire "constituted disloyalty to... and
disparagement of the employer's judgment").
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contexts as insubordination, interruption of production, illegality, and disclosure of confidences, they unnecessarily compound the confusion in section 7 law, because these employees may be disciplined irrespective of any
"disloyalty." The following subpart addresses a situation on the opposite
end of the spectrum; that is, circumstances under which employees evidently
are disloyal but are not subject to discipline under the disloyalty test.
B. An Unworkable Standard
At least part of the reason why disloyalty is often confused with, or unnecessarily added to, existing section 7 exceptions is that "disloyalty" is an
unworkable standard. It is unworkable in large part because, rhetoric
notwithstanding, the so-called disloyalty cases do not consistently turn on
loyalty or its absence. This problem is highlighted by comparing Jefferson
Standard with a factually similar case, National FurnitureManufacturing
Co. 16 In National Furniture, six employees (one in company uniform), as
part of attempts to obtain recognition and bargaining, showed up at an
annual furniture exposition attended by over 15,000 buyers from over 7500
stores.1 69 For three days they distributed leaflets describing National Furniture as a "chiseling," "unfair," and "hard-nosed" labor law violator, who
treated employees "badly," "under-min[ed]" the wages paid by "fairminded" employers, and refused to comply with an NLRB order. 70 The
171
Board found the activity protected.
One is hard-pressed to find distinctions between the loyalties of the radio/
television technicians and the furniture store employees. In its discharge
letter to its employees, National Furniture insisted that they had been disloyal: "[t]hey have attempted to degrade, humiliate, hurt, injure, and otherwise damage the reputation, ability to sell and/or the productive capacity of
this company.' ' 172 Recall that Jefferson Standard also involved distribution,
173
during bargaining, of handbills criticizing the employer's business policies.
Both the furniture employees and the radio/television technicians endeavored to harm their employers economically, chose passionate appeals to customers as their means, severely criticized their employer, hoped to diminish
sales, and had the purpose of obtaining bargaining demands. Although the
cases do contain some factual differences, 174 there is no persuasive or worka168

134 N.L.R.B. 834 (1961), enforced in part, 315 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1963).

169 Id. at 840 (Trial Examiner's report).

Id. at 841; see also infra notes 301-05 and accompanying text (discussing additional
factors in the case).
11 National Furniture, 134 N.L.R.B. at 836.
172 Id. at 843 (Trial Examiner's report).
173 The employees in Jefferson Standard also criticized the technical quality of the
programs. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
174 A key distinction noted by the court was that National Furniture's employees
engaged in "no disparagement of National's furniture." NLRB v. National Furniture
Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 280, 286 (7th Cir. 1963). Other distinctions included the fact that the
170
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ble distinction based on the degree of loyalty of the two sets of employees. If
disloyalty means causing or desiring economic harm, public disdain, or ridicule, then many "disloyal" employees, both before and since Jefferson Standard, have been protected. Indeed, as I discuss more fully later, most
collective activity, such as community publicity, union organizing rallies,
lawful boycotts, and strikes, arguably is "disloyal."' 75
In wrestling with this unworkable test, some decision makers have
resorted to bifurcating disloyalty into two levels: disloyalty that forfeits protection and disloyalty that does not. 176 For instance, National Furniture
framed the issue as whether the concerted activity was "illegal, or an example of such disloyalty that we may term it 'indefensible' in the sense enunciated [in Jefferson Standard]."177 Under Jefferson Standard, as interpreted in
NationalFurniture,disloyalty so egregious that it is "indefensible" loses protection, but "defensible" disloyalty, such as that in National Furniture,does
not. 7 ' In a different vein, in one case, the Board applied a criterion of
whether conduct is "organized [and] widespread" to distinguish Jefferson
Standard and justify the reinstatement of cafeteria workers who told customers that there were roaches and rat hair in food. 179 Still another group of
decisions has split the disloyalty test into subcategories based on whether the
comments are "so disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue as to deny...
[them] protection."'" ° Under this standard, one must assess not only
whether an employee is disloyal, but also the subtle degrees of loyalty to
determine if the disloyalty is of the "indefensible" or "egregious" type that is
"beyond the pale."'' Such bifurcated standards have not been well received
furniture employees' leaflets clearly specified a labor dispute, identified some of the specific employee complaints regarding the dispute, and called for public support in the
employees' cause. Id.
175 See infra part IV.A.
178 Cf Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627, 1634-38 (1956) (Murdock & Peterson, Members, dissenting) (distinguishing between attacks of invidious character and
lesser attacks).
177 315 F.2d at 284 (emphasis added).
178 Accord NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1972) (stating that
only "egregious" improprieties committed in connection with § 7 lose protection); see
also supra note 22.
179 Furr's Cafeterias, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 879 (1980), enforced without opinion, 656
F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1981).
180 Alaska Pulp Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1260, 1273 (1989) (A.L.J. decision) (citations
omitted), enforced, 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991); accord Champion Int'l Corp., 303
N.L.R.B. No. 11, 138 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1295 (May 28, 1991) (citing Alaska Pulp Corp.,
296 N.L.R.B. at 1260); Brownsville Garment Co., 298 N.L.R.B. 507, 508 (1990),
enforced without opinion, 937 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1991); Emarco, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 832
(1987).
's' Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1512 1951, rev'd sub nom.
Local Union No. 1229, IBEW v. NLRB (Jefferson Standard), 202 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir.
1952), set aside, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). Assessing egregiousness of conduct to determine if
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by some courts, l 2 and in the case of disloyalty, they add yet another layer
that must be evaluated in order to apply the nebulous exception.
Even when one sets aside definitional problems, and even when disloyalty
and disparagement appear to have similar meanings to various Board members and judges, there have been widely divergent results when these individuals have attempted to apply these terms to the facts of a given case. Thus,
there is little uniformity in outcomes even when the reviewers approach definitional consistency. These problems, their causes, and their consequences
are the subject of the following sections.
C.

Inconsistent Application
1. Differing Focus on Disloyalty--Objective or Subjective?

One source of confusion is whether disloyalty is an objective term, based
on external conduct, or a subjective one, based on the employee's state of
protection is lost did not originate with the Jefferson line of cases. For policy reasons the
Board has long ruled that minor instances of insubordination, momentary outbursts during bargaining or grievance processing, name-calling or minor misconduct on the picket
line may be excused. See infra part III.C.5.b.i. The Board recognizes that union organizing, bargaining, presenting grievances, striking, and other collective conduct cannot be
exercised in parlourpolitesse, and that to provide any meaningful protection, § 7 must
allow for some minor excesses in the exercise of those rights. This is especially true when
an employer's violation of the law provoked an employee's conduct. See generally
Getman, supra note 15, at 1231, and authority cited therein.
In 1948, the Board set the following standard:
A line exists beyond which an employee may not with impunity go, but that line
must be drawn "between cases where employees engaged in concerted activities
exceed the bounds of lawful conduct in 'a moment of animal exuberance' or in a
manner not activated by improper motives, and those flagrant cases in which the
misconduct is so violent or of such serious character as to render the employee unfit
for further service.
Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 526, 527 (1948) (citations omitted). The Board noted
that its standard would not always preclude an employee's discharge for statements or
actions occurring during bargaining. Id.; cf Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B.
1044, 1047 (1984) (holding that strikers' reinstatement rights may be forfeited by picket
line misconduct that reasonably tends to coerce or intimidate, including verbal threats
not accompanied by violence), enforced without opinion, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986). Although it might not be easy to assess egregiousness
in such cases, it seems more straightforward to decide if an outburst or momentary transgression may be excused under the circumstances without seriously jeopardizing production, safety, physical property, or other interests than it is to evaluate the egregiousness of
someone's disloyalty.
182 See, e.g., Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d at 728. The court in Red Top, Inc. framed the
Board's rule as "a general principle that insolent, rough, and intimidating conduct cannot
serve as a basis for discharge if that conduct is carried out in connection with the assertion of protected activity ...and that unless such improper conduct ...is 'egregious,' the
same must be accepted as a normal and usual incident of labor-management relationships"-and then the court rejected such a principle.
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mind.1ss Most commonly, decision makers consider the term to be a subjective one, and they analyze whether the employee was spiteful or was subjectively hoping to embarrass, harass, ridicule, or harm the employer.'
However, on occasion disloyalty is described as an objective criterion that
may be found even if the employee has innocent intentions. Thus, at least
one Board member and one appellate court would find disloyalty if they
determined that an employee had constructive knowledge of the likely harmful effects of her conduct. In Knuth Brothers, mentioned in another context
above,s the print shop pressman telephoned Schlitz Brewing Company to
ask if Schlitz preferred that its printing needs be met by unionized companies. Although the Board ruled the call protected,"s a dissenting member
concluded that the pressman "never had any excuse whatever for meddling
in his Employer's dealings with its customers," and that his conduct was
"clearly far beyond the scope of duties for which he was paid.' 8 7 For these
reasons,
he must be held to have been aware that he was meddling in his
Employer's business affairs without authorization. Therefore, Respondent was legally entitled to treat him just as it would any other
employee who so seriously disrupts his employer's business.
In my view, [the employee] was clearly and flagrantly disloyal to his
Employer. 1as
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the
dissent, ruling that an employee who proceeds "apparently heedless" of the
"potentially denigrating impact" of his actions can be considered disloyal. 8 9
Under this analysis, it was the fact that the employee did not stop to think
that made him disloyal."9'
Disparagement has generally been treated as objective, such that intent is immaterial. See, e.g., American Arbitration Ass'n, 233 N.L.R.B. 71, 74 (1977) (A.L.J. decision).
184 See, e.g., New River Indus. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290, 1295 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding
silly letter ridiculing free ice cream prepared with the sole purpose of belittling the company unprotected); American Arbitration Ass'n, 233 N.L.R.B. at 75 (A.L.J. decision)
(finding letter ridiculing management's dress code sent by an employee "not completely
innocent or unaware of the possible results ... [but with] pique or vengeance").
185 218 N.L.R.B. 869 (1975), enforcement denied, 537 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1976); see
also discussion supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
186 218 N.L.R.B. at 869. The pressman was trying to obtain information that would
motivate his co-employees to join the union. Id.
187 Id. at 871 (Kennedy, Member, dissenting).
188 Id. (emphasis added).
189 NLRB v. Knuth Bros., 537 F.2d 950, 956 (7th Cir. 1976). With some degree of
183

skepticism, the Court assumed for the appeal that the employee did not intend "to betray
a valued business relationship of his employer." Id. at 953 n.4. The contact, however,
arguably revealed a sensitive, confidential subcontracting relationship.
1 "In revealing the information, Popovitch acted in reckless disregard of his
employer's business interests. Respondent had the right to expect its employees to use
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An even more extreme interpretation of the subjective/objective dilemma
recently arose out of the widely publicized meat packers' strike against Hormel & Co.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit evaluated if a former striker was disloyal for having attended a
labor parade and rally. Participation in employee rallies, parades, and consumer boycotts, of course, usually is protected, but the court adjudged the
boycott promoted at the rally to be illegal.' 92 Given these facts, employees
greater care in using information acquired in the course of their employment. Failure to
use such care was an act of disloyalty to respondent." Id. at 956 (emphasis added).
191 George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992), denying
enforcement to 301 N.L.R.B. 47, 60 (1991).
192 The court did not clearly articulate why the support of the boycott was unprotected, and the usual non-secondary boycott is classic protected activity. The Administrative Law Judge explained that this boycott was contrary to the directives of the unions
involved. George A. Hormel & Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 47, 60 (1991) (A.L.J. decision),
enforcement denied, 962 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992). But that alone ought not have made
it illegal, because union members have a protected right to dissent from their union's
decisions. See, e.g., Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin)

Act of 1959, § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(2) (1988). The Administrative Law Judge apparently interpreted the boycotters' demands on the employer as a demand for separate and
direct dealing with them, as opposed to, and contrary to the bargaining posture of, the
local and international unions representing them. George A. Hormel & Co., 301 N.L.R.B.
at 60, 80-82 (A.L.J. decision). Employers are not required to respond to demands for
separate "bargaining," and because such demands frustrate statutory rights and obligations, they are unprotected. See, e.g., NLRA, § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988) (allowing
voluntary redress of grievances unless in violation of contract); Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (holding that the Act does not
protect minority employees' demand to bypass union and to bargain directly with them).
If the Administrative Law Judge did indeed determine the boycotters' request to be a
minority demand such as the one made in Emporium Capwell, then there is nothing
unusual about concluding that the boycotters were unprotected.
The Administrative Law Judge also ruled that the boycott had an objective of demanding the immediate return of former strikers who had already permanently and lawfully
been replaced. This demand was considered as the equivalent of demanding a breach of
contract. George A. Hormel & Co., 301 N.L.R.B. at 80-82 (A.L.J. decision). Neither the
Board nor the Court of Appeals went into detail on this questionable point.
Without having seen the settlement agreement, however, it is not clear to me that to
protest the permanent replacement of former strikers, and to demand their immediate
reinstatement, is the equivalent of demanding breach of the recall arrangements in a
strike settlement. Surely the company could voluntarily do more on behalf of former
strikers than the settlement required it to do without breaching the settlement rights of
replacements and crossovers. For example, presumably a company in response to such
demands voluntarily could temporarily expand its workforce to provide jobs for both
replacements and former strikers without altering the jobs of, or seniority of, those
replacements in breach of their strike settlement rights. Alternatively, the dissident
employees might seek to persuade their union and Hormel to renegotiate the strike settlement, providing for their inclusion in the post-strike staffing arrangements. This result, if
voluntarily adopted by the union and Hormel, would not breach a strike settlement con-
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engaging in the boycott would be unprotected. The case is significant, however, because the employee at issue did not boycott. He believed that the
boycott reduced his chances of being recalled, and thus took no action to
support it.' 93 The Court ruled that the mere presence of an employee at a
largely pro-boycott
parade and rally evidenced the appearance of
disioyaity.194
In addition to disagreement over the objective or subjective aspect of disloyalty, fundamental philosophical and ethical differences among the reviewers will prevent consistent application of any disloyalty test. These

differences are explored in the three subparts that follow.
2.

Differing Labor Relations Paradigms-Harmony or Adversary?

A major problem the Board and courts have encountered when analyzing

the disloyalty issue stems from the longstanding controversy over the degree
tract, because labor contracts can be renegotiated upon mutual agreement of the parties.
Nor would it deprive replacements of any contract rights, because employees' seniority
rights can be renegotiated prospectively, as long as benefits owed are not withheld (for
example, vacation pay due, previously accrued). Apparently the court determined that
the union permanently had waived the employees' right to continue bargaining about
replacements and recall. George A. Hormel & Co., 962 F.2d at 1063 (citing Emporium

Capwell, 420 U.S. at 61-64).
It also is not clear to me as a factual matter that the Freemont collective bargaining
agreement at issue forbade boycotts, an issue that the Administrative Law Judge did not

clearly resolve. See George A. Hormel & Co., 301 N.L.R.B. at 51, 81. The agreement did
not on its face prohibit boycotts (in sharp contrast to a contract at the Austin plant)
though it did prohibit sympathy strikes. As a matter of labor contract law, the two are
not necessarily synonymous. The employee at issue was willing to work; he was not
striking, neither primarily nor in sympathy with the sister local at Austin.
193 George A. Hormel & Co., 301 N.L.R.B. at 84, 86-87.
14 George A. Hormel & Co., 962 F.2d at 1066. The holding is problematic on multiple
grounds. See supra note 192. Furthermore, the Court made factual findings about the
rally and parade that were inconsistent with the Administrative Law Judge's findings,
when it should have remanded to the Board to make an initial ruling. See infra notes
234-39 and accompanying text. (The Board had not addressed the rally or parade or the
boycott's legality, because it found the employee not to have supported the boycott.) The
boycott was only one of the rally's purposes, albeit a major one. Those in attendance
included some who manifested support of the boycott and some who did not. George A.
Hormel & Co., 301 N.L.R.B. at 76 (A.L.J. decision).
The court determined that a subjective definition of disloyalty would not be "a permissible construction" of the Act, making a remand unnecessary. The Court's conclusion
assumes too much. See infra part IV.A. This new "appearances of disloyalty" test seems
questionable. Moreover, not even the employer had argued that mere presence at the
parade and rally constituted support of the boycott. George A. Hormel & Co., 301
N.L.R.B. at 76, 86 (A.L.J. decision). The court created an objective disloyalty defense to
the unfair labor practice that neither the Board nor the employer had advanced in the
litigation. Additionally, the court does not have the benefit of the Agency's expertise
concerning this new "appearances" test.
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to which the interests of employees and management are invariably antagonistic and, accordingly, over the degree to which a fair and wise national
labor policy has made and should make allowances for such inherent conflict.195 Some decision makers adopt a "harmony paradigm," emphasizing
the aspects of labor law that promote harmony and cooperation. Others
adopt an "adversary paradigm,"'m recognizing the inevitably opposing
interests of labor and management. The paradigm one adopts provides the
lens through which one evaluates conduct and interprets labor law. This
potential for difference becomes significant when decision makers with different perspectives apply the "disloyalty" exception. Their differences affect
their views on how "polite" employees must be, what motives employees
may have," how far the language may go when making criticism, to whom
employees may appeal for redress of grievances, how much subjective loyalty
employees must feel to retain protection, and other issues that factor into a
disloyalty analysis. 98 The debate is complex, but put simply for my purposes here, it includes the following general points.'
Basic to the National Labor Relations Act is the goal of preserving industrial peace. This goal lends support to the proposition that labor and management's interests are necessarily aligned, and that cooperation and
harmony are more important national policies than preserving the ability to
advance one's own interests. The policy behind the labor laws is that
"industrial strife and unrest" are not in the public interest.2 o Proponents of
the harmony paradigm point to the fact that the Act seeks to encourage the
195 The issue is not necessarily whether the relationships are adversarial. Hard bargaining and intransigence in pursuit of one's own interests can occur without animosity.
Union negotiators and people administering contract grievances may engage in what

appears to be a heated battle, only to enjoy a cup of coffee together when the issue is
ultimately settled. The issue is whether the goals and interests of labor and management
are invariably opposed.

" My terms.
191 For a discussion of whether motives are relevant to disloyalty, see infra part
III.C.5.a.
198 When the reviewing courts differ from the NLRB concerning the appropriateness

and significance of each of these models, principles of deference to administrative agencies and limited review suggest that the Board's paradigms generally should prevail. See
infra part III.C.4. When the courts accord deference, the frequency of inconsistent
results caused by philosophical differences between the courts and the Board decreases;
however, Board members may differ among themselves concerning the paradigms. For
an analysis of some factors often considered in disloyalty determinations, see infra part

III.C.5.
'9' All agree that the employee and the employer have some shared interests, most

notably the profitability of the enterprise, but beyond such generalities the paradigms
diverge. Further, in some ways both sides in this debate are "right": mutual cooperation
and self-interest can co-exist at times. The discussion in the text is intended as an introduction to the arguments in this debate.
200 NLRA, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988); see also NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees
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"friendly adjustment of industrial disputes" arising out of labor and management's differences." 0 National labor policies acknowledge managerial interests as well as employees' interests.' 2 Several provisions of the Act place
specific timing constraints on behavior to preserve stability."3 Others forbid
certain economic tactics altogether.' There are limits on the right to picket
and strike.'05 Further, the Act has imposed bargaining obligations requiring
parties to confer in "good faith.""
Conversely, those who believe that the interests of employees and management are always potentially conflicting point to the Act's central goal of
redressing the "inequality of bargaining power between employees who do
not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and
employers." '
Congress expressed concern for "depress[ed] wage rates and
the purchasing power of wage earners."'
It recognized that employers
caused pervasive unrest by refusing to allow employees to associate, refusing
to recognize and bargain with unions, and discriminating against pro-union
employees.2 "9 Acknowledging "differences as to wages, hours, or other
working conditions," Congress sought to enable workers to deal more effectively with management to better their lot.210 Section 7 creates protection
for employees, motivated by the foregoing concerns.
of Am., Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192, 208 (1986) (stating that the "basic purpose of the...
Act is to preserve industrial peace").
201 NLRA, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
202 See, e.g., Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 1(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141
(1988) (asserting policy of "prescrib[ing] the legitimate rights of both employees and
employers").
203 § 8(b)(7)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A) (1988) (prohibiting recognitional picketing
by employees represented by a recognized union); § 8(b)(7)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B)
(1988) (prohibiting recognitional picketing within one year of election); § 9(c)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988) (prohibiting elections within one year of a prior election).
204 § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988) (prohibiting certain secondary boycotts);
§ 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1988) (prohibiting hot cargo agreements).
205 See, e.g., § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988) (outlawing secondary boycotts);
§ 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1988) (outlawing recognitional and organizational picketing for more than 30 days without having filed a petition for an election); Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 206, 29 U.S.C. § 178(a)(2) (1988) (allowing
injunctions against strikes or lockouts jeopardizing national health or safety).
2w

§ 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); see also NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149,

125-54 (1956) (discussing the Act's good faith bargaining requirement).
207 NLRA,
208 Id.
209

§ 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).

See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1937) (discussing

congressional findings). Section 8 outlaws employer interference or coercion regarding
these rights. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1988).
210 NLRA, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151; NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson
Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 480 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Harnischfeger Corp., 9
N.L.R.B. 676, 684 (1938) (stating that the purpose of collective bargaining is to allow
employees to bargain with employers as equals).
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Moreover, the Act either expressly acknowledges or expressly confers the
right to two forms of concerted activity that are successful only when they
cause or threaten economic harm: strikes and lockouts."' The Supreme
Court has acknowledged the intrinsically conflicting interests of labor and
management in its exemption of supervisors from section 7 protection, 2 2 its
treatment of collective bargaining, 1 and its acceptance of economic weapons such as the strike, boycott, and lockout. The Act preserves the right of
all parties to act in self-interest, and collective bargaining presupposes that
each party seeks to satisfy self-interests. Often, section 7 rights are especially
important in situations when the interests of management and labor are most
antagonistic. 214 The Act even requires employees to act out of self-interest,
as union officials will violate the law (the duty of fair representation) if they
act to further management's interests to the detriment of the bargaining
unit's self-interest.215 Employees must have the purpose of mutual aid or
protection to invoke section 7.216 Mutual aid or protection runs between
employees; it has never been construed to run between employees and management. In fact, the Act forbids excessive management involvement in the
211 See, e.g., NLRA, § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988) (protecting right to strike); NLRA,
§ 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988) (acknowledging right to lock-out).
212 Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 659-60 (1974).
213 [C]ollective bargaining, under a system where the Government does not
attempt to control the results of negotiations, cannot be equated with an academic
collective search for truth-or even with what might be thought to be the ideal of
one. The parties--even granting the modification of views that may come from a
realization of economic interdependence-still proceed from contrary and to an
extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The system has not
reached the ideal of the philosophic notion that perfect understanding among people
would lead to perfect agreement among them on values. The presence of economic
weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and
parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized.
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960).
214 Examples arise when an employer has refused to recognize a union desired by the
employees, or when an employer is considering firing an employee. That the interests are
especially conflicting in the latter example is reflected by the Board's having read into § 7
a right to fellow-employee assistance during investigatory interviews that may lead to
discipline. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (upholding the Board's
determination that the denial of union representation in an investigatory interview was
an unfair labor practice). But see E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 289 N.L.R.B. 627 (1988)
(per curiam) (concluding that Weingarten protection should not be extended to nonunion employees), review denied sub nom. Slaughter v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 10 (3d Cir.),
amended, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2221 (3d Cir. 1989).
215 See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-93 (1967) (stating that a breach of the
duty of fair representation occurs when a union's conduct toward a member is "arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith"); Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944)
(discussing obligation to "act for and not against those whom it represents"); see also
NLRA, § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1988) (discussing obligations of union
representatives).
216 See infra notes 400-01 and accompanying text.
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administration of unions.217 Special provisions in the statutory scheme allow
the expression of negative opinions without sanction, demonstrating that
expression of antagonism between the parties is allowed and expected. 218 To
the extent the Act seeks "harmony," it is driven simply by the goal of
preventing interruption of commerce from labor unrest and employer intransigence or coercion contributing to that unrest.2 19
In Jefferson Standard, the Court's "harmony" paradigm was the clay out
of which the disloyalty exception was molded:
There is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee than
disloyalty to his employer. It is equally elemental that the Taft-Hartley
Act seeks to strengthen, rather than to weaken, that cooperation, continuity of service and cordial contractual relation between employer and
employee that is born of loyalty to their common enterprise.
Congress, while safeguarding, in § 7, the right ... to engage in 'concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection,' did not weaken the underlying contractual bonds and
loyalties of employer and employee.22
To the dissent, disloyalty was an imprecise and unhelpful notion, one that
conflicted with the policies behind legislation designed to elevate labor's vulnerable position vis-a-vis management. 22 1 Subsequent attempts to apply the
disloyalty exception reflect the tension between these two philosophical
paradigms. 2
3. Differing Emotions and Personal Ethics
Even if reviewers were to agree on a guiding labor law paradigm, no useful
standard exists to help determine how "loyal" an employee must be to retain
protection. The term disloyalty inherently invites disagreement and has gen217 See, e.g., NLRA, § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988) (prohibiting employer
domination of or financial support to unions).
218

NLRA, § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988). This clause may also reflect congres-

sional opinion that some amount of adversity is salutary within our society.
[T]he fundamental policy of the Act is to safeguard the rights of self-organization and collective bargaining and thus the promotion of industrial peace to remove
219

obstructions to the free flow of commerce ....

[T]he purpose of the Act is to pro-

mote peaceful settlements of disputes by providing legal remedies for the invasion of
the employees' rights.
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257-58 (1939); see also Associated

Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 129-30 (1937) (explaining that safeguarding employees'
right to advance their own interests by protecting unionization and bargaining rights will

prevent disturbances in commerce and labor unrest).
220 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 472-73
(1953) (footnotes omitted).
221

Id. at 480-81 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

222

See infra part III.C.5. This Article need not resolve definitively or for all purposes

the adversary/harmony question in order to evaluate the

disloyalty test, because disloy-

alty simply is not a criterion grounded in § 7. See infra part IV.A-B.
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erated many dissenting opinions and reversals. ' As the Jefferson Standard
dissenters foresaw,2?A any assessment becomes the subjective expression of
the personal values and opinions of the decision maker.
There are several reasons for these inconsistencies. First, Board members
and appellate judges do not have the benefit of observing witnesses~A In the
murky area of "loyalty," subtle nuances of the employee's comments or
activity are critical. The attitudes of a witness may be best reflected in his
body language.22 The tone of his allegedly disloyal words may be accurately ascertained at trial only by hearing a witness describe the speaker's
volume, tenor, or facial expression.
Second, these problems are accentuated when courts of appeals review
Board decisions. Federal judges are not faced on a daily basis with the task
of applying the delicately balanced policies of the Act to various workplace
facts. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, "courts are generally not in
close contact with the pressures of labor disputes."'2
Third, the term disloyalty invites a differing application because of the
subjectivity of its application. For example, in the case mentioned earlier in
which an employee called the plant manager "Castro," the Trial Examiner
interpreted the comment as an unprotected comparison to a Communist
leader. 228 To the Board the reference was merely "frank," not especially
noteworthy, and certainly no more uncomplimentary than much protected
language.229 To the court of appeals it was flagrant insubordination, deliberate, defiant, blunt, vindictive, disloyal, and disparaging.2 °
223 See, e.g., H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Truck
Drivers, Oil Drivers, Filling Station & Platform Workers Union, Local 705, 630 F.2d 505
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Gilmer v. Truck Drivers, Oil Drivers, Filling Station & Platform Workers Union, Local 705, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Boaz Spinning Co. v.
NLRB, 395 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. National Furniture Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d
280 (7th Cir. 1963); see also infra part III.C.4 (discussing lack of deference to the Board).
224 See Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 481 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[T]o float
such imprecise notions as 'discipline' and 'loyalty' in the context of labor controversies, as
the basis of the right to discharge, is to open the door wide to individual judgment by
Board members and judges.").
225 Cf FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a) (stating that due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge credibility of witnesses).
226 See, e.g., NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1972) (noting that
the trial examiner had discredited the testimony of a witness because "his demeanor
made an unfavorable impression on me").
227 Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65 (1966); see also
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (explaining that unlike administrative agencies, judges are not experts in the field).
228 Boaz Spinning Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1019, 1024 (1967) (Trial Examiner's report),
enforcement denied, 395 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1968). See supra note 135.
229 Boaz Spinning Co., 165 N.L.R.B. at 1020.
230

395 F.2d at 515-16.
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Another example, which starkly contrasts with the unprotected Castro
comment is the following diatribe in leaflets that the court ruled protected:
"The bosses are making it harder for us everyday! .

.

. [T]he NYU

bosses have turned their security guards into a fascist gestapo illegally
searching workers and firing them ... "
. . . At the same time the bosses are building up Klan and Nazi
'white power' punks to further divide us. ..
"Turn [the Union] into an anti-fascist union .
"[T]he NYU management is using the security guards for fascist
gestapo tactics to intimidate black and Spanish workers ... ."
One is hard-pressed to discern why is it unprotected to refer to an individual's management style as Castro-like, when it is protected to call another's
style and intentions fascist, racist, Nazi- and gestapo-like, and supportive of
the Ku Klux Klan.232 Evidently, a comparison to Hitler or the Imperial
Wizard is less odious than a comparison to Castro.
Moreover, the subject of disloyalty is not merely subjective; it is also particularly emotional. The concepts of loyalty and disloyalty evoke powerful
and highly individual images that are conditioned by one's own experiences,
religion, and ethics: loyalty to one's spouse (fidelity), one's country (patriotism), one's God (worship). No wonder disloyalty as a legal standard is elusive to the best-intentioned administrative or judicial decision maker.
Last, inconsistency results from the fact that the Board members are political appointees with five-year terms. 23 They are pressured to follow the prevailing political winds. These political vagaries become magnified when
legal standards are set by terms as ill-defined, subjective, emotional, and generally problematic as disloyalty.
Do the mandates of administrative law not serve as a check on decision
makers' subjectivity-at least to the extent that the courts would uphold
disloyalty determinations made by the Board? After all, reviewing courts
must defer to administrative expertise and must respect limiting standards of
review. To that question I now turn.
4. Varying Willingness to Accord Administrative Deference
The Supreme Court, in its landmark decision Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural
21 NLRB v. New York Univ. Medical Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 286-87 (2d Cir.), vacatedon
other grounds, 464 U.S. 805 (1983).
232 Among other things, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
noted that the employees used the leaflets to communicate with each other about union
matters, and that the leaflets were rhetorical and did not jeopardize plant discipline. Id.
at 290-9 1.
" NLRA, § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1988). The members' terms are staggered such
that there is no complete change in Board membership at any one time. Id.
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Resources Defense Council, Inc.,24 clearly ruled that courts are not free to
substitute their own judgment for that of administrative agencies. Under
Chevron, when Congress has not directly spoken to a given question of statutory interpretation, the reviewing court must defer to any "reasonable" construction by an agency. When a statute is silent or ambiguous, the Court
may only examine whether the agency's interpretation is based on a "permissible construction of the statute."'
In Chevron, the Court openly acknowledged statutory interpretation for what it often is:
policymaking, which is
within the province of the agency.' With regard to responsibility for interpreting section 7 in particular, the Supreme Court has frequently stated that
the Board is charged with this responsibility and is to be given "wide latitude" in this task.2
Because section 7 is silent on the question of exceptions, both Chevron and
the Act mandate that its interpretation be delegated to the Board.23 6 Theoretically, these principles of administrative law ought to lend some measure
of stability to the law on disloyalty. However, it is precisely because disloyalty arouses emotions, implicates ethics, and begs for subjective assessment,
that it is a subject on which appellate courts have had great difficulty according deference. 23 9 Because the area is inherently social and political, it tempts
the substitution of one's own policy preferences.
234

235

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842-43. By contrast, when Congress has "directly spoken to the precise

question," the court and the agency "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent." Id. The reasons for deference include the following: (1) the agency generally has
a better understanding than the courts of facts and the practical impact of legal interpretations because of its expertise in the area; (2) it has superior understanding of how a
ruling fits into the overall field and into the Agency's overall mission; (3) it is the initial
decision maker, with the statutory scheme conferring on courts only the power to review
or delay; (4) review of its decisions are expressly and statutorily limited by specific standards of review; (5) Congress has granted it broad standards within which to act, and
within which differing results legitimately could be reached. Adapted from RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 331-33 (2d ed. 1992).
236 467 U.S. at 864-66. The Court noted that the agency may rely on the "incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments," and held that "it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices-resolving the competing interests." Id. at 865.
237 See, e.g., Meyers Indus. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 882-883 (1986), aff'd sub
nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Meyers
Indus. v. NLRB, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988). There are both express and implied delegations
of power to the Board. The Act expressly delegates to the Board the power to prevent
persons from engaging in commerce upon a finding of an unfair labor practice. NLRA,
§ 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988); NLRA, § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988); NLRA, § 10, 29
U.S.C. § 160 (1988). The Board has the power to investigate and issue complaints,
NLRA, § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988), and to remedy unfair labor practices, so as to
effectuate the Act. § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988).
236 See infra note 466.
239 In all fairness, the degree of deference required was less clear prior to the 1984
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Purporting to give due deference, many judges have not hesitated to overturn Board conclusions about disloyalty,n ° and they have gone to extraordinary lengths to "correct" Board findings about disloyalty.2 1 An example is
Knuth Brothers, mentioned above in another context, in which a Knuth
Brothers pressman had telephoned Schlitz Brewing Company to ask
whether it preferred that its printing be done by unionized companies.242
The call allegedly revealed a confidential subcontracting relationship that
could jeopardize the Schlitz printing order. The Schlitz order was later canceled, which Knuth apparently attributed to an unrelated paper shortage at
the time the Board investigated the initial charges. 4 s Subsequently at trial,
the company implied that the cancellation was a result of the call, though4
Knuth testified he could not remember the reason for the cancellation.
The Administrative Law Judge found no disloyalty, in large part because of
the lack of credibility of Mr. Knuth, and also because of four factual findings: the subcontract was not confidential, the employee was unaware the
call might cause harm, the employee did not intend harm, and the employee
had no intent to instigate a boycott against Knuth."4s In short, Knuth's
Chevron decision, as courts adopted competing theories of the appropriate degree of deference. Nonetheless, both of the accepted theories called for considerable deference to the
agency. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. I I (1944) (illustrating
the deferential rational basis review model); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267
(1974) (illustrating the independent review model), overruled by NLRB v. Hendricks
County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981). See generally PIERCE,
supra note 235, at 248-53.
Because the Board members themselves disagree so greatly about disloyalty, even if
judicial deference were consistently accorded, this would not lead to consistency.
240 See supra note 223.
241 See, e.g., NLRB v. Knuth Bros., 537 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1976), denying enforce-

ment to 218 N.L.R.B. 869 (1975). For a discussion of Knuth Brothers, see supra notes
164-67 and 185-90. In what has become commonplace in disloyalty cases, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit court performed a detailed factual
inquiry into the Board's analysis. Knuth Bros., 537 F.2d at 954-57; see also George A.
Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061, 1064-66 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (engaging in extensive
judicial factfinding), denying enforcement to 301 N.L.R.B. 47 (1991). For a discussion of
George A. Hormel & Co., see supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
242 537 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1976); see also Knuth Bros., 218 N.L.R.B. at 872 (A.L.J.
decision); supra notes 164-67.
243 Knuth Bros., 218 N.L.R.B. at 873 n.7, 875 & n.14 (A.L.J. decision).
2
Id. at 873 n.7, 875; 537 F.2d at 955 n.6.
11 Knuth Bros., 218 N.L.R.B. at 874-76 (A.L.J. decision). Knuth Brothers was "less
than candid," and the alleged confidentiality was "not as significant as [the employer]
would have one believe." Id. at 874. There were no confidentiality policies, and Knuth
Brothers had not clearly informed employees that subcontracts were confidential. Id. at
874-75. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Board's General Counsel failed to
prove anti-union animus, but reinstatement was appropriate because union organizing
calls are protected. Knuth Brothers erred in assuming that the employee sought cancella-
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claim that it fired him for a breach of confidentiality was untrue.' e The
Board agreed on these findings and deferred to the Administrative Law
Judge on credibility.
The appellate court reversed the Board's findings. The employee may not
have intended harm, but he recklessly disregarded its possibility.2"7 The subcontract must have been confidential, because employer witnesses testified
the client was very angry that the call had been made. 2"8 The employee must
have kiown the call could harm, because when the Company fired him, in
his exit interview he "then understood" that he could have caused his
employer a loss of business. 9 In the disloyalty cases this degree of detailed,
factual involvement by a reviewing court is not unique.25°
There is another reason why appropriate deference by the courts (or, for
that matter, consensus among Board members) is lacking: there is no agreement over what factors comprise disloyalty. Some of the differences that
have led to inconsistent results are explored below.
5. Disagreement Over Disloyalty's Components
There are many legal determinations that, like the disloyalty inquiry,
involve assessing "all the facts and circumstances." This aspect of the disloyalty test, without more, would not necessarily be objectionable. What
makes this test particularly difficult is disagreement over what "facts and
circumstances" legitimately may be considered in light of the statutory
scheme; of those that may be considered, which ought to be treated as relevant; and of those that are relevant, what weight should be accorded each.
a. Purpose and Motive
The reviewers frequently discuss whether employees' purposes or motives
tion of the subcontract, a purpose that would be unprotected (though incorrectly referred
to in the case as a "secondary boycott"). Id.
24 The Board held that Knuth Brothers' motive for discharging the employee was its
unfounded fear that he was attempting to pressure Knuth by causing cancellation of the
Schlitz account. Id. at 869.
247 Knuth Bros., 537 F.2d at 956.
248 The court determined that the employer needed confidentiality, and that the
employee could have proceeded without revealing the subcontract. Id. at 955-56. The
court relied on typical contracts in the industry referring generally to confidences,
although Knuth Brothers was not party to one. Id. at 955. The employer's concern
about confidentiality, the court said, was demonstrated by its discharge decision. Id.
249 Id.
21o See, e.g., NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1972) (rejecting Board
findings when, in an acrimonious context, employee called manager a liar and threatened
to hit him), denying enforcement in part and granting enforcement in part to 185
N.L.R.B. 989 (1970); see also George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (ruling as a matter of law that employee supported a boycott, when Administrative Law Judge and Board found employee had not); discussion supra notes 191-94
and accompanying text.
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are relevant to the determination of disloyalty, but these discussions are
fraught with confusion, and the decisions fail to distinguish between purpose
and motive."' Purpose is a goal, an "end" or "object." 2 An individual, a
group of employees collectively, or a union as an organization can have a
purpose. As discussed above, section 7 only protects activity for the specific
purpose of organizing, bargaining, or other mutual aid or protection. 25 For
that reason, employees' and unions' purposes are always relevant in the Jefferson Standard line of cases, but they are relevant at step two of the analysis
(section 7 purposes), not step three (loss of protection under an exception).
If there is no section 7 purpose, decision makers do not need to reach the
question of disloyalty or disparagement.
Motive is the "[clause or reasons that moves the will and induces
action."'
Motive, thus, refers to a person's individual subjective state of
mind, the reason why he is engaged in an activity. 5 Although a union can21

See, e.g., NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S.

464, 476-77 (1953) ("The only connection between the handbill and the labor controversy
was an ultimate and undisclosed purpose or motive on the part of some of the sponsors
that, by the hoped-for financial pressure, the attack might extract from the company
some future concession. A disclosure of that motive might have lost more public support
for the employees than it would have gained ....
(emphasis added)); Sierra Publishing
Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 218 n.13 (9th Cir. 1989) (using purpose, motive, and intent
interchangeably). The cases also confuse the term "intent" with purpose and motive. See
infra note 264.
252 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1236 (6th ed. 1990). In a criminal context, it might be
"I want Joe dead."
253 A union's purpose might be reflected in a union constitution or resolution or be
implicit in the organization's actions. For simplicity, references in the text to employees
include their unions as well (if they are unionized) unless the context indicates otherwise.
Section 7 purposes would include, for example, an ultimate goal of obtaining a favorable
contract, achieving recognition as the bargaining representative, or persuading an
employer to grant a grievance request. As part of such broad purposes, employees also
may have intermediate, short-term purposes such as preventing other employees from
crossing a picket line, persuading purchasers not to buy products during a boycott, or
publicizing a labor dispute so that labor policies will be placed on the next shareholders'
agenda. Such intermediate purposes are also within those covered by § 7, for they are
interim steps towards larger goals of mutual aid or protection.
254 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1014 (6th ed. 1990).

Intent and motive are not identical but are often used interchangeably. Motive is
the reason that a person acts, the moving impulse which prompts or incites him to act.
Intent is the "[d]esign, resolve, or determination with which a person acts." Id. at 810.
Intent may also be the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result, or the state
of mind with which the act is done or not done. Id. at 810, 1014. The distinction is
illustrated in the example, "I'm going to pull the trigger [intent] because I hate Joe
[motive]."
Intent is generally most relevant in the Jefferson line of cases in one of two contexts:
First, intent might mean the specific action the employees did or did not desire to take.
For example, the employees intended to stand and yell at the shareholders' meeting; or
255
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not have a motive because it has no mind, the Board and courts often speak
of a "union's motive." ' Section 7 does not require, at least not on its face,
that actors have any particular motives, as long as they have section 7
purposes.
Different employees engaging in the same activity might have different
motives. During contract negotiations, one employee might distribute leaflets because he hates working overtime, and its elimination is on the bargaining agenda. Another might distribute them because she desires visibility as a
candidate for union president. Another might do so because he is furious at
the company president for being "a terrible union-buster." Another might
do so fearing ostracism from co-workers if she does not. Another might
participate because he seeks revenge against the company president for having just ended their extra-marital affair. All have a section 7 purpose, the
distribution of persuasive literature during bargaining, but not all have
motives related to that purpose.
Before Jefferson Standard, the relevant section 7 inquiry addressed not the
motive but the purpose of the activity:
It is clear.., that to be protected the purpose of the concerted activities must be the mutual aid or protection of the employees ....
It is true as argued by the Board that, where there is a bona fide
concerted activity for any of the purposes named in the statute, its protection will not be decided because of the motives of those engaging in
the activity; but it is not the motive of the participants that we are concerned with here but the "purpose" of the activity.2" 7
the union did not intend to distribute any leaflets in draft stage, but the wind blew some
out of the car window before the union attorney had approved distribution. Used this
way, the inquiries should be if the action had a § 7 purpose at step two, and if it lost
protection under a step three exception. Second, intent may mean the specific desired
result of action. For example, the intent to obtain the long-term result of a favorable
labor contract, or to obtain the short-term result of customers not purchasing products
during a boycott. Both of these results have § 7 purposes and the latter is an example of
an interim or subsidiary § 7 purpose, part of a strategy to achieve an ultimate § 7 goal.
Used this way, intent often becomes part of the step two analysis of whether this desired
result is the product of a § 7 purpose. Intent is thus not particularly helpful in this area
of the law except as it overlaps with step two. However, if action is unintended, this
might shed light on an exception. Also, if loyalty involves one's subjective feelings, then
unintended incidents could have a bearing on loyalty, such as when employees drafted
leaflets but had not intended to distribute them before approval of counsel.
256 Theoretically, all sponsors of a union activity might have identical motives, but this
would be unusual and difficult to ascertain.
257 Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 750 (4th Cir. 1949) (emphasis
added). In Joanna Cotton, a foreman had warned an employee about operating raffles
and loitering around co-workers. The employee was discharged for responding in harsh
and insulting language and enlisting others to sign a petition asking that the foreman be
discharged. While negative motives such as desiring to vent one's spleen are not normally grounds for loss of protection, the court ruled that the employee was not acting for
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Under the statutory scheme, it makes sense to focus on purpose instead of
motive. Frequently, and in certain contexts such as strikes or boycotts, one
of the short-term goals is economic injury to the company. In order for the
employees to achieve results in recognition, bargaining, grievance processing, or other workplace goals, the Act protects their ability to resort to economic pressure if they are willing to pay the price.' Likewise, employers
are allowed to use economic weapons such as lockouts, demands for pay
cuts, and firm positions in bargaining. In the context of other lawful statutory activity such as strikes, leaflets, boycotts, organizing drives, and lockouts, "nice" personal motives have never been required, and there are no
compelling reasons to change the rule. In short, when the activity has a
section 7 purpose, the intent to cause economic harm cannot be a factor
justifying a label of disloyalty, even when the diverse personal motives of the
participants who are exercising those rights include anger, resentment, or
hostility. If the economic harm is lawful, then the "not nice" motives of
those desiring to exercise their rights generally should be irrelevant. 9
To require employees to entertain kindly feelings in order to receive protection would create a double standard. Section 8(c) allows employers to
communicate unkind thoughts or outright disgust without risk of Board
sanction. 260 To require warm feelings in the exercise of section 7 rights also
would impermissibly tamper with the balance of private power between
a § 7 purpose: the petition was a personal vendetta to humiliate the supervisor, not connected to bargaining, working conditions, or other aid or protection. Id. at 751-53.
There is some overlap in this case between motive and step two purpose: that the conduct
was in the nature of a personal vendetta (for example, motivated by anger and resentment) was part of the proof that it lacked a purpose of mutual aid or protection. But had
the employees been concertedly seeking mutual aid or protection, then the fact that one
or more of them felt anger or resentment would not have caused forfeiture of protection
for their petition. Nothing in the opinion implies to the contrary.
258 As long as employees have not waived contractually the right to strike, they are
protected in striking to further these purposes. Of course, employees are not paid for the
time they are striking, and except when the strike was caused or prolonged by unfair
labor practices, they may lose their jobs absent later job openings. NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 344 (1938) (dictum).
259 Indeed, having an acceptable motive for a concerted activity such as wanting to
warn the public about health risks of a product, has not ensured § 7 protection. See, e.g.,
Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 382-85 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(unprotected employees were honestly concerned with public health and loss of jobs due
to changes in production process). On occasion, employees' acceptable motives have
been a positive factor in a finding that there was no disloyalty. See, e.g., Richboro Community Mental Health Council, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 1267, 1268 (1979) (motives were
neither malicious nor ridiculing).
260 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988) (prohibiting only "threats of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit"). That section prohibits only certain coercive threats and promises, and it was
passed for the express purpose of allowing employers to respond to accusations with
explanations and counter-accusations. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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unions and employers, tampering which in other contexts has been decried
and forbidden. 261
On a practical level, inquiring into motive is difficult because of its inherent subjectivity, the difficulty of its proof, and the multiplicity of motives
underlying a particular goal. On a policy level, there is nothing in section 7
that indicates that the "magnanimous" exercise of section 7 rights is protected but the "selfishly motivated" or "spitefully motivated" exercise of
those rights is not.262 Any "nice-motives" test imposed by the Board or the
judiciary unfairly conditions and restricts the exercise of section 7 rights.
For the above reasons, motive is not, and cannot legitimately be, a factor
justifiably warranting a conclusion that an employee is "disloyal" and
thereby undeserving of protection.'
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit appropriately expressed reservations about the statutory legitimacy of inquiring into employee motives-whether malicious or
otherwise-in evaluating disloyalty.2"
b.

Tone

Heated or sarcastic exchanges have led the Board and courts to address if
the tone of oral or written comments causes forfeiture of protection. "Tone"
261 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) (commenting that
the theory of the Act is that opportunity for negotiation will bring about adjustments that
the Act does not compel); see, e.g., NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404
(1952) (noting that the Board and courts generally decline to consider the fairness or
justifications for a party's substantive proposals); NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275
F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960) (stating that even when a party insists on positions that are
"inherently unreasonable, unfair, or impracticable, or unsound" and will cause stalemate,
the Board may not force the party to make concessions).
262 Indeed, the exercise of § 7 rights possibly is most critical and most desired by the
employee precisely when good relations with management have broken down and anger
is expected. For example, organizing activity including recognitional strikes, picketing,
and leafleting; bargaining conduct when the company is refusing requested contract
terms; exercising the grievance process when an employee has been wrongly fired; and
protesting activity prompted by an employer's unfair labor practice. Further, the step
two "purpose" requirement demands a certain level of selfishness. See Richard M. Fischl, Self Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest Activities Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 791 (1989); infra notes 398-401
and accompanying text.
263 In contexts other than disloyalty, there may be exceptions to § 7 in which motives
are relevant. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 62-63
(1966) (noting that malicious defamation is not condoned). Nonetheless, because certain
motives are not required by the statute on its face, a specific subjective state of mind
should be required only if clearly called for or if expressly or necessarily dictated by the
statutory scheme.
264 Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 218 n.13 (9th Cir. 1989) ("How
much reliance to place on motive is problematic because of the Janus-like nature of legitimate and illegitimate intent.").
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is used here to mean the tenor of comments made; that is, how decision
makers characterize the manner in which the words are delivered and the
word choice used. Examples include speech that is considered to be sarcastic, frivolous, humble, respectful, insincere, flippant, ingratiating, ironic, positive, ridiculing, temperate, or uttered with pique or vengeance.A One
employee, for example, was adjudged unprotected because he was perceived
by the court to have been "loud and arrogant" and exhibiting "deliberate
defiance," even though the employer was not offended.'
The disloyalty
determination often turns on whether the decision maker considers the language "reasonable," or too vulgar, inappropriate, or extreme. Several factors, of which the decision maker might or might not be conscious, influence
his conclusions; however, these factors are rarely acknowledged in the disloyalty decisions.2 "7
i. Whether the Reviewer Believes in the "Venting" and "Robust
Debate" Aspects of National Labor Policy
One factor that appears to be important in tone assessment is the extent to
which the decision maker places a value on the functional aspect of section 7
(and of the statutory scheme in general) of fostering robust debate about
labor matters. The Board and courts have often made allowances for a certain amount of emotional "venting" in the labor context because, inevitably
on occasion, labor relations will be fervent.' s "Labor disputes are ordinarily
heated affairs; the language that is commonplace there might well be deemed
actionable per se in some state jurisdictions. '269
26 See, e.g., Sierra Publishing Co., 291 N.L.R.B. 540, 550 (1988) (A.L.J. decision)

(not ridiculing), enforced, 889 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989); Jefferson Standard Broadcasting
Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1526 (1951) (Murdock, Member, dissenting) (temperate), rev'd

sub nom. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW v. NLRB (Jefferson Standard), 202 F.2d 186
(D.C. Cir. 1952), set aside, 346 U.S. 464 (1953); American Arbitration Ass'n, 233
N.L.R.B. 71, 75 (1977) (A.L.J. decision) (pique or vengeance).
266

NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prods. Co., 500 F.2d 6, 11 (8th.

Cir. 1974).

But see

Farah Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 666 (1973) (reinstating employee fired for refusing to
lower voice).
267 See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981) (discussing conscious and unconscious interpretive constructs
that lie behind rational rhetoricism).
28

See, e.g., Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin,

418 U.S. 264, 271-72 (1974) (observing that labor disputes are often heated affairs); Linn
v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966) (tolerating intemperate speech so long as not intentionally defamatory); Great Lakes Steel, 236 N.L.R.B.
1033, 1041 (1978) (holding that use of rhetorical hyperbole is within protected right of
employees), enforced, 625 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1980); FarahMfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. at 669
(holding that even though on company property, employer had no right to limit
employee's loud tone, absent a showing that it was having some demonstrably disturbing
effects on plant business or operations such as distracting employees).
269 Linn, 383 U.S. at 58 (holding that only libel uttered with malice and causing dam-
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Some decision makers express consciously their value choices regarding
the appropriateness of robust debate in labor disputes. Not infrequently they
express a belief that it is wise to allow some margin (short of violence) as a
"safety valve" for the blowing off of excess steam. On occasion, they openly
express their reason for allowing venting as simple pragmatism, in light of
the realities of typical labor disputes.- 0 For example, the Board assessed
politeness in a case in which an employee cursed a supervisor, telling him to
"piss on" a letter, and accused a supervisor at an NLRB trial of being "the
lyingest son-of-a-bitch I have ever seen. 2 71 The Board disapproved of this
method of expression to supervisors but noted "that such a mode of expression is not at all unusual in work-a-day associations among industrial workers. It is also a fact that tempers are aggravated and attitudes are hardened
in the stress and strain of hotly contested labor disputes. '272 Similarly, when
publicity by strikers included allegedly truthful comments about defective
paint made by non-strikers, several dissenting Board members reasoned that
restraining the language would be "incompatible . . .with the realities of
legitimate industrial contest between employer and employee., 27' Finally,
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that heated exchange in labor issues is
27 4
inevitable.
age could be the subject of state tort suits); see also Misericordia Hosp. Medical Ctr. v.
NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 814 n.8 (1980) (rejecting arguments that statements in organizing
efforts receive greater § 7 protection than other efforts to further employee interests).
Though the quoted language refers to representation cases, as opposed to subsequent
disputes such as strikes after a union has been elected, the Linn Court's characterization
of labor dispute language is equally true, if not more so, in the latter context.
270 See, e.g., Linn, 383 U.S. at 60-61 (holding certain epithets protected because
they
are "commonplace"); Acme-Arsena Co., 276 N.L.R.B. 1291, 1292, 1295 (1985) (finding
union steward protected, even though he used vulgar language in duties and insinuated
he would call the IRS to suggest investigation of the company's books), enforced, 804
F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1986); Longview Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 301, 304 (1952) (finding
that not protecting some cursing on picket line would "ignore the industrial realities of
speech in a workaday world"), enforced as modified, 206 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1953). As
the Board noted in Longview, because there are vital economic interests at stake, strikers
resent those who cross the picket line and will express themselves "in language not altogether suited to the pleasantries of the drawing room or even to courtesies of parliamentary disputation." Longview FurnitureCo., 100 N.L.R.B. at 304.
271 National Furniture Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 834, 842, 859 n.58 (1961), enforced in
part, 315 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1963). The employee was distributing leaflets when management sought to give him the letter, which he assumed to be adverse to his interests. The
employer also argued that the employee should not be reinstated because he made certain
comments to a customer about the company's finances, but the Board concluded that this
conduct did not bar reinstatement. Id. at 836; see also infra notes 301-05 and accompanying text.
272 National Furniture, 134 N.L.R.B. at 835.
273 Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627, 1638 (1956) (Murdock & Peterson,
Members, dissenting).
274

Linn, 383 U.S. at 64-65.
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But the issue of allowing venting is more than a matter of pragmatism; it
is a matter of philosophy. Unduly curtailing acceptable means of expression
unacceptably "chills" section 7 activities.' 5 Decision makers understanding
this premise weigh this danger of overdeterrence more heavily on the scale
when assessing degrees of loyalty than will other decision makers. In many
disloyalty 76cases, the Board has ruled that very extreme language is
protected.1

Similarly, the Supreme Court has determined that robust debate in labormanagement relations is desirable as a matter of national policy.'
It has
evidenced its concerns about rules that might "dampen the ardor of labor
debate and truncate the free discussion envisioned by the Act."278 The
Court has approved the Board's conclusion that section 7 protects much
erroneous and defamatory language. The Court has agreed that the following examples of disrespectful and pejorative speech are protected: characterizing an employer or a strike replacement worker as a "scab," with "rotten
principles," and lacking "character";279 calling an employer a "liar," 2s°
"traitor,"'28 "fascist," or "unfair; 2 and accusing an employer of "blackmail" during bargaining.283 Accordingly, it is important to appreciate that
the Board and courts have not only tolerated but valued the role of venting
in labor-management disputes, for both practical and policy reasons.
275 See Longview Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 301, 304 (1952), enforced as modified,
206 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1953); see also NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 833 n. 10
(1984); Meyers Indus. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 888-89 (1986), aff'd sub nom. Prill
v. N.L.R.B., 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Meyers Indus. v.
NLRB, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988); Farah Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 666, 667 (1973).
276 See, e.g., Misericordia Hosp. Medical Ctr., 246 N.L.R.B. 351, 354, 356 (1979)
(report presented at public hearing stating that hospital has "unsanitary conditions" and
"serious deficiencies in quality of care"), enforced, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980); Golden
Day Sch., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1292, 1296 (1978) (statements to parents of children in
child development center that children are served spoiled food, ride unsafe buses, are
depressed, and are not taken on field trips as parents are told, and that teachers falsified
evaluations of children), enforced, 644 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1981); Great Lakes Steel, 236
N.L.R.B. 1033, 1035 (1978) (claims to co-employees that company lets employees "DIE
WAITING" and engages in "MURDER TO SAVE PROFITS" because company lacks
ambulances), enforced, 625 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1980).
27 Linn, 383 U.S. at 64-65.
278 Id. at 64. For such reasons the Court severely limited state tort remedies for defamation in labor matters. Id. at 64-65. The Court also noted, however, that the Board
does not construe § 7 as protecting conduct that intentionally injures someone by circulating known falsehoods that are defamatory or insulting. Id. at 61.
11 Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S.
264, 283 (1974).
280 Linn, 383 U.S. at 60.
281 Id. (liar); Letter Carriers,418 U.S. at 283 (traitor).
282 Letter Carriers,418 U.S. at 284 (quoting Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302 v.

Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943)).
283

Id. at 284-85.
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The question of how "polite" employees must be to retain their jobs under
the statute arises in many cases when language used in venting includes vulgarity or sexual innuendo.'
The facts in these cases mirror the employee's
social background, which is reflected in his choice of words, how he communicates generally, and whether he is fortunate to have an attorney draft
the critical speech. Therefore, fashioning a test that turns too narrowly on
the degree to which the speaker is genteel has class-based ramifications.
Moreover, the "politeness test" also turns on the decision maker: her own
cultural predilections, familiarity with the particular vulgarity used, knowledge of common parlance in many workplaces, and sensibility to crude,
harsh, or critical language. 8 5
ii.

Whether the Reviewer Adopts an "Adversary" or a "Harmony"
Model of Labor Relations

A related philosophical dispute involves whether management's and
labor's interests are necessarily adversarial or aligned. The broader implications for disloyalty regarding the reviewer's paradigm choice were explored
earlier.28 ' That choice becomes particularly significant when the decision
maker evaluates the tone of speech.
The decision maker's paradigm choice affects whether he looks to tone at
all. If he does, his choice influences the way in which he relates tone of
speech to his disloyalty assessment. The importance of exercising section 7
rights "politely" depends on his perspective of the conflict between employees' right under the Act to further their own interests and management's
desire to control in name of "discipline" and workplace peace.
The paradigm choice affects the reviewer's attitude towards insulting or
heated language. For example, ridicule and sarcasm are inevitable on both
"sides" of economic warfare, especially when it is fought in the public arena
and assisted by the media, as often happens in the corporate campaign. The
employee's glee at irreverently ridiculing the employer is proportionate to
the latter's dismay. Both perspectives are natural human responses. The
humor in language that is gleefully and irreverently sarcastic, such as comparing the boss to a goose, vulture, 28 7 or "Wrankle head, ' 28 is a source of
284 NLRB v. New York Univ. Medical Ctr., 702 F.2d 284, 290 n.6 (2d Cir.) (citing
cases in which obscenities and sexual innuendo marked language found unprotected),
vacated on other grounds, 464 U.S. 805 (1983).

285

See Kelman, supra note 267, at 670 (suggesting conscious and unconscious inter-

pretive constructs are products of a person's class).
288 See supra part III.C.2.
287 Maryland Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 538, 539, 541 (4th Cir. 1950) (opining
that when language compared company officials to goose, vulture, and Hitler, "[flreedom
of speech nowhere means freedom to ... wantonly lampoon or insult anyone"). But see
infra notes 411-20 and accompanying text.
288 See, e.g., Champion Int'l Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 102, 107 (1991) (protecting offensive

newsletter that referred to a supervisor as "Wrankle Head").

HeinOnline -- 73 B.U. L. Rev. 350 1993

1993] LABOR, LOYALTY, AND THE CORPORATE CAMPAIGN

351

solidarity and comradery. Indeed, the primary motive in using "gleefully
irreverent" language is to create solidarity and further comraderie in the
concerted cause, not necessarily to harm the employer's operations.
Conversely, sometimes the employer's primary motive in disciplining sarcastic employees is not to advance its direct or indirect economic interests,
but rather to respond to the natural humiliation or anger from the ridicule." 9 When such a case comes before the decision maker for a "loyalty
screening," to one reviewer the tone of speech shows comraderie and solidarity epitomizing the essence of the union's cause within the adversarial paradigm. To another, it reflects disrespect and intolerable embarrassment of the
employer.
iii.

Whether the Reviewer Characterizes the Tone as an "Attack"

Moving from the reviewer's philosophy to her own choice of language,
there is one especially frequent characterization of tone accompanying findings of disloyalty: that the employee's comments were an "attack." In Jefferson Standard, the Board had concluded that the "second class handbills"
constituted a "verbal attack upon the employer."'
When the case reached
the Supreme Court, to say that this characterization resonated with the
Court would be an understatement, for the majority used the word "attack"
and its derivatives over twenty times. The Court's captivation with the metaphor reached its apex when the Court used "attack" five times in four consecutive sentences:
[T]he attack of August 24 was not part of an appeal for support in the
pending dispute. It was a concerted separable attack purporting to be
made in the interest of the public rather than in that of the employees.
We find no occasion to remand this cause to the Board for further
specificity of findings. Even if the attack were to be treated ... as a
concerted activity wholly or partly within the scope of those mentioned
in § 7, the means used by the technicians in conducting the attack have
deprived the attackers of the protection of that section."'
The dissenters did not use the word at all.
After Jefferson Standard, decision writers have frequently used the
"attack" appellation. Although it is not specifically portrayed as a factor in,
or component of, the disloyalty test, evidently it is perceived as an objective
289

Direct economic interests refers here to output (productivity) and income (profit).

Indirect interests refers to auxiliary interests, such as enforcement of plant rules or maintaining discipline, that further the direct interests.
29

94 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1512 (1951), rev'd sub nom. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW v.

NLRB (Jefferson Standard), 202 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1952), set aside, 346 U.S. 464

(1953).
291 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 477-78
(1953) (emphasis added).
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description of conduct.2 92 Yet, "attack" has no useful meaning, because all

section 7 publicity over circumstances employees wish to change "attacks"
some aspect of the employer or its operations. To the reader of the decision,
the term serves the function of the canary in the mines; it has no independent value in the setting and is merely a signal: when the word is used, if the
employees had any section 7 rights, they soon will be extinguished.
I propose the Jefferson Standard Court's "attack" characterization merely
reflected the Court's reaction to the product disparagement in that case.
Since then, the term has expanded because it frequently surfaces as an
unstated factor in disloyalty analysis. The choice to saddle the conduct with
this appellation, and in doing so to find disloyalty, directly results from the
writer's individual characteristics discussed above, such as whether he values
the venting and robust debate aspects of labor law, and whether he adopts
the adversary or harmony paradigm.
Turning to specifics, reviewers have characterized a variety of circumstances as "attacking," including speech critical of products and business
policies as in Jefferson Standard itself.293 The term has been applied to silly
ridicule and sarcasm, such as a dress code protest asking an employer's clients, inter alia, whether jean jackets look better on dogs or administrators,
and whether jeans should be worn at the office by children, monkeys, administrators, dogs, or janitors.'
The term has referred to speech critical of
specific individuals and defamation of individuals.29 The term functions
both as a shield by those claiming their activity should be protected (because
292 See, e.g., Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 385

(D.C. Cir. 1972) (finding leaflets with intent and effect "to attack the Company's product
rather than to inform the public of a genuine issue in a labor dispute" unprotected);
Maryland Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 538, 539 (4th Cir. 1950) (holding that the
company lawfully prohibited distribution of union newspaper "attacking" supervisor's
association as a "'scab' organization" and lampooning company president); Cordura
Publications, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 230, 231, 237 (1986); Knuth Bros., 218 N.L.R.B. 869,
870 (1975) (Kennedy, Member, dissenting), enforcement denied, 537 F.2d 950 (7th Cir.
1976). But see Champion Intl Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. at 107-08 (A.L.J. decision) (describing union newsletter as "consistently attack[ing] Respondent's position in the labor dispute," and still finding comments protected).
293 See also Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627, 1627 n.3 (1956) (describing
employer's objection to leaflets as "attacking the quality of our paint"). The Board used
the term six times in describing Jefferson Standard'sholding. Id. at 1629-30. But see id.
at 1633-38 (Murdock & Peterson, Members, dissenting) (arguing that truthful criticism
of paint's quality made by non-regular employees during strike is not an unprotected
attack).
I American Arbitration Ass'n, 233 N.L.R.B. 71, 75 (1977) (A.L.J. decision) (finding
that a letter to clients asking them to fill out a sarcastic questionnaire concerning dress
code constituted an attack).
295 Kitty Clover, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1665, 1688 (Trial Examiner's report) (noting that
the employer viewed comments to customers that company hired "diseased girls" from
"skid row" as an "unsubstantiated attack"), enforced, 208 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1953).
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it was not an attack), and as a sword by those claiming it should not be
protected (because it was an attack), often on the same facts.
Examining the use of the "attack" characterization underscores the arbitrary results when different reviewers attempt to apply the disloyalty test. A
group of examples illustrates the scope of divergent attitudes about disloyalty and demonstrates that the distinctions between what is and what is not
an "attack," and therefore what is or is not disloyal, are so ephemeral as to
be humorous, if not absurd.'
The Board divided three to two on whether words constituted an unprotected attack in Patterson-SargentCo. 27 Several striking paint company
employees had distributed a handbill to the public at retail stores. It advised
consumers that because the "well-trained, experienced" employees were
striking, workers currently making the paint might not know the manufacturing formulas, and the paint might "peel, crack, blister, scale, or any one
of many undesirable things that would cause you inconvenience, lost time,
and money."" 8 To the majority, the leaflets triggered loss of protection.'
The two dissenters however, concluded that "[t]he content of the instant
handbills fails, in our opinion, to warrant the conclusion so readily drawn by
our colleagues that the handbill in fact constitutes an 'attack on the quality
of the employer's product.' 9t30"
In National FurnitureManufacturing Co. ,"0: the Board agreed with an
Administrative Law Judge's finding that negative comments in leaflets disI This is not to fault those who have struggled with the disloyalty exception. Many

decision makers have valiantly attempted to work within its constraints. Their utter lack
of success at creating a coherent doctrine merely demonstrates that the disloyalty test is
vague and unwieldy and, at bottom, nonsense.
m 115 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1956). I think this case is distinguishable from Jefferson Standard on multiple factual grounds and was wrongly decided. See infra note 363.
298
--

115 N.L.R.B. at 1628.

Id.

at 1630 (quoting Jefferson Standard's "attack" comments).

ao Id. at 1633 (Murdock & Peterson, Members, dissenting) (quoting id. at 1629
(majority)). The dissent distinguished the handbill from an attack because (1) it did not
claim as fact that the paint was inferior; (2) it only cautioned the public about possible
future effects of the strike; (3) there was a factual basis for believing the statements true;
and (4) employees' speech rights include the right to publicize statements inseparably
related to their strike warning of inferior products made by non-regular employees. Id. at
1633-34. The dissent also distinguished Jefferson Standard on other grounds. Id. at

1634. Furthermore, the dissent concluded that the employer committed a separate violation by selectively discharging the union leaders for representing employees and striking.

Id. at 1639-40.
Perhaps qualifying their conclusion concerning the "attack" term, the dissent also

refused to characterize the statements as a product attack "of the invidious character"
ascribed by the majority. Id. at 1634. This sentence, if taken alone, implies that the
dissent believed there are two kinds of attacks, invidious (unprotected) and non-invidious

(protected). See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
301

134 N.L.R.B. 834 (1961), enforced in relevant part, 315 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1963).
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tributed at a furniture exposition were protected because they did not
"attack... the quality of the Company's products," 30 2 even though they
were harshly critical. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit agreed that section 7 protected the leaflet distribution. 0 3 Concurring, Judge Kiley distinguished the case from what he termed the "vitriolic
attack on the quality of the company's television broadcasts" in Jefferson
Standard.' In dissent, Judge Schnackenberg, argued that the leaflets evidenced "such detrimental disloyalty as to provide 'cause' " to discharge the
"perpetrators of the attack."' 5
In Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc.,06 several strikers observed through
plant windows that strike replacement workers were not using the usual
electronic equipment that detected foreign objects in Coke bottles. The
strikers worried that their jobs might have been abolished, and also that the
public could be endangered by dirty bottles.' When they warned the public
about their concerns, the company considered these warnings an attack."
The Board's General Counsel argued that the warnings were "not a direct
attack" on the company's product, but "merely publicized" the strikers' protest against a development that they in good faith believed would result in
injury to the public." However, the Trial Examiner, with the agreement of
the Board, found the leaflet distribution an unprotected attack.310
302 Id. at 836; id. at 854 (Trial Examiner's report). See discussion supra notes 168-73
and accompanying text.
303 NLRB v. National Furniture Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 280, 284-86 (7th Cir. 1963).
34 Id. at 287 (quoting Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 468, and adding emphasis).
Judge Kelly also noted that in Jefferson Standard, there had been no prior Board hearing
and order, and there the employees picketed off and on for ten days while drawing full
pay. Id.
305 Id. at 288-89 (Schnackenberg, J., dissenting) (concluding that the leaflets were misleading and were a "brutal effort to destroy National's business"). In a different issue in
the case, an employee told a customer that the company had had layoffs, "trouble with"
certain employees, poor reception at a national exposition, and that "the whole organization was turned upside down" and would soon discontinue making furniture. 134
N.L.R.B. at 857 (Trial Examiner's report). The Board concluded that these remarks
should not be treated as an attack, id. at 836, but the Court found them unprotected.

National Furniture, 315 F.2d at 286 n.7.
3m 186 N.L.R.B. 1050 (1970), enforced in part sub nom. Retail, Wholesale & Dep't
Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
37 The Company did not dispute that the employees' two stated motives were their
actual motives. Id. at 1062 n. 11 (Trial Examiner's report). The parties stipulated that
foreign objects were found in returned bottles. Id. at 1063 (Trial Examiner's report).
308 Id. at 1063-64 (Trial Examiner's report).
39 Id. at 1064 (Trial Examiner's report).
310 "I find it was an attack on the Company's product and an effort to persuade members of the public not to purchase Coca-Cola." Id. Because the Board had found that the
employer condoned the leafleting, the court of appeals did not address the activity's protection. Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 385 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
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In MisericordiaHospital Medical Center,311 a report to a hospital's funding source alleged, inter alia, that there were staffing shortages, unsanitary
conditions, and "serious deficiencies in the quality of care" proved by the
hospital."3 3 To the employer, these accusations were a "vicious and venal,"
"selfish,"
disloyal attack. To the Administrative Law Judge, Board, and
appellate court, for various reasons they were not a disloyal attack.31 4
In Richboro Community Mental Health Council, Inc. ,315 an employee of a
drug rehabilitation center wrote a letter complaining of the discharge of an
employee and alleging that the administration's conduct had "signified a
decrease in the quantity and quality of service to clients." 16 The letter
named the persons "directly responsible for this decline in service." '17 It
asked that the recipients consider the matter as their "immediate and personal concern," and that the administration be "held accountable" to the
community through its congressional representative.318 The employee even
mailed the letter to the local newspaper, a Congressman, and the government agencies that funded the Center. 19 To the Administrative Law Judge,
these comments were an unprotected "personal attack"' 2 on the employer
unrelated to a labor dispute.3 21 To the Board, however, they were not "a
personal attack unrelated to [the employee's] protest of Respondent's labor
practices.",22
311 246 N.L.R.B. 351 (1979), enforced, 623 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1980).

Id. at 354.
Id. at 357.
314 The various reasons included the fact that the report was not distributed to the
public, except to those present at the public accreditation meeting; that it pertained to
working conditions; that management requested a report; that management had ignored
complaints; and that some of the allegations were partly true.
315 242 N.L.R.B. 1267 (1979).
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Id.
312

313

319

Id.

Id. at 1273 (A.L.J. decision).
Also important to the Administrative Law Judge was that the employee used his
employer's letterhead and that by sending it to the hospital's funding sources it
threatened the employer's existence. Id. at 1272-73 (A.L.J. decision).
322 Id. at 1268 (noting that the employee had no malicious motive and that the criticism "was not so extreme as to reflect a disloyalty").
The Board reached a similar result in Emarco, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 832 (1987). A construction company's striking employees told a contractor that their company's president
was "no damn good" and "a son of a bitch." They claimed that the company never paid
its bills and "can't finish the job" and that "this job is too damn big for them." Id. at 833.
The two unrecalled strikers had visited the job site to see if their co-workers had been
working there and to seek information about their employer's financial viability. Id. at
832-833. The remarks passed muster because they did not contain malicious falsehoods
and "were not in the nature of a personal attack unrelated to the employee's protest of
the Respondent's labor practices," id. at 834 (footnote omitted). Dissenting, Chairman
320
321
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On occasion, the Jefferson Standard holding has been restated as denying
protection to employees who make a "malicious attack on the product or
reputation of their employer." '3 Often, as in one example above, it is stated
in the double negative: protection is allowed when the conduct is "not a
personal attack unrelated to" the labor dispute.3 24 This last test actually
goes more to the issue of whether employees have a section 7 purpose (as
opposed, for example, to being on a personal vendetta), but it is sometimes
merged into the step three disloyalty inquiry.'
iv.

Conclusions to Be Drawn from the Consideration of Tone

Several important points are gleaned from decision makers' treatment of
tone. First, because employers are far more likely to feel attacked than the
Board is to label the employee's language as an attack, 26 decision makers
must distinguish the lay, or ordinary, meaning of "being attacked" (or "feelDotson labeled the remarks a "broadside, reckless, and malicious attack on the
[employer's] general, financial and operational integrity." Id. at 838 (Dotson, Chairman,
dissenting). Dotson also concluded that the remarks resulted in disparagement of the
respondent's "business reputation," that they did not relate to an existing labor dispute,
and that they were not based on facts. Id.
323 Sahara Datsun, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1045 (1986), enforced, 811 F.2d 1317
(9th Cir. 1987). This restatement of the Jefferson Standard holding omits critical additional aspects of the holding: that it was the Company's product, not just its "reputation"
that was disparaged; that the employees deliberately undertook to alienate customers and
cause economic harm; and that they failed to disclose that the flyer was written by union
members, for union purposes, in a labor dispute.
324 Richboro Community, 242 N.L.R.B. at 1268 (citing Springfield Library & Museum
Ass'n, 238 N.L.R.B. 1673 (1978)); see also Emarco, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 832, 834 (1987).
Presumably, this test is not implying that when it comes to disloyalty and product disparagement, "personal attacks" are deserving of less protection than some other attacks,
such as attacks on the business or product.
32I For example, in Springfield Library & Museum Ass'n, 238 N.L.R.B. 1673 (1978), a
union president published an article in the union newsletter, which included references to
the library administration as "hierarchical" and "'non-library, non-public oriented,'"
and "authoritarian," and to an administrator as out of touch with professionals and holding his job as "a form of welfare-for-the-rich." Id. at 1676 (A.L.J. decision). The
Administrative Law Judge characterized the newsletter as a "gratuitous attack . . .
entirely unrelated to any protected union or concerted interest." Id. at 1679. The Board
agreed with the latter test as stated, but determined that the article conveyed a message
concerning concerted and union issues. The Board based its holding on cases setting
defamation standards in labor matters and ruled that absent knowledge of the words'
falsity or reckless disregard of whether they were true or false, they were protected. Id.
at 1673-74; see also Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966);
Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264
(1974). At step three, the "personal attack unrelated to a labor dispute" test makes more
sense in disparagement cases than in disloyalty.
326 See, e.g., Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 217 (9th Cir. 1989)
(describing letter charging that "circulation has plummeted, good employees have left for
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ing attacked") from the legal conclusion that often attaches once the label is
applied. Reviewers will err if they apply the "attack" language to each situation in which an employer feels attacked. The cases have failed to articulate
clearly this pitfall.
Additionally, "attack" cannot be used as a term of art to help discern
disloyalty because it has no clear or intrinsic meaning.'
Even the most
routine, protected concerted activity, such as carrying a placard that says
"employer unfair-pays lousy wages," could be labeled as an "attack." Military metaphor is commonplace in both management's and labor's preparation for a strike, lockout, boycott, and even some bargaining sessions.am If
the "attack" were grounds for a loss of protection, then protection would be
lost during the most important assertions of labor/management differences.
In short, rather than being used consistently as some sort of term of art, the
frequently surfacing "attack" appellation appears to be a characterization
used to justify a conclusion of protection (not an attack) or lack of protection (is an attack). 3'
The cases also reflect that decision makers have virtually no agreement on
how to characterize the tone of specific language. Speech that is a "temperate and truthful criticism" to one' is a "sharp," 331 "vitriolic attack " 332 to
another. This discrepancy among those who sit in judgment of section 7
better jobs, and advertising has suffered," as disparaging to the employer newspaper, positive to the Board, and "constructive and hopeful" to the Court).
I Attack would not be unusual in this regard according to some writers who emphasize that no word has one intrinsic meaning. See generally Paul Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980) (arguing that because
the law needs to be adaptive and flexible in light of changing experiences and perceptions,
the text and plain meanings of a word are not dispositive); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417 (1899) (noting that because a
word generally has several meanings, to determine the meaning in a particular case, one
must consider the context in which a word appears as well as general usages). See also
JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri C. Spivak trans., 1st Am. ed. Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press 1976) (1967) (espousing an interpretive technique that follows from
the premise that language contains infinite possible meanings, and that one may deconstruct or unravel the text to determine that it has no one correct interpretation).
31 The union "marshals the troops," while the employer plans its "defensive moves."
3' The Board continues to use the term as a rationale for finding disloyalty, but it
implicitly acknowledged that the term refers more to context than to any set meaning
when it concluded that words did not warrant "treatment as an attack." National Furniture Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 834, 836 (1961) (emphasis added), enforced in part, 315 F.2d
280 (7th Cir. 1963).
10 Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1526 (1951) (Murdock,
Member, dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW v. NLRB (Jefferson
Standard), 202 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1952), set aside, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
331 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 471
(1953).
332 Id. at 468.
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activity indicates that the attack term specifically, and tone generally, are
exceedingly difficult to apply consistently.
Furthermore, the Board's treatment of the "attack" characterization, profanity, and sarcasm reflects that the Board often gives greater weight to the
venting and robust debate aspects of labor law than do the courts. Whether
the speech consists of vulgarity or simply highly emotional rhetoric, the
courts have been less willing to allow protection when the employee
expresses frustration or anger.3m Boaz Spinning Co., mentioned above,
exemplifies this point.' In Boaz, an employee attempted to extol the benefits of unionization following a company anti-union speech."Y ' When
ordered to sit down, the employee said that the manager was "no different
from Castro."" a Pointing out that the manager had invited questions, and
331 See, e.g., Precision Window Mfg., Inc. v. NLRB, 963 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1992)
(refusing to grant protection to an employee who had threatened to kill his supervisor);
New River Indus. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290 (4th Cir. 1991) (denying protection to
employees who posted a mocking letter of employer); Sullair P.T.O., Inc. v. NLRB, 641
F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding an employee who had uttered profanity at his employer
to have forfeited protection); NLRB v. Truck Drivers, Oil Drivers, Filling Station &
Platform Workers Union, Local 705, 630 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1980) (reasoning that
simply because "employees are protected while presenting wage complaints does not give
them carte blanche in choosing the method of presentation"), cert. denied sub nom. Gilmer v. Truck Drivers, Oil Drivers, Filling Station & Platform Workers Union, Local 705,
450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Abilities & Goodwill, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1979)

(holding that a protest over a change in management personnel is not a protected activity); NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prods. Co., 500 F.2d 6, 9 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating that
employee's "rigorous defiance" gave employer proper cause to dismiss employee);
Chemvet Lab., Inc. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 445, 451 (8th Cir. 1974) (refusing to grant protec-

tion to an employee who called her boss a "son-of-a-bitch"); Boaz Spinning Co. v.
NLRB, 395 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1968) (finding that an employee's remark that the
management representative was a "totalitarian dictator" was unprotected); NLRB v.
National Furniture Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1963) (refusing to enforce a Board
order requiring an employer to reinstate an employee displaying a disrespectful attitude);
NLRB v. Longview Furniture Co., 206 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1953) (engaging in namecalling while on picket line rendered employees unsuitable for re-employment).
One could speculate on reasons why the circuit courts are less likely than the Board or
the Supreme Court to value "venting" concerning working conditions. Perhaps the
courts' less frequent exposure to the policies of the Act leads to an increased willingness
to sweep issues within broad notions of "managerial rights." The Board's familiarity

with the American workplace may lead to greater empathy for the worker. The difference in backgrounds of the judiciary, as compared to those of the Board, provides
another possible explanation.
334 165 N.L.R.B. 1019 (1967), enforcement denied, 395 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1968); see

also supra notes 150, 228-30 and accompanying text.
= 165 N.L.R.B. at 1019.
3w The employee's full statement was:
I want you to know you are no different from Castro; Castro told the people in his

country if they did not like the way he was running it, to pack up and leave, and you
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that the employer's anti-union speech provoked the remark, the Board ruled
that the employee could not be expected to maintain "cool, analytical impartiality."'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found
the employee's conduct unprotected and characterized it as "deliberate, vigorous defiance" by an employee who had disobeyed instructions and
"resorted to invective," on company time and property.3m
Careful study of decision makers' treatment of tone also reveals the
importance of intangible motives. Although one can understand an
employer's economic motivation to discharge employees who disrupt operations or otherwise harm the employer, individual egos, reputations, and
pride are often more at stake than any actual harm to the employer's economic interest.'
In this area of the law, aroused emotions are almost as
tell people at Boaz Spinning Company if they do not like the way you are running
this plant to punch out and go home.

Id.
337 Id. at 1020. The Board also noted that the employee had not specifically accused
the manager of being a communist.
338 Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1968). The court
accepted the Trial Examiner's reasoning and grounded its ruling in "disparagement." Id.
at 514, 516. Most Board members and judges would have used a disloyalty rationale for
the outcome, because the employee did not disparage a company product and made the
comments within the plant only. The court did agree with the general rule of granting
allowances for certain impulsive behavior while pursuing § 7 purposes. Id. at 514. For
the argument that this and certain other cases should be treated as straightforward insubordination cases, see supra part III.A.2. Placing differing premiums on the value of
allowing employees some leeway for use of intemperate language in pursuit of § 7 activities is not confined to post-Jefferson cases. See, e.g., Aintree Corp., 43 N.L.R.B. 1 (1942)
(finding that distribution of leaflets urging fellow employees to listen to an upcoming
radio program, which would discuss recent Board ruling that an opposing union was
unlawfully employer-dominated, did not disrupt the workplace), enforcement denied, 135
F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1943) (concluding that employers justifiably disciplined employee
"troublemakers" because distribution of leaflets played upon a source of company uneasiness and could have caused hostility).
aa See, e.g., New River Indus. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding sarcastic letter ridiculing free ice cream unprotected); Maryland Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 183
F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1950) (finding silly references to company president unprotected);
Farah Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 666, 705 (1973) (A.L.J. decision) (finding loud talking and
refusal to lower voice protected despite the fact that it made supervisor "look bad").
Economic analysis of law traditionally posits a world in which decisions are based on
rationality, not on emotion. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 3-10 (2d ed. 1977). Further, decisions not based on rational, self-interest are considered "noncompetitive" and subject to self-correction along with other temporary market failures. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (arguing in employment-at-will
context that inefficient decision making will self-correct). A supervisor's "short term"
interest in his ego or pride, for instance, may well conflict with his firm's long-run best
interests, an example of agency cost. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior. Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
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important as whether the criticism caused or threatened economic injury.
Employers may seek to discharge an employee for ridicule or sarcasm even
when the concerted activity is harmless and fails truly to threaten management's "authority."
By including tone of speech as a factor in assessing disloyalty, decision
makers will make disloyalty determinations largely based on an unpredictable merger of the speaker's natural language and the decision maker's own
cultural predilections, value choices, and adoption of a particular philosophical paradigmY ° Questions such as how the particular decision maker sorts
out the matter of the importance of venting and robust debate, where she
stands on the issue of politeness in light of her position along the harmonyto-adversary continuum, or why she views the criticism as an attack, are all
interpretive constructs. These constructs, however, are usually unconscious,
or at least unstated, in the decisions. Therefore, the disloyalty rhetoric is
difficult to "unpack" or decipher.A4' Tone is not predictable, consistent, or
particularly helpful as a component of disloyalty.
c.

Striking or Working

Language in an early case created confusion, later intensified in disloyalty
cases, about the extent to which a striking or working employee has section 7
protection.'
In Montgomery Ward & Co., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the activities of employees who
had chosen to leave clerical work unprocessed for several days without
informing their supervisor.
In dictum, the court said,
It was implied in the contract of hiring that these employees would do
the work assigned to them in a careful and workmanlike manner; that
they would comply with all reasonable orders and conduct themselves
so as not to work injury to the employer's business; that they would
serve faithfully and be regardful of the interests of the employer during
the term of their service, and carefully discharge their duties to the
extent reasonably required. Any employee may, of course, be lawfully
discharged for disobedience of the employer's directions in breach of his
ture, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976). To the extent the data reveal reliance on emotional or
otherwise "non-rational" decision making, such as altruism or favoritism caused by
friendship or politics, the disloyalty arena may be one particularly prone to market
imperfections, and thus, one where law's intervention may be especially justified.
340 Perhaps this is not all bad. Maybe it is desirable to use § 7 to legislate manners,
acceptable versus unacceptable cursing, and other such norms of civility. But if we really
mean to impose a middle-class bias on the ability to claim statutory rights, this intention
should be openly acknowledged and debated.
341 See Kelman, supra note 267, at 591-93 (discussing how interpretive constructs,
such as choices in construing facts and framing possible rules, underlie and undercut the
law's rational rhetoricism).
I NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946).
343

Id. at 496.
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contract. While these employees had the undoubted right to go on a
strike and quit their employment, they could not continue to work and
remain at theirpositions, accept the wages paid to them, and at the same
time select what part of their allotted tasks they cared to perform of
their own volition, or refuse openly or secretly, to the employer's damage, to do other work. 3
In the context of the case, this language was not particularly noteworthy
because section 7 does not license deception, selectively refusing to do one's
Five years later, however, the United States
job, or insubordination. 3'
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit quoted much of this language as a
rationale for refusing to reinstate discharged employees who were boycotting
their employer's products. 3' The court said that employees may not seek
34 7
their own ends while "employed"; they must do so while striking.
Although the discussion was dictum because the court based its holding
upon a finding that the boycott had an unlawful purpose, 3' the court had
planted the seeds of confusion about the right to engage in collective activity
when not striking.34 9 The Supreme Court echoed this confusion in Jefferson
Standard when it noted that the technicians there had not struck. 3 °
344 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit had used similar language in an earlier case. United Biscuit Co. of
Am. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1942). In United Biscuit, salesmen selectively
refused to perform certain tasks but did not strike. Id. at 776. The Court upheld their

discharges, quoting the employer's argument that the salesmen were disloyal. Id. The
holding did not turn on notions of loyalty; the court found the salesmen unprotected for
failure to perform their duties. Id. The court stated that the salesmen were entitled to
strike but not "to remain as employees unless they were willing to perform their duties

wholeheartedly and efficiently." Id. Thus, as in Montgomery Ward, the relevant language referred simply to the insubordination, or selectively working.
345 See supra part III.A.2.
3" Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380, 389 (6th Cir. 1951).
347 Id. at 390.

348 The purpose of the boycott was to compel the employer to recognize and bargain
with a union other than a union that had filed a petition for election. Achieving this
objective would constitute an unfair labor practice, as it was ruled counter to the Board's
election processes. The references in the case to forbidding anything that could harm the
business could be misconstrued to forbid unionizing, seeking higher wages, and other
such classic, protected activity. The language forbidding working for one's own ends
while remaining "employed," as opposed to doing so while striking, could be misinterpreted to forbid any § 7 activity until going on strike. I believe the Court intended
neither erroneous construction.
349 Shortly thereafter, the Board approved a trial examiner's conclusions that clarified

that Hoover did not stand for the proposition that boycotts by striking employees were
unprotected. Kitty Clover, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1665, 1688, enforced, 208 F.2d 212 (8th
Cir. 1953). The Board explained that a boycott may be unlawful because of unlawful
ends, as in Hoover, or may constitute an illegal secondary boycott. Id.
350 346 U.S. 464, 467 (1953) (observing that the employees "confined their respective
tours of picketing to their off-duty hours and continued to draw full pay").
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Contrary to this misleading language, nothing in the Act restricts one's
section 7 rights to strike-time only. To require employees to strike in order
to exercise their right to mutual aid or protection would not only lack any
statutory basis, but it would also have the counterproductive effect of actually encouraging strikes. Such a rule would therefore stand contrary to the
policies of the Act to promote labor peace and avoid obstructions of commerce as1 In section 7 cases, including disloyalty cases, whether the employees are striking or working generally should not be a factor in assessing if
they are protected.
d. Calculated or Impulsive
Decision makers occasionally consider whether conduct was calculated or
impulsive in evaluating disloyalty. Before Jefferson Standard, employers
had used this distinction as a factor to decide if an employee was
insubordinate, warranting discipline. 5 2 The Board often used the calculatedness question to determine the egregiousness of concerted actions (especially picket line misconduct), in order to decide if the conduct fell outside
the bounds of protection. 5 3 The Board also made this distinction in section
10(c) inquiries,' to assess whether an unlawfully discharged employee had
forfeited reinstatement remedies by subsequent misconduct.
The Board has good reasons to make allowances in strike conduct and
section 10(c) cases for minor transgressions, because the employer's own
unfair labor practices might provoke the conduct, or the conduct simply
might be understandable as part of the necessarily heated give-and-take of
economic warfare.3 55 To allow employees leeway for impulsiveness in the
351

Generally, employees cannot continue to work while acting insubordinately by

working selectively, or interrupting production. However, employees do not have to forfeit their paychecks to exercise their § 7 rights. The bans against intermittent strikes and
selectively working can lead to ironic results. In Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB,
159 F.2d 280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 758 (1947), some employees decided only

to report for work on Wednesdays and Thursdays while others did not report at all. Id.
at 283. The court found that those who completely eschewed the employer could keep
their jobs.
352 See, e.g., NLRB v. Aintree Corp., 135 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1943) (finding
insubordinate an employee who participated in a calculated design to arouse heated ani-

mosities among co-employees through a leaflet distribution). For a discussion of preJefferson Standard decisions, see generally supra part I.A.
"I The Board often excuses minor misconduct as momentary "animal exuberance."
See, e.g., NLRB v. Kelco Corp., 178 F.2d 578, 582 (4th Cir. 1949) (distinguishing the

chasing and beating of a nonstriker from animal exuberance). Though the Board maintains good reasons for distinguishing minor transgressions, the Board's animal metaphor
is less than flattering. By contrast, see American Arbitration Ass'n, 233 N.L.R.B. 71
(1977) (finding employees unprotected because they compared management with

animals).
s54 See supra part II.B.2.
15 See supra notes 268-85 (discussing venting).
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context of insubordination or picket line misconduct, however, is not to say
that "calculated" conduct should provide a basis for a disloyalty designation. Many activities, such as a carefully planned and orchestrated boycott,
although very calculated, are protected. 3"
e.

Audience

To ascertain disloyalty, some reviewers have examined the particular
audience to which employees have appealed. Alleging disloyal behavior,
employers have discharged employees for engaging in criticism externally
(outside the plant), and internally (in the workplace). Employers are particularly sensitive, however, to public criticism, fearing that it may injure their
business reputation.3 7 Two conflicting questions arise when an employee
lodges criticism outside the "privacy" of the workplace. First, does this public criticism justify adjudging the employee unprotected, because the
employee has aired publicly what the employer wished to keep private? Second, does this airing justify adjudging the employee protected, at least when
the subject involves employer violations of the law or other employer misconduct, because the public may have a special interest in or a need to know
the information?'
In cases involving the corporate campaign, the audience
is likely to be placed in issue often, because the conduct is directed to external entities and individuals as diverse as corporate shareholders, citizen-environmentalists, and state regulatory agencies. 9
Prior to Jefferson Standard, several cases had affirmed the right of
employees under section 7 to appeal to public audiences. 3 ° The Jefferson
Standard Court, however, created confusion with its concern about the
external airing of the information. The Court discussed the "public" nature
I Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614, 1617 (1950) (finding peaceful boycott is protected),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 191 F.2d 380, 389 (6th Cir. 1951) (holding that
although boycotts are usually protected, here there were unlawful objectives and cooperation with competitors).
357 Internal criticism may undermine a supervisor's authority and prove equally harmful. In some cases, the question of audience may also overlap with the question of confidentiality. As discussed earlier, the Board has emphasized that it will not consider all
public airings of private, personal matters as disclosure of confidences. See supra notes
159-67.
358 Section 7 is not a whistleblower statute. However, when the activities are concerted and serve to provide mutual aid and protection in the workplace, § 7 does share
some commonalities with whistleblower protections. The current expansion of
whistleblower protection laws illustrates that national policy favors protection for
employees who serve the public by calling illegality, fraud, environmental abuses, and
other problems to the public's attention.
351 See supra notes 6, 10 and accompanying text.
3W NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir.
1942) (affirming employees' right to "subsidize propaganda, distribute broadsides, support political movements, and in any other way further its cause" even though these
caused great harm to the employer).
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of the technicians' leaflet distribution from at least three different angles: (1)
the distribution was public, (2) the leaflets' plea was directed specifically to
the public, and (3) the appeal purportedly was made in the public's own
interests, without informing the public of the existence of the union or the
labor dispute." The Court emphasized the third point, the fraud perpetrated on the public, but it failed to clarify the legal significance of the three
factors. Subsequent decision makers have differed on whether an appeal to a
public audience, as opposed to an appeal solely within the workplace, is relevant in disloyalty analysis.
The Patterson-SargentCo.a 2 case, in which strikers advised the public
that paint made by replacement workers might crack and peel, illustrates
this confusion. The Board did not specifically find the activity unprotected
because the employees appealed to the public, but the only factors PattersonSargent and Jefferson Standard shared were that the employees criticized
product quality and took their dispute to the public."
Later, the Supreme Court narrowed the question of audience in Eastex,
Inc. v. NLRB.Y
The case involved the distribution of union literature
inside a plant, but the subject did not relate to an immediate workplace dispute. The leaflets criticized the President for vetoing increased minimum
wage and requested employees to write their legislators to oppose a "right to
work" law. The Court found the criticism protected and rejected the
employer's argument that employees lose protection "when they seek to
improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot
as employees through channels outside the immediate employee-employer
relationship. ' "m The Board has interpreted the Eastex holding as generally
protecting appeals to third parties, paraphrasing the rule as "[the
employee's] right to appeal to the public is not dependent on the sensitivity
of [the employer] to [the] choice of forum."' The rule has been extended to
31 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 468
(1953); see also supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text. With regard to the second of
these points, the court interpreted the leaflets as a call for a public boycott.
362 115 N.L.R.B. 1627 (1956); see also supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
I The Board focused on the public airing of the dispute, saying, "we reach the same
result on the same broad principle as did the Board and the Supreme Court in the Jefferson Standard case, namely that by the means employed here in the preparation and circulation of the handbill the strikers forfeited any right they may have otherwise had to the
protection of the Act." 115 N.L.R.B. at 1630 (footnote omitted). Thus, the "means" the
Board focused on were the negative expression and public distribution; it overlooked Jefferson Standard's other criteria. The two cases differed substantially. Most importantly,
in Patterson-Sargent,the employees had identified the labor dispute in the handbill, their

leaflets discussed vital, strike-related issues, and their conduct lacked any element of
deception. Id.; see also supra note 300. In my opinion the Board wrongly decided this
case.
364
365

437 U.S. 556 (1978).

Id. at 565.

a66 Richboro Community Mental Health Council, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 1267, 1268
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cover public appeals that do not directly address a labor dispute, provided
that a logical relationship exists between the appeal and the dispute. 7 The
decision in Eastex either reversed what the Court perceived as an erroneous
aspect of Jefferson Standard, or at least narrowed the erroneous application
of Jefferson Standard in cases such as Patterson-Sargent.se
f.

Conclusions to Be Drawn from Examining Disloyalty's
Components
The foregoing examination of some of the factors used to determine disloyalty and the problems associated with their use shows that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was correct when it noted
recently in Sierra Publishing Co. that the various factors have created a test
with "shifting boundaries of protection."36 9 In that case, the court ultimately abandoned any attempt to assess conduct under a coherent "disloyalty" doctrine. Rather, the court simply found the conduct protected
"under any of the various ways which that concept has been applied over the
years. '37" There will never be an acceptable disloyalty exception, for, at
base, such an exception is in conflict with the fundamental underpinnings of
the statutory scheme itself. To that most basic problem I now turn.
IV.

PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLICY PROBLEMS: THE ACT Is NOT

PREMISED ON LOYALTY AND THE TEST SHOULD BE ABANDONED

A. All Exercise of Section 7 Rights Is "Disloyal"
The most important fact that drains the disloyalty test of legitimacy is that
it is profoundly at odds with both lay understandings of disloyalty and the
fabric of the statutory scheme. Candid assessment requires acknowledgment
of one fundamental and critical truth: to many employers, any exercise of
section 7 rights is "disloyal." Historically, many employers labeled employ371
ees disloyal solely because of the employee's pro-union sentiments.
(1979) (protecting letter to third-parties protesting the discharge of a fellow employee and
employer's capacity to manage plant; see also Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 248 N.L.R.B.
229, 231 (protecting public criticism of aircraft mechanical services safety), enforced, 636
F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1980).
37 See, e.g., Allied Aviation, 248 N.L.R.B. at 231; see also Alaska Pulp Corp., 296
N.L.R.B 1260, 1262 (1989) (discussing protected character of employee's testimony
before Congress), enforced, 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991).
368 The Eastex Court did not cite Jefferson Standard or Patterson-Sargent.
369 Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989); see also
supra note 73 and accompanying text.
370 Sierra Publishing Co., 889 F.2d at 217.
371 NLRA, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (acknowledging in its declaration of policy
that the Act has been implemented to combat the denial by some employers of the right
to organize); see also, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1937)
(employer arguing that NLRA is unconstitutional, inter alia, because allowing union
security agreements deprived employer and employee of "friendship, mutual loyalty, and
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Employers often feel betrayed by "their" employees' desire to unionize.
Understandably, the very fact that employees seek to be represented in
workplace issues is, to many employers, a personal affront, a demonstration
of lack of gratitude for management's efforts to create just or generous working conditions.172 On a less emotional and more factual level, some employers fear that unionization will hurt the company's profitability and
competitiveness and is disloyal on that ground." Additionally, employers
have argued vigorously that pro-union employees are unable to be good
employees or good American citizens, even though the courts have rejected
these arguments for six decades. 4
wise cooperation"); id. at 138-40 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (arguing that an employee
cannot be both a good newspaper editor and actively pro-union); Gatliff Business Prods.,
Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. 543, 550 (1985) (discharging supporters of union as "treasonous" and
disloyal); Misericordia Hosp. Medical Ctr., 246 N.L.R.B. 351, 357 (1979) (A.L.J. decision) (employer characterizing employees who wrote protected report as "selfish,"
"vicious," and "venal"; equating involvement in protected activities with "disaffection or
disloyalty"), enforced, 623 F.2d 808 (2d. Cir. 1980); JOHN W. SCOVILLE, LABOR
MONOPOLIES-OR FREEDOM 150 (Arno Press repr. 1972) (1946) (describing union leaders as evil tyrants, and collective bargaining as "plac[ing] loyalty to the labor leaders
above loyalty to the nation").
To be sure, the courts at one time showed equal hostility to the notion of employee
collective activity. See, e.g., Meyers Indus. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 883 (1986)
(discussing Norris LaGuardia Act of 1932 and need for protection from court decisions
concerning conspiracy antitrust doctrines), aff'd sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Meyers Indus. v. NLRB, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).
372 See, e.g., Yerger Trucking, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 141 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1156
(May 15, 1992) (furious employer insulted at unionization efforts, fired entire workforce
and falsely represented information to lender such that pro-union employee was denied
home mortgage loan); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31-34
(1937) (noting that the Act's passage was largely motivated by unrest caused by employer
discrimination and coercion with regard to union activities).
373 Compare SCOVILLE, supra note 371, at 70-71 (asserting that it is "natural and
entirely proper" that employers oppose unionization because it will "destroy shop discipline.... make it difficult.., to discharge incompetent workmen ... [and] interfere with
the promotion of men according to merit") with RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L.
MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 162-65 (1984) (concluding that unions increase pro-

ductivity) and ProfessorMorris Warns that Union-FreeEnvironment May Fail to Achieve
Productivity, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 208, at A-6 (Oct. 27, 1992) (arguing that collective bargaining serves as the natural catalyst to promote the cooperation and participation necessary for workplace morale and productivity) and Kenneth G. Day-Schmidt, A

Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and
IndustrialPeace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 431-34 (1992) (explaining productivity increases
associated with unionization).
311 See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (rejecting argument that walkout to protest working conditions was disloyal); Associated Press, 301 U.S.
at 115 (forcing retaining of unwanted employees); id. at 137-40 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (arguing that one cannot be pro-union and be a good newspaper editor); Willmar
Elec. Serv., Inc., 968 F.2d 1327, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (rejecting argument that union-
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Given that many employers argue that to unionize evidences disloyalty, it
is not surprising that for years employers have urged the Board to conclude
that classically protected forms of concerted activity, such as boycotts, picketing, and protesting working conditions are disloyal and therefore should
not be protected.37 5 The Board and courts have rejected these arguments as
well, but they must remain alert to this temptation to impose obligations of
loyalty that are based on arguments using lay terminology, not on carefully
circumscribed legal terms of art.37 6 To rely on common-sense definitions
from the viewpoint of owners and managers3 7 would result in placing protection of the employee "wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding"
of employers' definitions of, and interpretations of, employee loyalties." s An
adoption of lay definitions would chill much union activity because the
actor/speaker would fear to act in light of the potentially disastrous consequences (discharge) if a decision maker judges her loyalty negatively.379
Ultimately, such a course would eviscerate section 7 of its meaning. For
these reasons, even if a disloyalty test could be adopted consistently with the

Act, it would need to have a special meaning as a narrowly circumscribed
term of art.
Although adoption of a special definition of disloyalty solves the foregoing
problems, it creates others. A technical definition may be intelligible to
attorneys but is not useful to employees and employers needing to underorganizer job applicant necessarily would be a disloyal employee), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1252 (1993); SCOVILLE, supra note 371, at 150.
315 See, e.g., Willmar Elec. Serv., 968 F.2d at 1330 (refusing to hire job applicant who

engaged in picketing and intended to organize on the job on the grounds that hiring him
would create "intolerable risks of disloyalty" held unlawful); Coors Container Co. v.
NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 1980) (reprimanding employees for advocating
boycott against employer and supporting strikers while working held unlawful); NLRB v.
Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1942) (firing
employee for publishing criticism of employer held unlawful); Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B.
1614, 1622 (1950) (suspending employees for advocating consumer boycott while working held unlawful), enforcement denied on other grounds, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951)

(holding boycott unlawful because it was used to force an employer to take illegal action);
SCOVILLE, supra note 371, at 23 (arguing against labor law reform because "we should
stop 'hacking at the branches,' and strike at the root of the evil--collective bargaining"
(emphasis in original)); cf. NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard),
346 U.S. 464, 479 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (concluding that conduct considered improper is not necessarily disloyal).
376 Cf Jefferson Standard, 346 U.S. at 479 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"conduct may be 'indefensible' in the colloquial" sense, yet within protection of § 7).
377 The above overgeneralizations speak of lay definitions held by some, but not all,
managers. Concerning employee sentiments, an individual may do her job impeccably
because of high standards or personal pride, rather than out of loyalty to management.
378 Red Top, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 989, 990 (1970) (quoting Harding Glass, 158
N.L.R.B. 1366, 1372 (1966) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945))),
enforcement granted in part and denied in part, 455 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1972).
379

Id.
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stand and predict their legal rights and obligations in the ordinary work
environment. A legal definition at odds with common understandings and
common sense is not a practical standard for evaluating conduct. A recent
case, GHR Energy Corp.," crystallized these problems, adding insight and
irony to the disloyalty dilemma. The employer, a manufacturer of petrochemicals in Louisiana, established a loyalty policy: "Any actions or statements made by employees against the Company's interests which expose the
Company to public contempt and/or ridicule or damages [sic] its business
reputation or interferes [sic] with its ability to expand and grow shall be
considered as disloyalty."38 1 The Board held that unilateral promulgation of
this policy was an unfair labor practice because it conflicted with section 7
rights. The policy imposed "excessively broad restrictions on employee
'actions and statements' protected by section 7. " 382 Section 7 protects many

actions and statements
that could interfere with a Company's ability to
"expand and grow. '38 3 Further, the policy was overbroad. It was "so general and ambiguous" that the company could not show that it had "narrowly
tailored" the policy to "legitimate and necessary objectives." 3 4 The matter
of disloyalty simply was not a core concern of the business. 8
The irony of GHR Energy Corp. should not be missed. If the petrochemical company's disloyalty policy was ambiguous, a rule that employees cannot possibly be expected to understand, what does this say about the
workability of Jefferson Standard'stest? 3w More importantly, if a company
cannot show that employee loyalty is essential to its enterprise, and if
demanding it will chill the exercise of section 7 rights, how can the Board or
courts require it to exercise section 7 rights?
As the Board implicitly acknowledged in GHR Energy Corp., the disloyalty test is inconsistent with the very fabric of the Act. This is so for a
number of reasons. First,regardless of whether one adopts a harmony para380

294 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1989).

381

Id. at 1012 n.l0.

Id. at 1012. The promulgation also violated NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1988), the duty to bargain, because it was issued unilaterally.
383 GHR Energy Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. at 1012. The Administrative Law Judge, who
spoke to the issue in more detail, noted that such § 7 activities might include any
employee speech in support of economic demands, recognition, or bargaining. Id. at
1030 (A.L.J. decision).
382

384 Id. The company had to prove that disloyalty was a "core" concern. The "narrowly tailored" and "core concern" standards come from duty-to-bargain law, but this
does not alter the point for which this case is cited here. See Peerless Publications, Inc.
(Pottstown Mercury), 283 N.L.R.B. 334 (1987) (establishing the standards governing the
unilateral implementation of rules instead of bargaining).
385 GHR Energy Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. at 1031.
386 In GHR Energy Corp., the Administrative Law Judge implied, as I have argued in
this Article, that Jefferson Standard's loyalty language was simply extra rhetoric
employed to justify a lawful discharge under the product disparagement exception. Id. at
1028 (A.L.J. decision).
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digm or an adversary paradigm of labor relations, 3 87 one cannot deny that
the latter is accurate in one fundamental respect: Congress was more interested in advancing employees' rights vis-i-vis employers and in strengthening employees' protections from employers than it was in advancing
employees' loyalties to employers.'
Congress enacted the Act largely in
response to the professional associations, oligopolistic competition, and
price-fixing that had been increasingly replacing the "atomistic individualism" of free enterprise." 9 The Act specifically addressed the "inequality of
bargaining power" between employee and employer by preventing employers from interfering with the right to organize, by requiring employers to
recognize certified unions, and by requiring collective bargaining with the
union.'
Congress found that imposing these requirements on employers
would prevent employee coercion. 39' Congress determined that fostering
collective bargaining serves the public interest, and therefore it protected the
right to organize and bargain even when opposed by employers.392 The Jef
ferson Standard dissenters succinctly acknowledged the antagonistic underpinnings of the Act: "Many of the legally recognized tactics and weapons of
labor would readily be condemned for 'disloyalty' were they employed
between man and man in friendly personal relations."'
This is not to say
that Congress would want to foster disloyalty; it is only to say that the long387 See discussion supra part III.C.2.
3 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (stating that the
purpose of the Act was to give employees the ability to bargain on fair and equal footing
with employers). A marxist critique would go farther than these congressional observations and would posit that the entire economic system of capitalization is premised on,
and indeed prays on, the owner-manager/employee schism.
389 CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINs, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS 7-8 (1985). (reporting
that political theorists around World War I believed the state was losing its cohesiveness
and was increasingly constituted by atomistic, self-interested organizations).
390 NLRA, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (redressing "[t]he inequality of bargaining
power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty

of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association"); see also NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984)
(observing that § 7 evidences intent "to create an equality in bargaining power . . .
throughout the entire process of labor organizing, collective bargaining, and enforcement
of collective-bargaining agreements").
391 NLRA, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
11 [P]rotection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes
the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and
unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees.
Id.
393 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 479-80
(1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Indeed, it would be difficult ever to carry out a union
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range goal of reducing labor strife through the immediate goal of empowering workers and arming them with the full force of the law were by far the
3
pivotal rationales behind the Act, not notions of loyalty.
Second, a disloyalty standard does not make sense in the context of a labor
policy that permits such antagonistic tactics as strikes and lockouts. The
strike, and its attendant negative publicity, are the epitome of disloyalty in a
colloquial sense, because their object is to turn the public, employees, customers, and suppliers against the employer; yet protection for such conduct
is central to the Act. Section 7, and the special acknowledgment of strikes in
section 13,"' are premised on Congress's belief that employees must be
allowed to publicize their cause without fear of losing their jobs.' Boycotting employees may publicly vilify their employer while still drawing
paychecks. They may even go so far as to withhold their labor to drive the
employer into bankruptcy, if necessary in their appeal, just as employers
may engage in a devastating lockout.'
organizing drive without appearing "disloyal," because the primary purpose of organizing is to strengthen employees' collective voice and power vis-a-vis the employer.
"I See supra notes 200, 207-10. Subsequent amendments to the Act have not altered
that rationale. To be sure, Congress enacted the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to curb
certain union abuses and tactics. See supra part II.B.2. But these amendments did not
alter the basic premise and rationale underlying the federal labor policy of encouraging
collective bargaining.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated incorrectly in recent dictum
that the only reasonable interpretation of the Act was that an employee lost protection for
disloyalty because another interpretation would be "inconsistent with the statutory policy
of preserving the employer's right to discharge an employee for disloyalty." George A.
Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also discussion supra
part III.C. . Although the Act does seek to protect some employer's interests, see, e.g.,
NLRA, § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1988) (addressing union unfair labor practices, secondary boycotts and secondary strikes, certain recognitional and organizational picketing,
work assignments, and hot cargo agreements), the statutory scheme certainly does not
subordinate employee rights to these. The Hormel court appears not to have included
employee rights in reaching this conclusion about disloyalty.
395 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988) ("Nothing in this subchapter, except as specially provided
for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications of that right.").
39 Cf NLRA, § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (protecting employers' freedom of
expression).
397 See, e.g., Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 1980)
(holding that § 7 protects advocating boycott or supporting strikers while working);
Community Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding hospital's issuance of a warning and removal of a nurse from an on call list an unlawful attempt to channel employee organizing activity); Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614
(1950) (holding that advocating consumer boycott although working is protected by § 7),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951). The lockout is

expressly acknowledged in the Act, though it is not expressly stated to be a "right" of
employers as is § 7 for employees.
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Congress did not allow any of the lawful economic weapons available in
labor disputes because they are, in and of themselves, desirable. Rather, it
permitted resort to these tactics to enable each side to press its economic
demands. It is this tension created by the possibility of economic warfare
when employers or employees seek their goals on which our national labor
policies are delicately balanced. In the midst of this tension, a "disloyalty"
test cannot stand.
Third, the process of collective bargaining is premised on self-interest, not
loyalty to the opposing party. Parties may harbor their own personal antiunion or anti-management beliefs, as long as the beliefs are not reflected in
closed-mindedness or obstruction of the process. Parties have an unqualified
right to act selfishly and to refuse to agree in bargaining, even if unreasonable, unfair, or morally unjustifiable."' 8 With regard to the fairness of bargaining proposals, as with the administration of section 7, neither the Board
nor the courts may "measure concerted activity in terms of whether the conduct is wise or fair, or satisfies standards which [it] think[s] desirable."'
Fourth, labor law doctrine requires both individual employees and their
union officers to act in their self-interest. Excessive solicitude for, or loyalty
to, the employer has costly consequences. Employees whose conduct is not
for their own "mutual aid or protection" cannot claim section 7 protection. 4°° Union leaders who act for the employer's benefit may be neglecting
their obligation to press zealously for employees' interests, and are likely
violating their legal duty of fair representation, committing an unfair labor
practice, or both."' The disloyalty exception, by contrast, would have
employees and their union officers act altruistically in the employer's best
interests and for the employer's benefit. The current disloyalty doctrine
requires employees and their representatives to walk too thin a tightrope
between altruism and the required self-interest.
To superimpose a duty of loyalty to the employer on top of the mandate
that employees exercise section 7 rights in furtherance of self-interest and, in
the case of union officers, in furtherance of the self-interests of the bargaining
unit, is not simply inconsistent with the statutory purposes of providing
398 NLRA, § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988) (bargaining obligation does not obligate
a party to agree to proposals or make concessions). "Good faith bargaining" is a misnomer. As long as the parties meet minimal requirements of procedure and tactics (such as
turning over certain documents, not unduly delaying bargaining sessions, etc.), they need

only work toward an agreement; they need not subjectively desire to reach one.
399 Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. at 1621.
o See Estlund, supra note 15, at 921; Richard M. Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7:
Mutualism and Protected ProtestActivities Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 789, 791 (1989).
401 See NLRA, § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1988) (defining certain union conduct as
an unfair labor practice); NLRA, § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1988) (providing that the
union is the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
183 (1967) (holding that bad faith or arbitrary treatment by a union toward an employee
violates duty of fair representation).
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employees with section 7 protection; it is directly contrary to those purposes.
Indeed, the reason supervisors are not protected by section 7 is precisely
because they do not have such practical or statutory constraints on their
loyalties to management. 40 2
Fifth, a disloyalty test is incongruous with the Act because, unlike the
common law of agency regarding masters and servants,' the Act imposes
on employers no reciprocal loyalty obligation toward their employees.
Surely, notions of loyalty would be premised on mutuality.'
There are
some mutual obligations imposed by the labor laws (such as the bargaining
obligation to meet, confer, and negotiate), but the Act is not a wrongful
discharge statute. It allows employers, even when making a profit, to
demand wage concessions and to lock out employees, depriving willing
workers of an opportunity to earn an income.40 5 It allows employers (and
employees) to refuse to yield to collective bargaining agreement terms, even
arbitrarily or unfairly.' One cannot justifiably construe the Act as a vehicle that carries loyalty obligations in only one direction.
402 Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 659-60 (1974) (observing that
"supervisors [are] management obliged to be loyal to their employer's interests," and
their unionization would threaten basic ends of labor law); cf Getman, supra note 15, at
1212-13 (noting that because the system is premised on the incompatibility between the
interests of management and labor, protests against discharge of top management are
unprotected, and discharge of pro-union supervisors is not necessarily unlawful).
40 See infra notes 444-60 and accompanying text. The common law did impose on
employers certain obligations to servants, but these have been largely eroded. Certain
doctrines today do impose fiduciary obligations on company owners and managers. See,
e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.) (holding that dominant stockholder,
chairperson of board, and corporation president, have a fiduciary duty to the corporation), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)
(holding that director's duty to exercise informed business judgment is in nature of a duty
of care, not a duty of loyalty).
4 See supra note 403; infra note 460. Some important obligations imposed by the
Act, such as the obligation that both sides negotiate in good faith, are mutual. See supra
note 390 (noting how the Act sought to improve the relationship of employees vis-a-vis
management, and to restore "equality of bargaining power"). Notions of mutuality are
well established in other labor law contexts as well. For example, a covenant not to
compete generally is not enforceable absent consideration given by the employer. See
State Labor Law Developments, 8 LABOR LAW. 618, 674-85 (1992). Also, in this century
mutuality is used as a major justification for the employment at will doctrine. Because
employees can quit for any reason, the argument goes, employers should be able to discharge for any reason. For a review of the literature concerning the sufficiency of this
justification, see PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 89-104 (1990).
405 American Ship Bldg Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965) (holding that an
employer lockout did not violate §§ 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3) because it lacked a proscribed
purpose).
I See supra note 398 and accompanying text. However, certain activities by an
employer purporting to act "magnanimously," out of concern for employee welfare, are
unlawful. See, e.g., Electromation Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
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Sixth, the law has long recognized that the Board and courts should exercise great restraint in determining, as opposed to letting employees themselves determine, how section 7 rights should be exercised.40 The decision
makers have acknowledged that as a general rule, they should no more sit in
judgment of the particular methods by which employees chose to express
themselves, than they should tell a company or a union what terms it ought
to request or accept at the bargaining table. The use of economic weapons is
"part and parcel" of the statutory scheme.' To allow the Board or courts
to determine the acceptable ways in which employees "ought" to engage in
collective activity would unduly chill the exercise of section 7 rights and
embroil the Agency and judiciary in a time-consuming and endless thicket of
detailed decision making about "appropriate" employee conduct. If decision
makers were able to evaluate the underlying loyalties of employees' exercise
of collective activity, this would superimpose on section 7 "a convenient
device whereby a [reviewer] might outlaw union conduct which was contrary to his own economic or social philosophy"'
and would upset that
natural balance of power between management and labor.410
Last, to impose a loyalty requirement on employee activity would contra1001 (Dec. 16, 1992) (holding that committee established by employer to address
employee concerns violated § 8(a)(2)).
407 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (holding an unannounced
walkout without making specific demands protected, as employees have right to engage in
unwise, unnecessary, unreasonable activity); Farah Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 666 (1973)
(holding that Board and employer cannot dictate the manner in which employees carry
out protected activity); see also NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477
(1960) (holding that repeated tactics such as sit-ins and reporting late are unprotected but
do not violate duty to bargain).
Likewise, absent tactics that are so extreme as to be inherently destructive of § 7 rights,
the Board and courts sit in judgment of neither the bargaining power of employers nor
the particular tactics they employ. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S.
333, 344 (1938) (refusing to interpret rights based on wisdom or reasonableness of collective activity); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) (stating that the
Board may not compel bargaining concessions or review substantive terms of agreements); NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960) (holding that the
Board cannot force unreasonable parties to make concessions in bargaining).
408 InsuranceAgents'Int'l Union, 361 U.S. at 489; see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.
v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 57981 (1988); American Ship Bldg. Co., 380 U.S. at 318 (holding that an employer may
offensively lockout employees); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) (holding that an
employer's use of temporary replacements for strikers does not violate § 8).
409 American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944) (referring to legislative history concerning whether the purposes of concerted activities ought be considered).
410 Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 14. The Board and courts are strongly
opposed to meddling in this natural balance in other contexts. See InsuranceAgents', 361
U.S. at 497 (holding that the Board may not introduce distinctions about "justifiable"
and "unjustifiable, proper, and 'abusive' economic weapons" (footnote omitted)); see also
Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427
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vene current legal trends concerning speech, under both labor law and First
Amendment doctrine. These trends reflect more appreciation for speech
rights and less concern for policing speech, even extreme, exaggerated, false,
or misleading speech.4 ' In union elections, today's campaign rules allow
employers in many instances to lie knowingly and to mislead employees in
campaign propaganda without consequence, and the rules allow unions and
employees to do the same.4 " Regarding secondary boycotts, the Supreme
Court recently ruled that peaceful, nonpicketing consumer boycotts are not
"6coercive" within the meaning of the ban against secondary boycotts, even
though from the vantage point of an "innocent, neutral" boycotted
employer, they are not only coercive, but they are also disloyal and reprehensible.41 3 With regard to defamation during labor disputes, the Supreme
Court has imposed strict limitations on a defamed individual's right to
recover.41 4 As Board Member Murdock pointed out in Jefferson Standard,
employees should be encouraged to speak out on matters of concern to the

U.S. 132, 147-51 (1976) (holding that the Act preempts states from regulating economic
self-help weapons used between labor and management).
411 Concerning the First Amendment, see, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct.
2538 (1992) (invalidating an ordinance forbidding "hate speech" directed at certain races
and groups as content-based and viewpoint-based); Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist.,
978 F.2d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing children to challenge discipline for wearing
buttons supporting teachers' strike and referring to "scabs," notwithstanding school's
claim that buttons were vulgar, offensive, and disrupted discipline). But see Peel v.
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (holding that the state
may prohibit misleading attorney advertising).
412 Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982) (holding that the Board
will "not probe into the truth or falsity of parties' campaign statements, and.., will not
set elections aside on the basis of misleading campaign statements"). The Board still
must review speech in the case of threats or promises of benefit, because the Act expressly
requires the Board to review such speech to remedy unfair labor practices.
413 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
(DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (stating that peaceful handbilling urging consumer
boycott of neutral employer, absent picketing, does not constitute coercion under the
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) secondary boycott prohibitions). The Court reasoned that there was no
clear statutory intent to proscribe such handbilling, and that the provisions primarily
concerned secondary picketing and strikes. The handbills were merely truthful, persuasive communications that did not induce or encourage employees to strike the secondary
employer. There was no violence or patrolling, and economic harm does not invalidate
the collective activity. Any other construction, the Court said, would pose serious
problems of constitutionality when an activity, such as that challenged, involved merely
persuasive speech. Id. at 577.
414 See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264, 269 (1974); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53
(1966).
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community, such as product quality, not be punished for doing so. 415 The
employer is free, of course, to rebut inaccurate allegations.4 1
First Amendment principles, like the trends in labor law doctrine, are premised on the positive benefits of encouraging robust debate in society. The
Court has long held that a spirited exchange of opinion and information is
healthy and desirable, despite the disadvantages or harm that the occasional
excess or falsehood may bring. The alternative, involving the policing 417
of
speech in both the First Amendment or labor contexts, is too costly.
Laws policing speech not only curtail speech that is "impermissible," but
they also chill valuable speech that is lawful. Policing speech also entangles
the Board and courts in the task of sifting through speech to separate the
acceptable from the unacceptable.41 s Further, it is expensive and time-consuming, delaying the parties' ability to carry on with their activities. 419 It
involves the murky morass of assessing degrees of truthfulness (or for our
purposes, degrees of loyalty), which are subject to unpredictable variations
on the part of the reviewer.4 °
For all of these reasons, the Supreme Court was simply wrong in its dictum in Jefferson Standard to the effect that activities must be carried out
loyally to retain protection. The disloyalty test is so antithetical to the structure of the national labor policy that the test cannot be modified, limited, or
otherwise "fixed" in a way that conforms to the Act.
B.

The Flawed Authority for the Disloyalty Exception

Jefferson Standard'sdisloyalty test has been and will continue to be problematic largely because it rests on overstated, if not misstated, historical and
legal precedent." 1 The Court's rationale was founded on the dubious prem415

94 N.L.R.B. 1507, 1524 (1951) (Murdock, Member, dissenting), rev'd sub nom.

Local Union No. 1229, IBEW v. NLRB (Jefferson Standard), 202 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir.
1952), set aside, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
416 See supra part II.B.2.
" See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-75 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (declaring that the right of free speech is fundamental and essential to liberty), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
418 See, e.g., Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 130-31 (1982) (ruling that
the Board will not probe campaign propaganda because it would result in extensive analysis of speech and increased litigation); cf R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538,
2545 (1992) (regulating speech based on hostility or favoritism to its content is
unconstitutional).
419 See Midland Nat'l, 263 N.L.R.B. at 132.
420 See id. at 131.
1 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 479
(1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that nothing in the legislative history of the
Act supports the notion that disloyalty is permissible grounds for dismissal); Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that disloyalty and
"indefensible" conduct standards are vague and inappropriate, citing Justice Frankfurter's dissent).
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ises that (1) "[t]here is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee
than disloyalty,""42 and that (2) the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments seek to
strengthen the "cooperation, continuity of service and cordial contractual
relation . . .that is born of loyalty to the[] common enterprise."'

The

Court listed the policy section of the Taft-Hartley Act for these premises,'
but neither it nor the NLRA mentions loyalty, much less cooperation, continuity of service, or cordiality.
From these premises, the Court next reasoned that section 7, was passed
to safeguard collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection, but
that the section "did not weaken the underlying contractual bonds and loyalties of employer and employee."'
For this proposition, the Court cited a
conference report concerning the 1947 amendments,42 but the report does
not support the proposition. The 1947 deliberations included debate about
amending section 7 to exempt three specific types of activities from protection: unfair labor practices, unlawful activities, and contract breaches.'
Congress determined that the Board sometimes had improperly interpreted
section 7 as protecting certain types of undesirable conduct, especially these
three.42 The cited report, as well as other parts of the 1947 deliberations,
consistently included similar types of extreme conduct as examples of the
"unlawful or other improper" conduct that the Act is not intended to protect. 4' Ultimately, Congress rejected the proposed amendment as unnecessary for several reasons. 430 However, the examples of unlawful and
422

346 U.S. at 472 (footnote omitted).

423 Id.
424 Id.

at 472-73 n.9 (quoting Labor Management Relations Act, § 1(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 141(b) (1988)). The policy section of the Taft-Hartley Act states the purposes of promoting the flow of commerce, providing orderly procedures to protect the rights of
employers, employees, and unions, and proscribing acts that jeopardize public health,
safety, or interests. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § l(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 141(b) (1988).
425 346 U.S. at 475.
426 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, supra note 110, at 38-39, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF LMRA, supra note 104, at 542-43.
427

Id.

Id.
Id. (giving as examples, and citing cases involving: sit-down strikes involving violence, mass picketing, criminal activity, mutiny, acts to compel employers to violate wage
stabilization and labor laws, strikes in violation of labor agreements, and acts compelling
other workers to violate labor laws); H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 104, at 27-28,
428
429

reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF

LMRA, supra note 104, at 318-19 (citing sit-

down strikes, mutiny, criminal activity, mass picketing, illegal boycotts, violence, violations of collective bargaining agreements, and acts to compel employers to violate wage
stabilization and labor laws); 93 CONG. REC. 6600 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft),
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LMRA, supra note 104, at 1538-39 (citing sitdown strikes and mutiny).
430 Congress gave three reasons for rejecting the amendment: (1) the amendment

HeinOnline -- 73 B.U. L. Rev. 376 1993

1993] LABOR, LOYALTY, AND THE CORPORATE CAMPAIGN

377

undesirable conduct that Congress discussed illustrate its concern with
extreme conduct, especially illegal conduct and conduct it expressly made
unlawful by other 1947 amendments.43 1 In short, the conference report indicates that Congress believed the Board had gone too far in protecting certain
conduct; it does not indicate that loyalty was a driving force behind the TaftHartley amendments, or that there is or ever has been a disloyalty exception
to section 7, especially a disloyalty exception that has any meaning
432
independent of illegal conduct.
As a second source for support of its disloyalty test, the Jefferson Standard Court relied on an allegedly large body of case law that the Court said
emphasizes the importance of discipline to prevent insubordination, disobedience, and disloyalty. 4' The Court cited fourteen cases" for the foregoing
proposition and nine cases 4 5 for the proposition that employees might lose
protection because of the "means" employed. The cited cases do support the
proposition that workers are unprotected in instances of insubordination and
interruption of production,4s or for violence and other illegality,43 7 or for
could be misinterpreted to mean that "unlawful" or "improper" activities other than the
three mentioned in the amendment were protected; (2) the Board had been following
Supreme Court precedent in recent decisions, such that an amendment codifying the
principles in these decisions was no longer necessary; and (3) Congress amended the policy declaration of the Act instead, demonstrating its intent that improper and undesirable
labor activities will not be protected. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, supra note 110, at 3839, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LMRA, supra note 104, at 543; see also
H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 104, at 27, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
LMRA, supra note 104, at 318.(stating that the amendment would codify current law);
93 CONG. REC. 6600 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE HisTORY OF LMRA, supra note 104, at 1539 (discussing Board's following precedent,
amendment as unnecessary, and amended policy statement). The amended policy statement adds that the purpose of the law is to eliminate undesirable union practices such as
"strikes and other forms of industrial unrest ... [and] concerted activities which impair
the interest of the public in the free flow of [interstate] commerce." NLRA, § 1, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
431 For example, union coercion of employees, certain secondary boycotts, and
attempts to force employers to assign work in union jurisdictional disputes were declared
to be union unfair labor practices.
412 The report refers to unlawful "or improper" conduct but only gives examples of
unlawful conduct, such as breaching labor contracts, sit-down strikes with violence, and
strikes to compel employers to violate the Act or rulings of the Board. H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 510, supra note 110, at 38-39, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LMRA,
supra note 104, at 542-43. All of the examples of objectionable conduct mentioned in the
report are unprotected today under Board law, irrespective of notions of disloyalty.
411 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 474-75
(1953).
434 Id. at 475.
435 Id. at 478 n.13.
41 See, e.g., International Union, UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. (Briggs & Stratton), 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (disruption of production by intermit-
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reasons unrelated to collective action, such as incompetence.'
However,
not one case turned on notions of loyalty as a distinct exception to
protection.
Of the twenty-three decisions cited, only five mentioned loyalty or disloyalty, and only three are arguably relevant. 4 In the first of these three, in
which nonstriking salesmen had refused to follow instructions, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used the term disloyalty in
passing in the narrow, ordinary context of not doing one's duties while at
work (insubordination)."' In the second, involving a petition for rehearing
filed by the Board, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
decided unanimously that it unwisely had used the disloyalty term in its first
decision. Agreeing with the Agency, the court explained that the imposition
of a disloyalty test in section 7 cases would be inappropriate, overbroad, and
"subject to misinterpretation.""' In the third case, the United States Court
tent strikes), overruledon othergrounds, Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Maryland Drydock Co. v. NLRB,
183 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1950) (preservation of plant discipline); Home Beneficial Life Ins.
Co. v. NLRB, 159 F.2d 280 (4th Cir.) (insubordination in refusing to obey rules of management and partial striking), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 758 (1947).
417 See, e.g., NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 81 (1953) (refusing to
follow orders to cross another union's picket line when contract had no-strike clause and
refusal breached contract's obligatory grievance/dispute resolution procedure held illegal); Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Int'l Alliance, Local No. 122 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 437 (1942) (committing numerous assaults and blocking
access to employer's premises by force and arms held not protected under Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause).
43 See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) ("The Act... does
not require that the petitioner retain in its employ an incompetent editor."); Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1949) (holding that employee discharged for circulating a petition against a foreman was on a personal vendetta, not
involved in a concerted activity for mutual aid and protection).
"' The other two of the five cases used the terms in other contexts. Associated Press,
301 U.S. at 111-12 (Argument for Petitioner) (arguing unsuccessfully that the NLRA
and the ban on company unions deprives the employer of friendship, mutual loyalty, and
cooperation with employees); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 498
(8th Cir. 1946) (concluding that the employer did not violate the Act by verbally defending itself "before its employees whose loyalty it had a right to ask" when attacked in
union propaganda).
440 United Biscuit Co. of Am. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1942), enforcing as
modified 38 N.L.R.B. 778 (1942). The employer claimed that the salesmen refused to sell
to customers and refused to accompany delivery trucks in sympathy with other striking
employees. In passing, the court quoted the employer's argument that the salesmen
"failed and refused to perform their duties as salesmen-in other words, they were disloyal." Id. at 776. The Board had found that the salesmen did perform their job duties;
the Court of Appeals disagreed, but on other grounds enforced the Board's order that
they be reinstated. Id.
441 Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. NLRB, 127 F.2d 118, 118 (4th Cir.), denying reh'g to 127

HeinOnline -- 73 B.U. L. Rev. 378 1993

1993] LABOR, LOYALTY, AND THE CORPORATE CAMPAIGN

379

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit mentioned loyalty only in passing, 442 but the
Board's decision had echoed the Fourth Circuit's warning that vague concepts of disloyalty do not supersede section 7 rights." 3 Thus, as a matter of
case law under the NLRA, the Jefferson Standard Court's creation of the
disloyalty exception was a novelty, contrary to lower court and agency
rulings.
Perhaps the Jefferson Standard Court was influenced by the early master/
servant doctrine under the common law of agency when it waxed eloquently
about loyalty. Under that doctrine, a servant owed to the master a general
duty not to act or speak disloyally in matters connected with employment.4
The Jefferson Standard Court did not mention the common law duty of loyF.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1942) (per curiam). At issue was the discharge of a foreman who
refused instructions to operate certain machines during a strike with which he sympathized. Under the law at the time, an employer violated the Act if it discharged a supervisor in order to interfere with § 7 rights of employees. The court initially held that the
foreman's "disloyalty in refusing to help his employer in an emergency in contrast with
the willing assistance of his brother foremen of equal standing, was an all sufficient reason
for his discharge." Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. NLRB, 127 F.2d 109, 118 (4th Cir. 1942).
In denying the rehearing, the court withdrew the disloyalty analysis and clarified that the
individual was properly discharged because he had supported an illegal strike, not
because of notions of disloyalty. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. NLRB, 127 F.2d 118, 118
(4th Cir. 1942).
442 Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380, 389 (6th Cir. 1951) (referring in dictum to
United Biscuit, 128 F.2d 771, as a case holding that "disloyalty in the performance of
duties was a cause for employees' discharge"), enforcing in part and denying enforcement

in part on other grounds 90 N.L.R.B. 1614 (1950).
44 Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614, 1620-22 (1950), enforced in part and enforcement
denied in part on other grounds, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951). At issue was whether
employees could be fired for participating in a consumer boycott, which urged the public
not to buy the employer's products. The employer argued that for nonstriking employees
to boycott is unjust and disloyal. Id. at 1621. The Board responded:
This may well be true, as it is true, to be sure, in certain other individual instances
where employees strike, picket, or engage in other forms of concerted activity. But
absent any showing that the means employed were other than peaceful or that the
objectives sought were as have been held for reasons of clear public policy to be
improper, we find no authority to regard the concerted activity involved herein as
unprotected.
Id. at 1621-22. The court refused enforcement on the grounds that the boycott was for
an unlawful purpose, and that the employees cooperated with competitor-employees.
4 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 387 (1958); SELL, supra
note 159, at 18, 131-38. Under the common law the servant also owed the master specific
duties, such as to account for profits, follow reasonable instructions, and exercise due care
and skill. The "servant" was one who was "employed by another, called the master,
who, with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the service to the other, is
subject to the other's control or right of control." SELL, supra note 159, at 18. Disloyalty by an employee (as agent) towards an employer (as principal) included competing
with the principal and using or disclosing confidential information acquired during
employment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §§ 393, 395 (1958); see also
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alty, but if this was the doctrinal source for its holding, it is not a legitimate
source in which to ground a section 7 exception."' The common law duty
was not absolute: it contained broad exceptions, such as allowing servants to
act in their own self-interest or in the interests of others." Moreover, any
Estlund, supra note 15, at 921 (discussing the relationship between § 7 and the public
employee speech doctrine under the First Amendment).
441 The Court would have lacked labor law precedent for borrowing this common law
doctrine. It is true that some early § 7 insubordination cases refer to "obeying" the
employer, a notion reminiscent of the servant's common law obligation to exercise care
and skill and to obey reasonable commands. See, e.g., Southern S.S. Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 26,
38-40 (1940), enforced, 120 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1941), rev'd, 316 U.S. 31 (1942). See generally HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP § 67, at 125-27 (2d ed. 1990); SELL, supra note 159, at 116-18 (discussing
duties of care, skill, conduct, and obedience). However, these cases did not impose any
required subjective frame of mind or type of sentiments the employee must possess while
obeying orders. Language in several of the early § 7 cases to the effect that employees
must "faithfully" serve the employer's interests is reminiscent of master/servant obligations. See, e.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946) (failing
to "serve faithfully" by refusing to process clerical orders for several days without
informing management). However, these cases involved employees who refused to perform their jobs. Id. at 496; Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 338 (1950) (collective
slowdown); see also Cox, supra note 83, at 330-37 (stating that common law agency doctrine does not furnish a satisfactory test for protected "concerted activities" because the
Act modified the doctrine).
446 The agent was "not... necessarily prevented from acting in good faith outside his
employment in a manner which injuriously affects his principal's business." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 387 cmt. b (1958). The servant was even allowed to
serve several masters, the critical issue generally being whether one dutifully carried out
one's duties as the servant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 226 (service to one
must not involve abandonment of service to the other). A similar maxim was that the
agent "may, in all cases, act to protect his interests or those of others if they are equal to
or greater than the interests of his principal." SELL, supra note 159, at 119-20; see also
REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 445, § 68, at 127-28 (describing circumstances
under which an agent may serve two masters). Section 7's protection for collective activity for mutual aid or protection echoes this common law rule. See Willmar Elec. Serv.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that just as common law
allowed servant to serve two masters when service to one does not involve abandonment
of service to the other, union-organizer job applicant may not be excluded under NLRA
on grounds he intends to retain his title and responsibilities), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1252
(1993). But cf. H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
full-time, paid union organizer is not applicant for bona fide "employee" position when,
inter alia, he would be subject to union's directive while simultaneously working for
employer, and in elections his vote would essentially be paid for by his union salary). But
see id. at 73 (court's holding does not turn on notion that employees owe employer "some
type of transcendent loyalty").
Moreover, there was an exception to the common law duty when the employer retained
employees with knowledge of their adverse interests. SELL, supra note 159, at 120-22.
Since the passage of the Act, whenever an employer hires an employee, she must be said
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common law duty was breached only if the servant took actions "unfairly"
adverse to the employer's interests, with fairness turning on the particular7
relationship between master and servant in light of community standards."
It would be anomalous to measure today's fairness against yesterday's standards for workplace relationships, because in section 7 Congress specifically
set new standards for governing that relationship. Today's standards
include the Act's curtailment of many "management rights" that hampered8
collective employee activity, such as the "right" to manage plant property,"
hire or fire employees, 449 close the business,' make changes in business
operations, 451 and keep employment information confidential.' 2 In contrast,
with regard to contemporary standards of expression, section 8(c) is solicito have constructive notice that the latter will have a statutory right to act collectively to
advance his own interests in wages, hours, and working conditions, to management's
financial detriment.
Many of the common law duty principles are not important to § 7 disloyalty analysis.
Many cases involved breach of fiduciary duties, but those who have fiduciary duties (corporate managers, officers, etc.) typically are excluded today from the bargaining unit.
The common law cases primarily involved the failure to follow company policies or to
perform job duties, which are removed from § 7 under other exceptions. See supra part
III.A.2. Common law obligations not to engage in dealings detrimental to the employer
are not typically involved in § 7 conduct, and, when relevant, are generally exempted
from § 7 by exceptions such as illegality (as in diversion of corporate assets) or unlawful
contract breach (as in violating a non-competition agreement).
4"' SELL, supra note 159, at 120-22.
448 Section 7 makes it unlawful to ban certain discussion of union matters or distribution of union literature. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 570 (1978);
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803-04 & n.10 (1945); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1973). It may also be unlawful to
take steps to discern employees' feelings about management or if they are predisposed
towards unionizing. See NLRB v. Aero Corp., 581 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978).
449 NLRA, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988) (forbidding discrimination to
encourage or discourage union membership).
4o Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1965) (holding certain plant closures unlawful); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203, 209 (1964) (holding certain subcontracting unlawful); Dubuque Packing Co., 303
N.L.R.B. No. 66, 137 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1185 (June 14, 1991) (holding certain work relocation unlawful).
451 NLRA, § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988); NLRA, § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(3) (1988); NLRA, § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). The duty to bargain
restricts making changes in matters related to wages, hours, or working conditions that
are mandatory subjects of bargaining without first giving the union an opportunity to
bargain. When a labor agreement is in effect, the duty to bargain restricts making
changes in mandatory terms embodied in the agreement, absent consent of the union.
452 The duty to bargain requires, upon request, disclosure of certain information relevant and necessary to bargain, negotiate, and enforce contracts effectively. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351
U.S. 149, 153 (1956).
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tous of strong and emotional speech, no matter how critical, short of actual
promises and threats.45 As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has recognized, through the years there have been "changing
norms regarding what constitutes loyal worker behavior."' 4" The evolution
of Board decisions, especially since the early 1980s, reflects a policy of4providing for more robust debate in labor/management matters, not less. W
Common law agency obligations only required the agent to act for the
benefit of the principal in matters within the scope of the agency relationship. 4" Employers do not hire employees to carry out collective activity,457
and, more importantly, the labor laws have expressly placed collective activity outside the scope of the master/servant relationship.4 ' If the common
law duty has ever applied, then in the context of lawful collective activity for
mutual aid or protection that adversely affects employers,459 ithas been
modified by the passage of the Act, which expressly protects such activity.
The common law also imposed obligations on employers, and these have
been eroded as well. 4w
453 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1988) ("The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or
the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice ... if such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.").
41 Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989).
41 See National Micronetics, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 993, 994 (1985) (overruling precedent concerning dissemination of partial Board decisions); Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
263 N.L.R.B. 127, 131-33 (1982) (overruling precedent concerning campaign propaganda
and misstatements).
456 SELL, supra note 159, at 119-20.
457 See id. at 14-15, 119-20.
458 This fact is evidenced by such clauses as the ban against company unions, NLRA,
§ 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988), and against employer contributions to employee
representatives, Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 186
(1988); see also NLRA, § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (1988) (exempting employees from
applying laws related to collective bargaining to bargaining units that include supervisors); cases cited supra note 448.
459 See supra notes 448-52 and accompanying text.
410 Under the common law of agency, the master had obligations to the servant such
as duties to provide tools, inspect tools for visible defects, maintain the premises, exercise
a "high degree of care" to maintain a safe environment, and a duty of noninterference
with the employee's right to work, which have been modified. See REUSCHLEIN &
GREGORY, supra note 445, § 55. The common law duty to furnish a safe work place has
been circumscribed by the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, §§ 2-33,
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990), which imposes a general duty to furnish a
safe workplace but sets federal standards, limits remedies, imposes caps on recovery, sets
statutes of limitations, and imposes monitoring and reporting requirements. The cause of
action that principals used to have against third parties for harm to the servant has nearly
disappeared. REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 445, § 56 ("[A]n ancient cause of
action [that] has outlived its usefulness in modern society."). Today, the principal does
not breach his duties by failing to furnish tools for the job. At common law the employer
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Practicaland Legal Impacts of Abandoning the Disloyalty Test

1. The Exception Is Not Needed and Its Abandonment Will Not
Have Adverse Repercussions
As was shown above," 1 many of the disloyalty cases could have been
decided based on other established exceptions to section 7, such as insubordination, interruption of production, illegality, and disclosure of confidences.
These exceptions have the advantage of being more clearly defined and more
objectively ascertainable. The Board may apply other exceptions as well.
Presumably, it also may use the early "totality of the circumstances" test for
loss of protection,' provided that it clearly states what circumstances
should be considered.' Thus, abandoning the unworkable and unnecessary
disloyalty test will not have adverse ramifications. On the contrary, its abandonment will increase protection for some individuals engaging in collective
activity whose conduct does not fall within another exception.' This result
is consistent with the Act.4
2. The Board and Courts Are Free to Abandon the Test
The Board has the power to reject the Jefferson Standard disloyalty test,
and such a rejection would not amount to an impermissible attempt to
"overrule" a higher Court. I am not suggesting that the Board overturn the
had an obligation not to interfere intentionally and unjustifiably with the servant's right
to work, id. § 55; SELL, supra note 159, at 141-42, but this notion could not be used as a
rationale for denying employers the right to lockout employees, a tactic allowed under
the Act even when the employer does so "unjustifiably." See also supra note 403.
The point is not that common law agency obligations are useless or irrelevant. When
the common law doctrine still squares with societal notions of the workplace relationship,
such as prohibitions against absconding with profits or revealing confidences, it is useful.
See, e.g., NLRA, § 2(13), 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1988) (concerning when one individual
will be deemed agent of another).
"I See supra part III.A.2.
462 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
I Some might contend that a "totality of the circumstances" test will simply reclothe
the former disloyalty analysis, with no impact on the cases' outcomes. Although any test
has the potential for misuse, the Board is restrained to some extent in that it must always
articulate an outcome that is consistent with the Act. The administrative law requirement that agencies specify which "means" or which "circumstances" serve as a basis for
the Board's conclusion should serve as a check on potential misuse and enable meaningful judicial review.
I For example, calling a supervisor "Castro" in the context of an argument about
treatment of employees and the benefits of unions might not interrupt production or rise
to the level of insubordination, particularly in the 1990s. Cf Boaz Spinning Co. v.
NLRB, 395 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1968); see also discussion supra notes 228-32 and
accompanying text. Each situation still will need to be examined on the facts to discern
whether it is collective and for a § 7 purpose, and whether it loses its protection under
one of the legitimate exceptions.
'65 See discussion supra notes 207-19 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 73 B.U. L. Rev. 383 1993

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:291

Court: the Board and the Court in Jefferson Standard were in agreement; i.e.
the employer did not commit an unfair labor practice by discharging the
technicians, because section 7 did not protect their conduct. The Jefferson
Standard Court did not hold that all employees must thereafter pass a loyalty litmus test, separate and distinct from product disparagement considerations when exercising section 7 rights; nor did it hold that the Act only
provides protection for employees who could successfully pass such a loyalty
screening. The Board is free to abandon the disloyalty rhetoric without disturbing the holdings of the Board and Court in Jefferson Standard. I advocate rejecting the disloyalty rhetoric, which merely embellished the holding
that the product disparagement lost protection, and rejecting the reasoning
in some subsequent decisions that have treated disloyalty as if it were an
exception to section 7, distinct from product disparagement or other
exceptions.
Moreover, the Jefferson Standard Court did not declare that a disloyalty
test is the only reasonable interpretation of the Act, one that can never be
abandoned. 4 The Court merely agreed with the NLRB's ruling and added
a new discussion of disloyalty as a supporting rationale for the ruling that
11 The Court's disloyalty language in Jefferson Standard is, thus, distinguished from
instances when the Court has made a prior, express statutory interpretation and has held
it to be the "only" reasonable construction of legislation, such as in Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 847- 48 (1992). In Lechmere, the Court rejected a Board interpretation on the grounds that it was inconsistent with a prior, express judicial determination
of the statute's clear meaning. Id. at 849; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (establishing deference to agency
policy making unless contrary to "only" reasonable interpretation of controlling legislation); see also Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990) (ruling that
prior ICC interpretation of "filed rate doctrine" was the only reasonable statutory construction, based on the clear, fixed statutory terms).
The posture of Jefferson Standard is distinguishable from that in Lechmere on four
grounds. First, Lechmere involved a distinction found in the language of the statute.
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 845. Disloyalty involves statutory silence. The matters of inferring a loyalty requirement from § 7 and the scope of any such unwritten exceptions are
Chevron Step two issues to which judicial deference is required, not Chevron Step one
issues. Second, the interpretation invalidated in Lechmere contravened a prior Supreme
Court interpretation. Id. at 847-49. Disloyalty was not a distinct § 7 exception and was
judicial dictum. Third, the Board interpretation the Court rejected in Lechmere was one
the Court said it already had rejected in an earlier case. Id. at 848-49. Jefferson Standard did not reject an agency interpretation; it upheld one. Fourth, the Court's role in
Lechmere was distinct from its role in Jefferson Standard, and this distinction makes a
difference in administrative law. See Wallace Rudolph, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretation: When Is it Proper?, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 291 (1988) (explaining that the
court's role in the particular context determines whether it should apply the "doctrine of
deference" or the "doctrine of interpretation"). Specifically, Lechmere involved the adjudication of private property rights, matters traditionally within the expertise of courts of
general jurisdiction. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 845. Jefferson Standard involved unfair
labor practices, the Act's nuances, and labor policy, all within the Agency's expertise.
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the disparagement was unprotected. This rationale does not amount to a
pronouncement by the Court that the Act mandates the application of a
disloyalty test in product disparagement cases or any other cases. Even if
the decision were interpreted as supplying disloyalty as an additional, distinct basis for which activities could lose protection, the Court did not say
that a different opinion about disloyalty as a distinct exception would not be
a rational construction of the Act. 7 Thus, the disloyalty language is not
perpetually binding.'
Next, rejection of the disloyalty test would not violate principles of stare
decisis. 469 The stare decisis doctrine provides that when established precedent has proved workable and sound, generally it should be followed in the
interest of predictability and judicial economy, absent compelling reasons.
The doctrine is not applicable, however, when a rule is incorrect, works an
70
injustice, or does not promote predictability, stability, and uniformity.
The disloyalty test has proved to be, on the practical level, unworkable,
unwieldy, and unpredictable. As a legal doctrine, it has been unsound, conflicting with both common sense and the Act's underlying policies. As the
I Even if the Jefferson Standard Court had ruled that the Board's holding (that the
product disparagement was unprotected and the employer not in violation of the law)
were the "only" rational interpretation of the Act, this still would not have amounted to
a judicial declaration that there exists a disloyalty exception, distinct from disparagement, much less that the Act mandates one. This Article shows that such a distinct
exception is not even a "reasonable" interpretation of the Act. Cf. Prill v. NLRB, 835
F.2d 1481, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding a Board interpretation as a "reasonable"
construction of the Act, while emphasizing that it was "by no means" the only reasonable
interpretation), cert. denied sub nom. Meyers Indus. v. NLRB, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).
That a disloyalty test is not the "only" reasonable construction is also evidenced by the
number of Board members and judges who have questioned the test or rejected it completely, the latter category including the three dissenting Justices and dissenting Member
Murdock in Jefferson Standard itself, and a unanimous United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. See supra notes 52-53, 441 and accompanying text.
I The Court also gave a rationale based on its reading of § 10(c). See discussion
supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (criticizing the Court's injection of a § 10(c)
discussion into the analysis). Although the Court said that the disloyalty provided
"cause" in its § 10(c) analysis, it is clear that it was actually the disparagement of the
product quality in this particular manner, and not the employees' "disloyalty," that provided the § 10(c) "cause." See also discussion supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text
(explaining that the Court found that the "means" used by the employees were sufficiently "disloyal" to constitute "cause" for discharge).
469 BLACK, supra note 88, at 616-18 (judicial construction of a statute should be followed as precedent unless to do so would work an injustice).
470 Id.; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992) (explaining that
the application of stare decisis turns on "prudential and pragmatic" considerations of the
rule's workability, the parties' expectations or reliance on the rule, and whether the rule is
obsolete or its premises have changed); see also BLACK, supra note 88, at 619 (statfng
that judicial construction of a statute should be followed as precedent unless to do so
would work an injustice).
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agency entrusted with the task of interpreting and applying the policies of
labor law to the statute,47 ' the Board has the authority to abandon the test.
It has the obligation to do so because the test conflicts with the statute. For
the same reasons, if the courts have occasion to revisit the issue, they
should
472
reject the disloyalty test sua sponte, just as the Court created it.
In fact, there have been steps towards abandoning the disloyalty exception. As early as three years after Jefferson Standard, some Board members
questioned the usefulness of the new test, saying with skepticism, "the
degree of 'detrimental disloyalty' . . . here, if it is susceptibleof measurement
at all, is certainly no greater than that involved in the product boycott situations which have been held protected by Section 7.'' 473 Since then, some
decision makers have moved away from the "disloyalty" test for many of the
reasons discussed in this Article.474 In 1989, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed clear reservations about the exception: "The logic of the 'disloyalty' test has been criticized, and its reach
remains unclear. 4 71 Yet, as of this writing the Board has not made explicit
471 The Court has explicitly recognized that it is the Board's responsibility to "adapt
the Act to changing patterns of industrial life," NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S.
251, 266 (1975), and to define the parameters of § 7 exceptions in particular, see, e.g.,
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567-68 (1978) (upholding a Board finding based on
its construction of the "mutual aid or protection" clause § 7); Sierra Publishing Co. v.
NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 215 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding a Board finding, and reasoning that
the Board has the task of delineating the boundaries of § 7).
472 Presumably, the courts of appeals may continue to clarify and refine the ambiguous
disloyalty and disparagement terms, or even to avoid using the disloyalty rubric entirely;
but given the Chevron mandate of deference, the appellate courts are probably the least
suited to overhaul this problematic area. Congress may, of course, revisit the question.
Until then, in keeping with the spirit of conferring discretionary policy to the agency with
day-to-day expertise in the subject, the Board is in the best position to correct the
problem.
473 Patterson-Sargent Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1627, 1634 (1956) (Murdock & Peterson,
Members, dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
474 See, e.g., Sierra Publishing Co., 889 F.2d at 216 (questioning disloyalty's basis and
parameters); GHR Energy Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. 1011, 1012 (1989) (finding a disloyalty
policy to unacceptably infringe on § 7 rights); Sierra Publishing Co., 291 N.L.R.B. 540,
550 (1988) (A.L.J decision) (rejecting the argument that appeals to third parties are unacceptably disloyal), enforced, 889 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989). Even in recent decisions purporting to endorse the. disloyalty rubric, the courts actually contemplated other
exceptions implicitly, such as failure to carry out one's job. See Willmar Elec. Serv., 968
F.2d 1327, 1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that an employee is not disloyal to the
company for also having an employment relation to a union, as long as service to the
latter does not involve abandonment of the former), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1252 (1993);
H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that although
employee may not simultaneously work under the direction of two employers during the
same hours, an employee does not owe the employer "some type of transcendent loyalty"
(emphasis added)).
475 Sierra Publishing Co., 889 F.2d at 216 (footnotes omitted).
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what those criticisms suggest and what the Board's GHR Energy decision47
implied: that the disloyalty test is too vague to be understood by employees,
employers, and decision writers, and that it stifles or appears to outlaw much
activity that the Act was meant to protect.
CONCLUSION

As one who takes seriously the commitments individuals make to their
families, communities, institutions, and faiths, I am not advocating disloyalty-by employees or anyone else-in any setting. And as one who is committed to peaceful resolution of disputes, whether in the workplace or in the
community at large,47 7 I applaud and support today's efforts of labor and
management to collaborate in a spirit of cooperation for the good of their
common enterprise. In saying that the Act is not premised on loyalty, I am
not proposing that employees be given carte blanche to disrupt the workplace, refuse to do their jobs, and engage in unchecked actions damaging
employers. There are numerous other constraints on such undesirable and
unlawful activity, both written into the law itself and found in the more
objective exceptions the Board and courts have read into section 7. The
issue is no more about my individual opinions concerning loyalty than it is
about the personal, individual feelings of Board members or judges, who
have been given no standards on which to apply the exception other than
their own equally subjective personal philosophies, emotions, and ethics.
Should Congress wish to mandate a Model Uniform Termination Act,
should Congress wish to turn section 7 into a wrongful discharge statute, or
should it wish in some other fashion to rewrite our national labor policies to
require levels of mutual cooperation and care, then in that context we can
consider the extent to which employees and employers must operate within
loyal and altruistic constraints. It may well be time to do so, but that is not
the model of our current national labor policy.
Congress has given employees and employers the tools of economic warfare to further their respective self interests, not to further the interests of the
other. None of the most drastic of these tools-including lockouts, strikes,
and consumer boycotts-are desirable in and of themselves.4 78 However,
Congress believed them necessary to promote individual and collective liberties under the structure of our delicately balanced national labor policies.
One of the vital tools that the Act presupposes is an allowance for robust
476 GHR Energy Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1989); see supra notes 380-86 and accom-

panying text.
"I I am a community mediator through the Dispute Resolution Centers of King
County and Thurston County, Washington.
478 No one "likes" the use of such economic weapons; the disagreement is not over

whether their use is a positive event, but over whether, and the conditions under which,
they must be allowed to occur. In the case of these tactics, the Act has answered the
question by allowing their use.
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debate in light of the First Amendment and an ability of employers and
employees to use rhetoric and propaganda to further their own interests.
The disloyalty test is vague, ambiguous, confusing, and impossible to
apply consistently. It leaves employers and employees with no guidance on
whether a desired collective activity is protected or an intended discharge is
lawful. It leaves a pulp mill worker in Alaska and a meat packer in Texas
without guidance on whether they can fly across the country to testify before
Congress or drive down the street to attend the local labor parade.4 79
Today, the preferred form of publicizing employee causes often is not the
implicit message in a physical picket line, but the express verbal persuasion
of a corporate campaign. This is especially true now that the Supreme Court
has held it lawful to persuade consumers to boycott "neutral" employers
who are indirectly tied to another employer involved in a dispute."s Ironically, if the disloyalty test remains viable, the more egregious the employer's
alleged misdeeds, and the more impassioned and creative the appeal, the less
likely the employees' collective activity is to be accorded the protection section 7 says it provides. Those aspects of today's rhetoric-emotional appeal,
negative conduct, and unanticipated tactics-are in substantial and unpredictable jeopardy under a loyalty litmus test. Even if the era of the corporate
campaign were not here, it is time to set standards for Jefferson Standard.
The disloyalty test provides none, and it should be abandoned.

479 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
40 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council

(DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 578-88 (1988).
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